# DER Market Integration Consultative Forum



25 August 2022





We acknowledge the Traditional Owners of country throughout Australia and recognise their continuing connection to land, waters and culture.

We pay respect to their Elders past, present and emerging.



## **AEMO Competition Law Meeting Protocol**

AEMO is committed to complying with all applicable laws, including the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (CCA). In any dealings with AEMO regarding proposed reforms or other initiatives, all participants agree to adhere to the CCA at all times and to comply with this Protocol. Participants must arrange for their representatives to be briefed on competition law risks and obligations.

Participants in AEMO discussions must:

- Ensure that discussions are limited to the matters contemplated by the agenda for the discussion
- Make independent and unilateral decisions about their commercial positions and approach in relation to the matters under discussion with AEMO
- Immediately and clearly raise an objection with AEMO or the Chair of the meeting if a matter is discussed that the participant is concerned may give rise to competition law risks or a breach of this Protocol

Participants in AEMO meetings must not discuss or agree on the following topics:

- · Which customers they will supply or market to
- The price or other terms at which Participants will supply
- Bids or tenders, including the nature of a bid that a Participant intends to make or whether the Participant will participate in the bid
- Which suppliers Participants will acquire from (or the price or other terms on which they acquire goods or services)
- · Refusing to supply a person or company access to any products, services or inputs they require

Under no circumstances must Participants share Competitively Sensitive Information. Competitively Sensitive Information means confidential information relating to a Participant which if disclosed to a competitor could affect its current or future commercial strategies, such as pricing information, customer terms and conditions, supply terms and conditions, sales, marketing or procurement strategies, product development, margins, costs, capacity or production planning.

## Today's meeting



Time	Item	Speaker
11:00 – 11:05	Welcome and introductions	Emily Pang (AEMO)
11:05 - 11:30	Project EDGE Trial Update & Market Suspension Tests Results	Nick Regan (AEMO)
11:30 – 12:15	DOE Objective Functions	Dr James Naughton, Prof. Pierluigi Mancarella (The University of Melbourne)
12:15 – 12:25	Q&A	All
12:25 – 12:30	Future Meetings & Close	Emily Pang (AEMO)

## **Project EDGE Trial Update**

Nick Regan (AEMO)



## **Project EDGE update**

## **Current position**

- Finalising stakeholder feedback into final CBA methodology
- Two new aggregators being onboarded for participation from September
- Ongoing customer acquisition (including additional) C&I customers
- Providing update on DOE Objective Functions study

### **Key upcoming activities**

- Publication of CBA Methodology Consultation Paper
- Further consultation on data exchange problem statements and use cases
- Wider sharing of results from Market Suspension tests
- Ongoing results analysis and input into reform



## Market Suspension Preliminary Results

Nick Regan (AEMO)



### **EDGE Market Suspension field tests**

To operate the system AEMO needs: 1. Visibility: Telemetry in real time

2. **Predictability**: Generator forecasts **3. Controllability**: Dispatch instructions

4. **Measurement**: Telemetry (settlement)



#### The AEMO, AusNet and Mondo team reacted quickly to establish a test plan to learn from this rare event


#### Why specific Market Suspension tests?

#### <u>What</u> did we do?

In Market Suspension AEMO was directing large scale generators. What should this look like in a high DER future (via VPPs)?		Test	Summary
		Test 1 Self-Dispatch (no AEMO direction)	<ul> <li>In lieu of capability to dispatch VPPs at scale ('Controllability') i.e current state, AEMO needs visibility (telemetry) and predictability (forecasts via boffers) to consider when directing large scale resources</li> <li>Q: What do VPPs do without AEMO direction?</li> </ul>
		Test 2 AEMO -> DUID direction via Dispatch Instructions	<ul> <li>Under market suspension AEMO instructs generators/loads test is for future where controllability exists for VPPs (i.e test will provide setpoints for aggregators to follow).</li> <li>How reliably can VPPs follow AEMO directions that differ from market incentivised behaviour?</li> </ul>
<u>Hypothesis 1:</u> AEMO Dispatch Instructions that give a 'target' are more reliable than DOEs which give 'permissible limits'.	<u>Hypothesis 2:</u> These two signals together will conflict at times and this needs to be understood to be managed in future operations.	Test 3 AEMO -> DNSP -> DUID direction via DOEs	<ul> <li>Currently AEMO instructs NSPs to maintain a profile within their network, NSPs currently do this by shedding load or generation.</li> <li>Are DOEs a better mechanism than directing VPPs under a non-market use case (e.g market suspension) ?</li> </ul>
		Test 4 Synchronous AEMO directions to DNSP and Aggregator (Test 2+3)	<ul> <li>Testing synchronous instructions from AEMO to DNSP and Aggregator to see if this helps reduce potential conflicts. Test 2 &amp; Test 3 together.</li> <li>Is it worth building capability to do both mechanisms for redundancy?</li> </ul>

#### Findings to be shared in coming weeks and relate to some gaps as highlighted in the Engineering Frameworks Paper<sup>1</sup>


1 At https://aemo.com.au/-/media/files/initiatives/engineering-framework/2021/nem-engineering-framework-march-2021-report.pdf?la=en&hash=3B1283D31B542115CC56E0ECCDFB3D69



#### Test 1 Q: What do VPPs do without AEMO direction?

#### Self-Dispatch (no AEMO direction)

In lieu of capability to dispatch VPPs at scale ('Controllability') i.e current state, AEMO needs visibility (telemetry) and predictability (forecasts via boffers) to consider when directing large scale resources




Supply curve



### Test 2 – Actual Net Active Power from Portfolio







#### Test 2 Q: How reliably can VPPs follow AEMO directions that differ from market incentivised behaviour?

#### AEMO -> DUID direction via Dispatch Instructions

Under market suspension AEMO instructs generators/loads test is for future where controllability exists for VPPs (i.e test will provide setpoints for aggregators to follow).








### **Test 3 – Actual Net Active Power from Portfolio**






**Test 3 Q:** Are DOEs a better mechanism than directing VPPs under a non-market use case (e.g market suspension) ?


#### AEMO -> DNSP -> DUID direction via DOEs

Currently AEMO instructs NSPs to maintain a profile within their network, NSPs currently do this by shedding load or generation.




-50 -25 0 25 50 75 1 Capacity offered (kW)

**EDGE** 



# EDGE




### **Test 4 – Actual Net Active Power from Portfolio**




#### Test 4 Q: Is it worth building capability to do both mechanisms for redundancy?

#### Synchronous AEMO directions to DNSP and Aggregator (Test 2+3)

Testing synchronous instructions from AEMO to DNSP and Aggregator to see if this helps reduce potential conflicts. Test 2 & Test 3 together.







### **EDGE Market Suspension field tests**

To operate the system AEMO needs: 1. Visibility: Telemetry in real time 2. Predictability: Generator forecasts 3. Controllability: Dispatch instructions

4. Measurement: Telemetry (settlement)



#### The AEMO, AusNet and Mondo team reacted quickly to establish a test plan to learn from this rare event

Why specific Market Suspension tests?

In Market Suspension AEMO was directing large scale generators. What should this look like in a high DER future (via VPPs)?

<u>Hypothesis 1:</u> AEMO Dispatch Instructions that give a 'target' are more reliable than DOEs which give 'permissible limits'. <u>Hypothesis 2:</u> These two signals together will conflict at times and this needs to be understood to be managed in future operations.

#### Key take aways

- 1) Aggs can hit intervention targets when directed
- 2) DNSP can calc DOEs to achieve a set point under certain conditions
- 3) DOEs take priority to keep network within operating limits
- 4) In designing directions to VPPs in future, AEMO needs to consider DOEs so that aggregators do not receive unachievable targets (test 4).
- 5) Visibility of DOEs in Project EDGE was provided by the Data Exchange Hub allowing multiple subscribers to include AEMO and Aggregators.
- 6) Target assessment was only achieved with telemetry of aggregated DER generation and load response ('flex') as opposed to only the site meter (Net NMI)

Findings to be shared in coming weeks and relate to some gaps as highlighted in the Engineering Frameworks Paper<sup>1</sup>

1 At https://aemo.com.au/-/media/files/initiatives/engineering-framework/2021/nem-engineering-framework-march-2021-report.pdf?la=en&hash=3B1283D31B542115CC56E0ECCDFB3D69



# Any other business





# Next meeting: 22 September 2022

Future Meetings & Close

## **Project EDGE Publications**



Publications	Publication Date
Project EDGE CBA Methodology Consultation Paper	July 2022
Project EDGE Public Interim Report	June 2022
Project EDGE Customer Insights Study	June 2022
Project EDGE Research Plan	March 2022
Project EDGE MVP Showcase	December 2021
Project EDGE Lessons Learned Report #1	May 2021
Project EDGE Public Webinar #1	March 2021
Project EDGE Factsheet	January 2021

For further news and knowledge sharing publications, please visit the **Project EDGE website** 

For any questions, comments or feedback please contact: EDGE@aemo.com.au



## For more information visit aemo.com.au