


Project EDGE

Demonstrations Insights Forum | 16 August 2022



Agenda



Item	Lead	Timing
Welcome, Acknowledgement of Country	Ryan Batchelor (Nous)	5 min
Quick project status update	Nick Regan (AEMO)	5 min
Results from market suspension tests	Nick Regan (AEMO)	20 min
Objective function	James Naughton (UoM)	45 min
Close and next steps	Ryan Batchelor (Nous)	5 min

A photograph of a dense forest of tall, thin trees with green foliage under a blue sky. The trees are the central focus, with their trunks and branches creating a complex pattern against the sky. The lighting is bright, suggesting a sunny day. The overall scene is a natural, outdoor setting.

Acknowledgment of Country

We acknowledge the Traditional Owners of country throughout Australia and recognise their continuing connection to land, waters and culture.

We pay our respects to their Elders past, present and emerging.

Project EDGE update

Current position

- Finalising stakeholder feedback into final CBA methodology
- Two new aggregators being onboarded for participation from September
- Ongoing customer acquisition (including additional) C&I customers
- Providing update on DOE Objective Functions study

Key upcoming activities

- Publication of the final CBA Methodology
- Further consultation on data exchange problem statements and use cases
- Wider sharing of results from Market Suspension tests
- Ongoing results analysis and input into reform

Results from market suspension tests

EDGE Market Suspension field tests

To operate the system AEMO needs:

1. **Visibility:** Telemetry in real time
2. **Predictability:** Generator forecasts
3. **Controllability:** Dispatch instructions
4. **Measurement:** Telemetry (settlement)



The AEMO, AusNet and Mondo team reacted quickly to establish a test plan to learn from this rare event

Why specific Market Suspension tests?

In Market Suspension AEMO was directing large scale generators.
What should this look like in a high DER future (via VPPs)?

Hypothesis 1:
 AEMO Dispatch Instructions that give a ‘target’ are more reliable than DOEs which give ‘permissible limits’.

Hypothesis 2:
 These two signals together will conflict at times and this needs to be understood to be managed in future operations.


What did we do?

Test	Summary
Test 1 Self-Dispatch (no AEMO direction)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> In lieu of capability to dispatch VPPs at scale (‘Controllability’) i.e current state, AEMO needs visibility (telemetry) and predictability (forecasts via boffers) to consider when directing large scale resources Q: What do VPPs do without AEMO direction?
Test 2 AEMO -> DUID direction via Dispatch Instructions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Under market suspension AEMO instructs generators/loads test is for future where controllability exists for VPPs (i.e test will provide setpoints for aggregators to follow). How reliably can VPPs follow AEMO directions that differ from market incentivised behaviour?
Test 3 AEMO -> DNSP -> DUID direction via DOEs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Currently AEMO instructs NSPs to maintain a profile within their network, NSPs currently do this by shedding load or generation. Are DOEs a better mechanism than directing VPPs under a non-market use case (e.g market suspension) ?
Test 4 Synchronous AEMO directions to DNSP and Aggregator (Test 2+3)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Testing synchronous instructions from AEMO to DNSP and Aggregator to see if this helps reduce potential conflicts. Test 2 & Test 3 together. Is it worth building capability to do both mechanisms for redundancy?

Findings to be shared in coming weeks and relate to some gaps as highlighted in [the Engineering Frameworks Paper¹](#)

¹ At <https://aemo.com.au/-/media/files/initiatives/engineering-framework/2021/nem-engineering-framework-march-2021-report.pdf?la=en&hash=3B1283D31B542115CC56E0ECCDFB3D69>

Test 1 – Actual Net Active Power from Portfolio







Test 1


Q: What do VPPs do without AEMO direction?

Self-Dispatch (no AEMO direction)

In lieu of capability to dispatch VPPs at scale ('Controllability') i.e current state, AEMO needs visibility (telemetry) and predictability (forecasts via boffers) to consider when directing large scale resources



Test 2 – Actual Net Active Power from Portfolio





Test 2


Q: How reliably can VPPs follow AEMO directions that differ from market incentivised behaviour?

AEMO -> DUID direction via Dispatch Instructions

Under market suspension AEMO instructs generators/loads test is for future where controllability exists for VPPs (i.e test will provide setpoints for aggregators to follow).



Supply curve Test 2 Test 1



Finding Question:
How should boffers which
have been directed by AEMO
be formed.

Trial simulated a directions
for 57kW of flexible export
from 14:00-14:30.


Energy Fixed Loading a better
Boffer?

Trial simulated a directions for 57kW of flexible export from 14:00-14:30.




Flexible Target achieved

Test 2: AEMO - DUID direction via Dispatch Instruction (22 June 2022)



Difference between Flex and Net equals the amount of non-controlled load

Test 3 – Actual Net Active Power from Portfolio




Test 3


Q: Are DOEs a better mechanism than directing VPPs under a non-market use case (e.g market suspension) ?

AEMO → DNSP → DUID direction via DOEs

Currently AEMO instructs NSPs to maintain a profile within their network, NSPs currently do this by shedding load or generation.



Hypothesis 1:
AEMO Dispatch Instructions that give a 'target' are more reliable than DOEs which give 'permissible limits'.




Test 3 – Actual Telemetry Active Power from Portfolio

Test 3: AEMO – DNSP – DUID – direction via DOEs (23 June 2022)

Test 3 demonstrated that DOEs can be set calculated to limit aggregation export and this was tested alongside directions to aggregator (Test 4)

This would require either control load to decrease or generation to increase


DOEs
9.5 kW
(aggregated)



To create a dispatch of 9.5 kW minimum then Lower Bound of the DOEs would be required to be lifted to 9.5kW

- Controlled generation (Source: Mondo)
- Controlled load (Source: Mondo)
- Active power (Source: Mondo)
- Real power (Source: AusNet)
- Uncontrolled load (Source: Calculated)
- DOE: Export limit (Source: System)

Test 4 – Actual Net Active Power from Portfolio




Test 4

Q: Is it worth building capability to do both mechanisms for redundancy?


Synchronous AEMO directions to DNSP and Aggregator (Test 2+3)

Testing synchronous instructions from AEMO to DNSP and Aggregator to see if this helps reduce potential conflicts. Test 2 & Test 3 together.



Hypothesis 2:
These two signals together will conflict at times and this needs to be understood to be managed in future operations.


- Prices between band1 (-999) and band2 (-998)
- Prices between band2 (-998) and band3 (-997)
- Prices between band3 (-997) and band4 (-100)
- Prices between band4 (-100) and band5 (228)
- Prices between band5 (228) and band6 (229)
- Prices between band6 (229) and band7 (600)
- Prices between band7 (600) and band8 (1497)
- Prices between band8 (1497) and band9 (1498)
- Prices between band9 (1498) and band10 (14999)
- Prices between band10 (14999) and band11 (-999)
- Prices between band11 (-999) and band12 (-998)
- Prices between band12 (-998) and band13 (-997)
- Prices between band13 (-997) and band14 (-99.99)
- Prices between band14 (-99.99) and band15 (228)
- Prices between band15 (228) and band16 (229)
- Prices between band16 (229) and band17 (600.01)
- Prices between band17 (600.01) and band18 (1497)
- Prices between band18 (1497) and band19 (1498)
- Prices between band19 (1498) and band20 (14999)
- Real power A(kW) (Source: AusNet)
- DOE - export limit (positive) and import limit (negative) (Source: System)



Unable to achieve 57kW of flex

Trial simulated directions for 57kW of flexible export from 14:00-14:30.

Test 4: Synchronous AEMO directions to DNSP and Aggregator (24 June 2022)



EDGE Market Suspension field tests

To operate the system AEMO needs:

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2. **Predictability:** Generator forecasts
3. **Controllability:** Dispatch instructions
4. **Measurement:** Telemetry (settlement)



The AEMO, AusNet and Mondo team reacted quickly to establish a test plan to learn from this rare event

Why specific Market Suspension tests?

In Market Suspension AEMO was directing large scale generators.
What should this look like in a high DER future (via VPPs)?

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Hypothesis 2:

These two signals together will conflict at times and this needs to be understood to be managed in future operations.

Key take aways

- 1) Aggs can hit intervention targets when directed
- 2) DNSP can calc DOEs to achieve a set point under certain conditions
- 3) DOEs take priority to keep network within operating limits
- 4) In designing directions to VPPs in future, AEMO needs to consider DOEs so that aggregators do not receive unachievable targets (test 4).
- 5) Visibility of DOEs in Project EDGE was provided by the Data Exchange Hub allowing multiple subscribers to include AEMO and Aggregators.
- 6) Target assessment was only achieved with telemetry of aggregated DER generation and load response ('flex') as opposed to only the site meter (Net NMI)

Findings to be shared in coming weeks and relate to some gaps as highlighted in [the Engineering Frameworks Paper](#)¹




¹ At <https://aemo.com.au/-/media/files/initialives/engineering-framework/2021/nem-engineering-framework-march-2021-report.pdf?la=en&hash=3B1283D31B542115CC56E0ECCDFB3D69>

Project EDGE | DOE Objective Functions

Demonstrations Insight Forum | 16 August 2022

Dr James Naughton, Prof. Pierluigi Mancarella
james.naughton@unimelb.edu.au ; pierluigi.mancarella@unimelb.edu.au

- Context
- Operating Envelope Objectives
- Assessment Metrics
- Simple Toy Network
- More Detailed Case Study
- Key Takeaways



- How should capacity be allocated?
- Should the allocation methodology be "fair"?
- How does this align with the NEO?
- **Aim: Assess a broad spectrum of possible Operating Envelope objectives across technical, economic, and fairness metrics**

$$\max P^{ex}$$

A. Maximise Service

- No consideration of fairness
- Solely optimal power flow

$$\max \sum \alpha_k P_k$$

B. Weighted Allocation

- Each DER has a weighting coefficient assigned by the DSO.
- E.g., prioritise renewable DER:
 - PV have $\alpha_k = 2$
 - Other DER have $\alpha_k = 1$
- Or some DER may pay for "priority access"

$$\max P^{ex}$$

C. Proportional Allocation

- Each DER is allocated $X\%$ of its rated capacity, where X is constant across all participating DER.
- The value of X is determined by OE optimisation.

$$P_k = X \widehat{P}_k^\tau$$

$$\max P^{ex}$$

D. Proportional Unallocated DER Capacity

- Each DER has $X\%$ of its rated capacity left **unallocated**.
- The value of X is determined by OE optimisation.

$$P_k = (1 - X) \widehat{P}_k^\tau$$

$$\max P^{ex}$$

E. Equal Unallocated DER Capacity

- Each DER has Y kW of its rated capacity left **unallocated**.
- The value of Y is determined by OE optimisation.

$$P_k = \widehat{P}_k^\tau - Y$$

$$\max P^{ex}$$

F. Equity

- Each participating DER is assigned the smaller of:
 - Y kW
 - DER rated capacity
- The value of Y is determined by OE optimisation.

$$P_k = (1 - \zeta_k^{eq}) \widehat{P}_k^\tau$$

$$P_k = \zeta_k^{eq} Y$$

$$\max P^{ex}$$

G. Equality

- Each participating DER is assigned Y kW
- This means DER may be assigned capacity greater than their rated capacity
- The value of Y is determined by OE optimisation.



$$P_k = Y$$

P^{ex} : Active power exported to the grid

P_k : Active power injection capacity assigned to DER $k \in DER$


\widehat{P}_k^τ : Rated capacity or forecast active power injection τ time ahead \bar{P} : Maximum individual DER constrained capacity

OE Objectives - Illustrative Examples




▪ Network Utilisation

- Tells you how much of the network export/import capacity is being used




▪ DER Capacity Utilisation

- Tells you how much of the available DER capacity is unlocked



▪ Renewables Utilisation

- Tells you how much of the available renewable generation is assigned capacity



- Local Network Social Welfare: \sum DER revenue – \sum DER cost
- Optimal Social Welfare: Social welfare achieved by centralised combined network and market optimisation
- **Relative Social Welfare**
 - Tells you how effective the OE is at unlocking economic value



Value of **relative social welfare** dependent on market price.

Higher **relative social welfare** likely to have wider system benefits (e.g., reduced market clearing prices) – not captured in current work

NEO: Market Efficiency?

How to measure fairness?

- What is desirable in a “fairness” metric?
- Population Size Independence
 - Doesn't matter whether 10 DER or 100
- Scale and Metric Independence
 - Doesn't matter if we measure capacity in W or kW
- Boundedness $[0,1]$
- Intuitive
 - 0 means absolutely unfair
 - 1 means completely fair


Because we can have DER of differing size, fairness metrics consider the **normalised capacity allocated**, not the absolute value of capacity.

NEO: Long term consumer interest? Quality of supply of electricity?

Min-Max Ratio Fairness [1]


- Fairness measured by range of capacity allocated
- Defined by the relative difference between "best off" DER and the "worst off"
- Customer view of fairness: *The difference between the "winners" and "losers" should be as small as possible.*

Relative difference between winners and losers is greater in bottom graph




Theoretical Example

MiM: 0.625



MiM: 0.250




[1] R. Jain, W. Hawe, D. Chiu, "A Quantitative measure of fairness and discrimination for resource allocation in Shared Computer Systems," DEC-TR-301, September 26, 1984

Quality of Service Fairness [1]



- Otherwise known as “Jain’s Fairness Index”
- Fairness measured by coefficient of variation of capacity allocated
- Fairness in customer satisfaction with the service
- Customer view of fairness: *Everyone is entitled to capacity. It is important I get close to the same as my neighbour, but also the more capacity we are assigned, the fairer the system.*

Quality of Service **DOES NOT** refer to baseline load fulfilment




Both have same distribution, but bottom graph has higher average

Theoretical Example



Quality of Experience Fairness [2]


- Fairness measured by standard deviation of capacity allocated
- Fairness in **relative** customer satisfaction with the service
- Average capacity allocation has no impact on fairness
- Customer view of fairness: *We are all in the same boat. As long as everyone is impacted similarly to me, it is fair.*




Standard deviation of both allocations is the same

Theoretical Example

QoE: 0.833



QoE: 0.833



Assessment Metrics – Fairness

- Min-Max Ratio



Any DER is assigned no capacity

All DER assigned capacity proportional to their rated capacity

- Quality of Service



All DER assigned 0 capacity

All DER assigned capacity proportional to their rated capacity


- Quality of Experience



Half DER assigned full capacity, half assigned no capacity

All DER assigned capacity proportional to their rated capacity


Example: DER either assigned full capacity or no capacity



Hoßfeld, T., Skorin-Kapov, L., Heegaard, P.E. et al. A new QoE fairness index for QoE management. Qual User Exp 3, 4 (2018). <https://doi.org/10.1007/s41233-018-0017-x>

Simple Toy Network

- Allow us to fully understand the intricacies of the OEs.
- Investigated relationship of DER size and location to capacity allocated
- Examined each OE objective for 2 toy networks
- Both networks are constrained by voltage rise at the end of the feeder




Maximise Service

Rated Capacity

Capacity Allocated




1



- DER at the head of the feeder prioritised
- Location of DER has impact on total capacity that can be allocated

Network Utilisation	0.808	Network Utilisation	0.994
Capacity Utilisation	0.740	Capacity Utilisation	0.903
Renewable Utilisation	0.610	Renewable Utilisation	0.782
QoS	0.895	QoS	0.945
QoE	0.448	QoE	0.589
MiM	0.415	MiM	0.564

2



Weighted Allocation

1

Aim: Favour PV over BESS



Same allocation as
Maximise Service

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Capacity Utilisation	0.740
Renewable Utilisation	0.610
QoS	0.895
QoE	0.448
MiM	0.415

Capacity shifted from
BESS to PV (low
weight to high weight)
– increase RES use

Network Utilisation	0.994
Capacity Utilisation	0.907
Renewable Utilisation	0.895
QoS	0.991
QoE	0.829
MiM	0.790

2



Weighted Allocation – Larger Weight


1

PV&BESS loses **all** capacity allocation

Weighted Allocation may have unexpected consequences

Capacity shifted from BESS&PV to PV (mid weight to high weight)


2



Total capacity allocated is reduced for Network A

Network Utilisation	0.637
Capacity Utilisation	0.584
Renewable Utilisation	0.542
QoS	0.660
QoE	0.132
MiM	0.000


Network Utilisation	0.994
Capacity Utilisation	0.905
Renewable Utilisation	1.000
QoS	0.980
QoE	0.740
MiM	0.721



Proportional Allocation

1

X% = ~59%




- Location of resources has a significant impact on the capacity that can be allocated

Network Utilisation	0.640	Network Utilisation	0.969
Capacity Utilisation	0.588	Capacity Utilisation	0.884
Renewable Utilisation	0.686	Renewable Utilisation	0.942
QoS	1.000	QoS	1.000
QoE	1.000	QoE	1.000
MiM	1.000	MiM	1.000

2


X = ~88%



Equal Unallocated Capacity

1

$Y = 3.71kW$




Performs poorly when large resources at end of feeder

Network Utilisation	0.548	Network Utilisation	0.994
Capacity Utilisation	0.505	Capacity Utilisation	0.907
Renewable Utilisation	0.672	Renewable Utilisation	0.930
QoS	0.901	QoS	0.999
QoE	0.692	QoE	0.941
MiM	0.410	MiM	0.925

2


$Y = 0.7kW$



Equity

1

$$Y = 5.30kW$$




- Less impacted by location of larger DER

Network Utilisation	0.758	Network Utilisation	0.807
Capacity Utilisation	0.693	Capacity Utilisation	0.739
Renewable Utilisation	0.687	Renewable Utilisation	1.000
QoS	0.937	QoS	0.955
QoE	0.613	QoE	0.657
MiM	0.530	MiM	0.581

2

$$Y = 5.81kW$$




Fairness quite consistent

Equality

1

$$Y = 5.29kW$$




- **Unaffected** by location of larger DER

Network Utilisation	0.757	Network Utilisation	0.757
Capacity Utilisation	0.692	Capacity Utilisation	0.692
Renewable Utilisation	0.686	Renewable Utilisation	1.000
QoS	0.936	QoS	0.936
QoE	0.612	QoE	0.612
MiM	0.529	MiM	0.529

2


$$Y = 5.29kW$$




Toy Networks - General Results

- *Maximise Service* has highest network and capacity utilisation. Performs poorly in fairness metrics.
- A slight change in *Weighted Allocation* can have large impact on capacity allocation, deep understand of individual network physics can be important.
- *Proportional Allocation* will always have '1' fairness.
- Location & Size of DER significant impact on all metrics.
- Relative technical performance of *Equity* and *Equality* volatile across the 2 networks.
- The economic performance of *Equity*, *Equality*, and *Equal Unallocated Capacity* is volatile across DER placement and market prices.

More Detailed Test Cases



- Varied DER penetration and participation
- High, low, and negative prices
- Assessed high load and high generation cases
- Weighted Allocation – Economic weighting to prioritise cheaper DER



Average of all results

	Average									
	Network Utilisation	Capacity Utilisation	Renewables Utilisation (Export Only)	QoS	QoE	MiM	Relative Social Welfare - High Price	Relative Social Welfare - Low Price	Relative Social Welfare - Negative Price	
Maximise Service	0.673	0.772	0.813	0.792	0.441	0.317	0.925	0.823	0.845	
Weighted Allocation	0.672	0.769	0.822	0.805	0.462	0.353	0.921	0.927	0.862	
Proportional	0.450	0.556	0.709	1.000	1.000	1.000	0.751	0.561	0.681	
Equal Unallocated	0.431	0.547	0.689	0.822	0.862	0.500	0.707	0.381	0.604	
Equity	0.457	0.560	0.726	0.973	0.875	0.676	0.767	0.655	0.690	
Equality	0.430	0.546	0.719	0.965	0.813	0.622	0.760	0.655	0.690	

Similar
results


- *Maximise Service* and *Weighted Allocation* perform best in technical and economic metrics, and worst in fairness metrics
- *Weighted Allocation* beneficial in Low Price and Negative Price scenarios
- *Proportional, Equal Unallocated, Equity* and *Equality* perform similarly
 - *Equity* performs best in Technical and Economic metrics

Correlation of Metrics for Export Constrained OEs



Correlation of Export Constrained OE	Network Utilisation	Capacity Utilisation	Renewables Utilisation	QoS	QoE	MiM	Relative Social Welfare - High Price	Relative Social Welfare - Low Price	Relative Social Welfare - Negative Price
Network Utilisation	1.00								
Capacity Utilisation	0.99	1.00							
Renewables Utilisation	0.80	0.78	1.00						
QoS	-0.43	-0.36	-0.45	1.00					
QoE	-0.71	-0.64	-0.79	0.85	1.00				
MiM	-0.60	-0.55	-0.54	0.90	0.86	1.00			
Relative Social Welfare - High Price	0.99	1.00	0.81	-0.37	-0.66	-0.56	1.00		
Relative Social Welfare - Low Price	0.56	0.53	0.93	-0.10	-0.42	-0.19	0.56	1.00	
Relative Social Welfare - Negative Price	-0.03	0.01	-0.16	0.05	0.06	0.00	-0.01	-0.28	1.00

QoE correlation trend line - exports




Plotting the values of QoE against technical metrics for exports would result in these trend lines

- Fairness Metrics have **significant negative correlation** with technical metrics and High Price Social Welfare for exports
- Technical Metrics have **significant positive correlation** with High Price and Low Price Relative Social Welfare

Correlation of Metrics for Import Constrained OEs

Correlation of Import Constrained OE	Network Utilisation	Capacity Utilisation	QoS	QoE	MiM	Relative Social Welfare - High Price	Relative Social Welfare - Low Price	Relative Social Welfare - Negative Price
Network Utilisation	1.00							
Capacity Utilisation	1.00	1.00						
QoS	-0.70	-0.70	1.00					
QoE	-0.97	-0.97	0.82	1.00				
MiM	-0.72	-0.72	0.86	0.84	1.00			
Relative Social Welfare - High Price	0.30	0.30	0.13	-0.23	-0.09	1.00		
Relative Social Welfare - Low Price	0.45	0.44	0.03	-0.34	-0.06	0.66	1.00	
Relative Social Welfare - Negative Price	0.87	0.87	-0.44	-0.78	-0.50	0.55	0.76	1.00

QoE correlation trend line - imports




- Fairness Metrics have **significant negative correlation** with technical metrics and Negative Price Social Welfare for imports
- Relative Social Welfare – Negative price **strongly correlated** with technical metrics

- Plotting the values of QoE against these metrics for imports would result in these trend lines

Key Takeaways (1/2)

- The **more constrained** the network, the **larger negative impact** “fairness” has on technical and economic metrics.



- Applying *Proportional/Equal Unallocated/Equity/Equality* have similar impacts on technical and economic metrics (**20% reduction** on average).
- There is **significant negative correlation** between the fairness metrics and the technical metrics (and some economic metrics), most strongly for QoE.
- **High participation** levels benefit *Maximise Service & Weighted Allocation* but **can have negative impact on other OEs**.
- Economic *Weighted Allocation* effective, but requires additional information for the DSO to calculate OE

Key Takeaways (2/2)



These results are **based on preliminary results only** – aim to test these findings on more use cases and networks

From these initial results **it seems that:**

- Increasing “fairness” will directly reduce capacity that can be allocated, and the social welfare of the network.
- Impact worse for higher participation and penetration levels
- **Fairness allocation objectives would appear to be in opposition to NEO efficiency principles.**

Next Steps - Scope

- Real world / Representative Networks
 - Taking guidance from the CSIRO LV Network Taxonomy Report
- Wider DER Penetration and Participation considerations
 - Including impact of changing static limits
- High level cost of implementation of different OE objectives
- Do these findings hold true in these expanded studies?



circulation

Close and next steps