

STTM PROCEDURES

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VERSION CONTROL

VERSION NUMBER	EFFECTIVE DATE	AUTHORITY	REASON & CHANGES
7.0	13 December 2011	AEMO	<p>Amend section 7.3 to include MSV window and extend to seven days.</p> <p>Amend section 8.2.2 to clarify requirement to set <i>dpflag</i> during material curtailment.</p>
6.1	On the Brisbane hub commencement date (1 December 2011).	AEMO	<p>Sections 7.2.1C(b) and 7.2.1C(c) amended to clarify intent. Section 8.4.2 amended to include reference to market administered settlement state.</p> <p>Corrected reference to subclause in 7.2.5(b)(i).</p> <p>Note: Version 6.1 is relative to version 5.2 (ie. includes all Brisbane hub amendments).</p>
6.0	7 November 2011	AEMO	<p>Sections 7.2.1C(b) and 7.2.1C(c) amended to clarify intent. Section 8.4.2 amended to include reference to market administered settlement state.</p> <p>Note: Version 6.0 amendments apply to version 5.0 (ie. without changes for Brisbane hub)</p>
5.2	To be advised	AEMO	Amendment of 2.3 Brisbane hub custody transfer points
5.1	To be advised	AEMO	Amendments to sections 1.2, 2.3, 7.1.4, 7.2.4, 7.2.5 (new), 8.1, 8.2.2, 8.2.2, 8.2.5, 8.2.6, 8.4.3, 9.2.2, 9.3.3, 9.3.4, 10.1.1, 10.1.2, 10.1.3, 10.8, 12.1, 12.2, and 12.3 to implement the STTM at a Brisbane hub
5.0	16 June 2011	AEMO	STTM validation and price setting process amendments.
4.0	16 June 2011	AEMO	Sections 6.4.2(f) and (h) modified to include MOS gas on registered facility services allowing flow from the hub in the market long offer and market short bid.
3.0	31 March 2011	AEMO	Added new section 7.5 – Ranked deviation quantities information

EFFECTIVE DATE: ~~ON THE BRISBANE HUB COMMENCEMENT DATE~~ 13 December 2011

NOTE: ~~CONSOLIDATED STTM PROCEDURES INCLUDING BRISBANE STTM HUB.~~

2.0	1 December 2010	AEMO	Deviation percentage method modified to remove MOS
1.0	7 May 2010	AEMO	Initial STTM Procedures

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1 - PRELIMINARY	1
1.1 INTRODUCTION	1
1.2 DEFINITIONS.....	1
1.3 INTERPRETATION.....	3
1.4 FORMULAE, CALCULATIONS AND VALUES.....	3
CHAPTER 2 – HUBS	6
2.1 ADELAIDE HUB	6
2.2 SYDNEY HUB.....	6
2.3 BRISBANE HUB.....	7
CHAPTER 3 – STTM FACILITIES AND DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM INFORMATION.....	9
3.1 BENCHMARK INFORMATION	9
3.2 OTHER INFORMATION.....	9
3.3 DETERMINING STTM FACILITY CAPACITY	9
3.4 STTM FACILITY OPERATOR DATA	10
CHAPTER 4 – REGISTRATION OF SERVICES AND TRADING RIGHTS	11
4.1 FACILITY SERVICES AND DISTRIBUTION SERVICES.....	11
4.2 ADDITIONAL TRADING RIGHTS	11
CHAPTER 5 - MARKET OPERATOR SERVICE	12
5.1 MOS PERIODS.....	12
5.2 MOS ESTIMATES	12
5.3 REQUEST FOR MOS INCREASE OFFERS AND MOS DECREASE OFFERS	14
5.4 MOS INCREASE OFFERS AND MOS DECREASE OFFERS.....	14
5.5 MOS STACKS	15
CHAPTER 6 - SCHEDULING AND PRICING ALGORITHM	16
6.1 THE SCHEDULING AND PRICING ALGORITHM	16
6.2 THE MATHEMATICAL FORMULATION DOCUMENT.....	16
6.3 INCREMENTAL PRICE STEP QUANTITIES.....	16
6.4 SPA INPUTS.....	17
6.5 FUNCTIONALITY OF THE SPA	20
6.6 SPA OUTPUTS.....	29
CHAPTER 7 - GENERAL MARKET OPERATIONS	32
7.1 SCHEDULING FOR THE EX ANTE MARKET.....	32
7.2 ALLOCATIONS.....	35
7.3 MARKET SCHEDULE VARIATIONS.....	40
7.4 MOS ALLOCATION SERVICE COST.....	43
7.5 RANKED DEVIATION QUANTITIES INFORMATION	43
7.6 REPORTING ON VALIDATION AND SUBSTITUTION OF DATA	44
CHAPTER 8 – ADMINISTERED MARKET STATES	45
8.1 CUMULATIVE PRICE THRESHOLD	45
8.2 TECHNICAL OR OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS.....	47
8.3 MAJOR AND MINOR RETAILER OF LAST RESORT EVENTS.....	51

8.4	MARKET SCHEDULE QUANTITIES IN MARKET ADMINISTERED SCHEDULING STATE AND MARKET ADMINISTERED SETTLEMENT STATE	52
CHAPTER 9 – CONTINGENCY GAS		56
9.1	CONTINGENCY GAS OFFERS AND BIDS	56
9.2	CONTINGENCY GAS BENCHMARK INFORMATION	59
9.3	CONTINGENCY GAS TRIGGER EVENTS.....	61
9.4	CALLING AND SCHEDULING CONTINGENCY GAS	62
CHAPTER 10 - SETTLEMENT		66
10.1	SETTLEMENT EQUATION DEFINITIONS.....	66
10.2	AMOUNTS FOR GAS DAYS.....	81
10.3	EX ANTE MARKET PAYMENTS AND CHARGES	83
10.4	PIPELINE FLOW DIRECTION CONSTRAINT PAYMENTS AND CHARGES	84
10.5	VARIATION CHARGES.....	84
10.6	CONTINGENCY GAS PAYMENTS AND CHARGES	89
10.7	MARKET OPERATOR SERVICE	90
10.8	DEVIATIONS	93
10.9	CAPACITY SETTLEMENT	104
10.10	SETTLEMENT SHORTFALL CHARGES AND PAYMENTS.....	107
10.11	DETERMINATION AND PAYMENT OF CLAIMS.....	109
10.12	SETTLEMENT STATEMENTS	114
CHAPTER 11 PRUDENTIAL REQUIREMENTS		115
11.1	MONITORING	115
11.2	MARGIN CALLS.....	115
CHAPTER 12 – TRANSITIONAL		117
12.1	MOS PERIODS.....	117
12.2	MARKET ADMINISTERED SCHEDULING STATE	117
12.3	CUMULATIVE PRICE THRESHOLD	117
12.4	DEVIATION QUANTITIES	117

CHAPTER 1 - PRELIMINARY

1.1 Introduction

These are the STTM Procedures made under section 91BRH of the National Gas Law.

1.2 Definitions

Words and phrases in these Procedures which appear in *italics* are either defined below or have the meaning given to them in Part 20 of the Rules. Other terms defined in the National Gas Law or the Rules have the same meaning when used in these Procedures.

In these Procedures:

ad hoc charge means an amount determined under clause 8.4.4 that is payable to AEMO by a *Trading Participant*.

ad hoc payment means an amount determined under clause 8.4.4 that is payable by AEMO to a *Trading Participant*.

default gas day capacity means the capacity of an *STTM facility* for a *gas day* that is provided to AEMO by the *STTM facility operator* under rule 376(1)(f), or determined by AEMO under rule 377(2) or clause 7.1.3C.

deemed STTM distributor means a user who is taken to be an *STTM distributor* in respect of a facility under rule 372A(3)(c)

deviation settlement function means a mathematical function used to define *deviation charges* and *deviation payments* to be applied to a *Trading Participant's deviation quantities*.

exiting retailer means an *STTM User* in respect of whom responsibility for customers that are connected to an *STTM distribution system* has been assumed by a *retailer of last resort*.

hub price means the price for gas at the *hub* determined under clauses 6.5.8(a)(i) and 6.5.8(c) which may represent either the *ex ante market price* or *ex post imbalance price* (as applicable).

incremental price step quantity means the incremental increase in quantity bid or offered in a *price step* which can be *scheduled* within the *capacity limit* of a *registered trading right*.

linepack in respect of an *STTM pipeline* at any time means the total quantity of gas in that *STTM pipeline* at that time.

linepack range – See clause 9.2.1.

major retailer of last resort event – See clause 8.3.2(b).

marginal capacity value means the marginal value of a unit of *pipeline hub capacity* determined under clause 6.5.8(a)(ii).

marginal cost means, for a quantity of gas purchased, the incremental cost, as implied by the *SPA*, of supplying an increment of that quantity.

marginal value means, for a constrained quantity, the incremental change in cost of the solution to the *SPA* resulting from an incremental change in that constrained quantity.

marginal flow direction value means the *marginal value* of the capability to increase withdrawal from a *hub* on an *STTM facility* when that withdrawal is limited by the flow to the *hub* on that *STTM facility*.

market facility means an *STTM facility* or *STTM distribution system*.

market long offer means an AEMO generated offer used in determining the *ex post imbalance price* which reflects the extent to which the gross flows to the *hub* in the *ex ante market schedule* exceed the gross allocations of gas flow to the *hub*.

market long offer price means the price associated with the *market long offer*.

market long offer quantity means the quantity associated with the *market long offer*.

market short bid means an AEMO generated bid used in determining the *ex post imbalance price* which reflects the extent to which the gross allocations of gas flow to the *hub* exceed the gross flows to the *hub* in the *ex ante market schedule*.

market short bid price means the price associated with the *market short bid*.

market short bid quantity means the quantity associated with the *market short bid*.

material involuntary curtailment means any involuntary curtailment of the delivery of gas to:

- (a) end users implemented by an *STTM distributor* in accordance with curtailment tables specified in the applicable access arrangement for its *STTM distribution system*; or
- (b) *deemed STTM distributors*, implemented by the *STTM pipeline operator* by limiting the withdrawal of gas from the *STTM pipeline* to a quantity less than the aggregate quantities of gas in final nominations accepted by the *STTM pipeline operator* for those *deemed STTM distributors*.

Mathematical Formulation Document means a mathematical description of the implementation of *scheduling* and pricing functionality described in clause 6.5.

maximum gas day capacity means the maximum capacity of an *STTM facility* for a *gas day* that is provided to AEMO by the *STTM facility operator* under rule 376(1)(g), or determined by AEMO under rule 377(2), used for the purposes of validating capacity information provided under rule 414.

minor retailer of last resort event – See clause 8.3.2(a).

negative deviation range means that part of the *deviation settlement function* applied to negative valued deviations.

operational constraint means technical or operational conditions in a facility that are caused by an unplanned event or circumstances and constrain the ability of that facility to produce, process, store or transport gas (as applicable).

Note: The term 'facility' in this definition is not limited to an *STTM facility*.

percentage method means a method for determining *variation charges*, *deviation charges* or *deviation payments* which processes variation quantities or *deviation quantities* (as applicable) as percentages of a reference quantity.

pipeline hub capacity means the quantity of gas that an *STTM facility operator* has notified AEMO that the *STTM facility* will be able to deliver to the *hub* for the *gas day* represented in the *SPA*, as specified in accordance with rule 414.

positive deviation range means that part of the *deviation settlement function* applied to positively valued deviations.

Provisional ex post imbalance price means the price determined in accordance with clause 7.2.1E.

quantity method means a method for determining *variation charges*, *deviation charges* or *deviation payments* which processes variation quantities or *deviation quantities* (as applicable) as GJ quantities.

significant constraint means an *operational constraint* that affects the flow of gas to or from a *hub* to the extent specified in clause 8.2.3.

variation settlement function means a mathematical function used to define *variation charges* to be applied to a *Trading Participant's* variation quantities.

1.3 Interpretation

- (a) These Procedures are subject to the same principles of interpretation as Part 20 of the Rules, unless otherwise stated.
- (b) A reference to a **rule** is to that rule in the National Gas Rules
- (c) A reference to **gas** is to natural gas.

1.4 Formulae, Calculations and Values

1.4.1 Gas days

In these Procedures, the following terms may be used to identify a *gas day*:

d refers to a *gas day*.

Example: There will be an *ex ante market price* for a *hub* and an *ex post imbalance price* for a *hub* determined for *gas day d*. On *gas day d* an *ex ante market schedule* for a *hub* will be

determined for *gas day* $d+1$ and an *ex post imbalance price* for a *hub* will be determined for *gas day* $d-1$.

$d-n$ (1, 2, 3, etc.) refers to the *gas day* that is n or a specified number (1, 2, 3 etc) of *gas days* before *gas day* d .

$d+n$ (1, 2, 3 etc.) refers to the *gas day* that is n or a specified number (1, 2, 3 etc) *gas days* after *gas day* d .

D refers to the *gas day* in respect of which a matter is to be calculated or determined.

Example: An *ex ante market schedule* for *gas day* D will be determined on *gas day* $d = D-1$ while an *ex post imbalance price* for *gas day* D will be determined on *gas day* $d = D+1$.

$D-n$ (1, 2, 3, etc.) refers to events or calculations that occur on the *gas day* that is n or a specified number (1, 2, 3 etc) of *gas days* before *gas day* D and which pertain to *gas day* D .

$D+n$ (1, 2, 3 etc.) refers to events or calculations that occur on the *gas day* that is n or a specified number (1, 2, 3 etc) *gas days* after *gas day* D and which pertain to *gas day* D .

n represents a number of *gas days*.

Note: It is not possible to describe differences between values determined for two distinct *gas days* using the term D since labels like $D-1$ and $D+1$ can only be used to refer to values that apply for *gas day* D . Only d can be used to describe differences between values determined for different *gas days*.

1.4.2 General

In these Procedures, the following mathematical notations used in formulae and equations have the meanings given in the table below.

Notation	Meaning
\in , as in $k \in SP$	This is an example of the usage of the term "element" (\in). This notation means that the expression it relates to is evaluated for every possible value of an index (in this case k) within a set (in this case SP).
Σ , as in Σ_k	This is an example of the usage of the term "sum" (Σ). This indicates that any expression following this term is to be evaluated for, and the results summed over, all values of an index (in this case k).
ABS()	The absolute value of the term within the brackets, eg. $ABS(-5) = 5$, $ABS(5) = 5$.
{ }, ' ()' and '[]'	A pair of brackets indicates that all calculations between the brackets are to be performed separately from expressions outside the brackets. Different forms of brackets are used solely to make it easier to match the opening bracket of a pair of brackets with the closing

Notation	Meaning
	bracket.
MAX()	The maximum (or highest) of two or more values within the brackets, eg. MAX(3,6) = 6, MAX(-4,-7,5) = 5.
MIN()	The minimum (or lowest) of two or more values within the brackets, eg. MIN(3,6) = 3, MIN(-4,-7,5) = -7.

1.4.3 Null Values

Where no value is required to be set under Part 20 of the Rules or these Procedures for a term in a settlement equation, the result of the equation is to be calculated without that term.

1.4.4 Initial values at STTM commencement date

Clauses 12.2 and 12.3 identify values to be used in specified formulae or equations for:

- (a) the *gas day* commencing on the *STTM commencement date*; and
- (b) where applicable, subsequent *gas days* until sufficient market data is available for the purposes of those formulae or equations.

CHAPTER 2 – HUBS

2.1 Adelaide Hub

For the purposes of rule 371(2) of the Rules, the following *custody transfer points* comprise the *Adelaide hub*:

- (a) custody transfer point 1: outlet of the Cavan Interconnection Pipeline from the *STTM pipeline* identified on the Natural Gas Services Bulletin Board as the SEA Gas Pipeline with the PlantID of 550052; and
- (b) custody transfer point 2: outlet of the Taperoo Gate Station from the *STTM pipeline* identified on the Natural Gas Services Bulletin Board as the Moomba to Adelaide Pipeline System with the PlantID of 550054; and
- (c) custody transfer point 3: outlet of the Elizabeth Gate Station from the *STTM pipeline* identified on the Natural Gas Services Bulletin Board as the Moomba to Adelaide Pipeline System with the PlantID of 550054; and
- (d) custody transfer point 4: outlet of the Gepps Cross Gate Station from the *STTM pipeline* identified on the Natural Gas Services Bulletin Board as the Moomba to Adelaide Pipeline System with the PlantID of 550054.

2.2 Sydney Hub

For the purposes of rule 372(2) of the Rules, the following *custody transfer points* comprise the *Sydney hub*:

- (a) custody transfer point 1: the Wilton Custody Transfer Station from the *STTM pipeline* identified on the Natural Gas Services Bulletin Board as the Moomba to Sydney Pipeline System with the PlantID of 520053; and
- (b) custody transfer point 2: the Horsley Park Custody Transfer Station from the *STTM pipeline* identified on the Natural Gas Services Bulletin Board as the Eastern Gas Pipeline with the PlantID of 520047; and
- (c) custody transfer point 3: the Port Kembla Custody Transfer Station from the *STTM pipeline* identified on the Natural Gas Services Bulletin Board as the Eastern Gas Pipeline with the PlantID of 520047; and
- (d) custody transfer point 4: the connection between the respective pipelines identified in Pipeline Licence No. 30 (Rosalind Park CSM) and Pipeline Licence No. 1 (Wilton to Horsley Park) issued under the *Pipelines Act 1967* of New South Wales, being the Rosalind Park Receipt Point located at chainage KP 15.3 of the Wilton to Horsley Park natural gas pipeline; and
- (e) custody transfer point 5: from the date identified in a notice *published* by AEMO, a custody transfer station at the location specified in that notice from the *STTM pipeline* identified on the Natural Gas Services

Bulletin Board as the Eastern Gas Pipeline with the PlantID of 520047.

2.3 Brisbane Hub

For the purposes of rule 372A(1) of the Rules, the following custody transfer points comprise the Brisbane hub:

- (a) custody transfer point 1: the outlet of the *STTM pipeline* identified on the Natural Gas Services Bulletin Board as the Roma - Brisbane Pipeline with the PlantID of 540057 at the connection point to the Riverview distribution meter station;
- (b) custody transfer point 2: the outlet of the Redbank distribution meter station from the *STTM pipeline* identified on the Natural Gas Services Bulletin Board as the Roma - Brisbane Pipeline with the PlantID of 540057;
- (c) custody transfer point 3: the outlet of the *STTM pipeline* identified on the Natural Gas Services Bulletin Board as the Roma - Brisbane Pipeline with the PlantID of 540057 at the connection point to the Swanbank facility meter station;
- (d) custody transfer point 4: the outlet of the *STTM pipeline* identified on the Natural Gas Services Bulletin Board as the Roma - Brisbane Pipeline with the PlantID of 540057 at the connection point to the Ellen Grove distribution meter station;
- (e) custody transfer point 5: the outlet of the *STTM pipeline* identified on the Natural Gas Services Bulletin Board as the Roma - Brisbane Pipeline with the PlantID of 540057 at the connection point to the Willawong distribution meter station;
- (f) custody transfer point 6: the outlet of the *STTM pipeline* identified on the Natural Gas Services Bulletin Board as the Roma - Brisbane Pipeline with the PlantID of 540057 at the connection point to the Runcorn distribution meter station;
- (g) custody transfer point 7: the outlet of the *STTM pipeline* identified on the Natural Gas Services Bulletin Board as the Roma - Brisbane Pipeline with the PlantID of 540057 at the connection point to the Mt Gravatt distribution meter station;
- (h) custody transfer point 8: the outlet of the *STTM pipeline* identified on the Natural Gas Services Bulletin Board as the Roma - Brisbane Pipeline with the PlantID of 540057 at the connection point to the Tingalpa distribution meter station;
- (i) custody transfer point 9: the outlet of the *STTM pipeline* identified on the Natural Gas Services Bulletin Board as the Roma - Brisbane Pipeline with the PlantID of 540057 at the connection point to the Dobby distribution meter station;

- (j) custody transfer point 10: the outlet of the STTM pipeline identified on the Natural Gas Services Bulletin Board as the Roma - Brisbane Pipeline with the PlantID of 540057 at the connection point to the Murarrie distribution meter station;
- (k) custody transfer point 11: the outlet of the STTM pipeline identified on the Natural Gas Services Bulletin Board as the Roma - Brisbane Pipeline with the PlantID of 540057 at the connection point to the Gibson Island facility meter station; and
- (l) custody transfer point 12: the outlet on the STTM pipeline identified on the Natural Gas Services Bulletin Board as the Roma - Brisbane Pipeline with the PlantID of 540057 at the connection point to the Lytton lateral.

CHAPTER 3 – STTM FACILITIES AND DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM INFORMATION

3.1 Benchmark information

- (a) The benchmark information to be provided to AEMO by an *STTM facility operator* for the purposes of rule 376(1)(j) is specified in clause 9.2.1.
- (b) The benchmark information to be provided to AEMO by an *STTM distributor* for the purposes of rule 376(2)(f) is specified in clause 9.2.2.

3.2 Other information

- (a) No other information is specified for the purposes of rule 376(1)(k).
- (b) No other information is specified for the purposes of rule 376(2)(g).

3.3 Determining STTM Facility Capacity

3.3.1 When AEMO must determine capacity

AEMO must determine the relevant capacity of an *STTM facility* under rule 377(2) if the *STTM facility operator* has not provided:

- (a) a *default gas day capacity* under rule 376(1)(f); or
- (b) a *maximum gas day capacity* under rule 376(1)(g),

as the case may be, by the start of the *gas day* before the first *gas day* on which the relevant capacity is required for the operation of the *SPA*.

3.3.2 Default gas day capacity

- (a) For the purposes of rule 377(2), subject to paragraph (b), AEMO must determine a *default gas day capacity* for an *STTM facility* as either:
 - (i) using available metering data for all *custody transfer points* of a *hub* that are connected to that *STTM facility*, the highest quantity of gas delivered from the *STTM facility* to the *hub* on any *gas day* in a period that AEMO considers appropriate to determine a reasonable approximation of the highest daily gas flows at those points; or
 - (ii) if metering data is not available or not sufficient, the sum of the *capacity limits* of each *registered facility service* for the *STTM facility* that is *firm capacity*.
- (b) In determining a *default gas day capacity*, AEMO may take into account any relevant information given to AEMO by the *STTM facility operator*.

3.3.3 Maximum gas day capacity

- (a) For the purposes of rule 377(2), subject to paragraph (b), AEMO must determine a *maximum gas day capacity* for an *STTM facility* by multiplying the *default gas day capacity* provided or determined for the *STTM facility* by 1.13.
- (b) In determining a *maximum gas day capacity*, AEMO may take into account any relevant information given to AEMO by the *STTM facility operator*.

3.4 STTM facility operator data

- (a) By 3 hours after the beginning of the *gas day* for the following *gas day*, AEMO must make available to *Trading Participants* and publish as soon as possible after that time:
 - (i) the *default gas day capacity*; and
 - (ii) the *maximum gas day capacity*; and
 - (iii) the validation thresholds to be applied under clause 7.1.3A.
- (b) By after the beginning of the *gas day*, AEMO must make available to *Trading Participants* and publish as soon as possible after that time, the validation thresholds to be applied under clause 7.2.1A.

CHAPTER 4 – REGISTRATION OF SERVICES AND TRADING RIGHTS

4.1 Facility Services and Distribution Services

No other information is specified for the purposes of rule 381(1)(j).

4.2 Additional trading rights

No other details are specified for the purposes of rule 385(2)(f).

CHAPTER 5 - MARKET OPERATOR SERVICE

5.1 MOS Periods

- (a) For the purposes of rule 396 a *MOS period* determined by AEMO must comply with the following requirements:
 - (i) a *MOS period* must be a period of at least 3 months;
 - (ii) a *MOS period* must commence at the beginning of the first *gas day* of a month; and
 - (iii) a *MOS period* must end at the end of the last *gas day* commencing in a month.
- (b) No later than 3 months prior to the commencement of a calendar year, AEMO must *publish* the *MOS periods* commencing in that calendar year.

5.2 MOS Estimates

- (a) For the purposes of rule 397(3), AEMO must determine a MOS estimate, or updated MOS estimate, in accordance with this clause 5.2.
- (b) AEMO must determine the MOS estimate for each *STTM pipeline* based on the range and frequency of *pipeline deviations* which reflect increased flows to the *hub* and *pipeline deviations* which reflect decreased flows to the *hub* on that *STTM pipeline*, to be determined by AEMO using:
 - (i) to the extent accepted by AEMO under clause 5.2(d), data provided by the *STTM pipeline operator* for that *STTM pipeline* indicating the forecast pattern of *MOS allocations* for the *MOS period*; otherwise
 - (ii) to the extent available, *MOS allocation data* held by AEMO for that *STTM pipeline* for all or some of the corresponding dates within the *MOS period* but for the prior year; otherwise
 - (iii) to the extent available, *MOS allocation data* held by AEMO for that *STTM pipeline* for the dates not covered by subparagraph (ii) but with similar expected flow characteristics as the dates in the *MOS period*; otherwise
 - (iv) to the extent accepted by AEMO under clause 5.2(f), data about historical pipeline nominations and allocations provided by an *STTM pipeline operator*; otherwise
 - (v) to the extent available, Natural Gas Services Bulletin Board data for that *STTM pipeline*, adjusted as AEMO reasonably determines to correct for any discrepancies between the delivery points and time intervals represented in that data and

the delivery points and time intervals relevant to MOS estimates for that *MOS period*; otherwise

- (vi) MOS estimates determined by AEMO for other *STTM pipelines* for that *MOS period*, adjusted as AEMO reasonably determines to allow for the relative capacity of each pipeline to supply the *hub* and whether it is pressure controlled or flow controlled,

and AEMO may also adjust any of the above data as it reasonably determines to account for:

- (vii) expected growth (or fall) in average and peak gas volumes;
- (viii) significant changes in the operation of a pipeline or the relevant *STTM distribution system*; and
- (ix) changes to Part 20 of the Rules.

- (c) An *STTM pipeline operator* may provide to AEMO:
 - (i) forecast patterns for its *STTM pipeline* of the daily allocation of *MOS* during the *MOS period*, where these are to reflect the range of the expected *pipeline deviations* on that *STTM pipeline*;
 - (ii) details of the methodology used to derive the forecast patterns in subparagraph (i); and
 - (iii) details of the source of data used to derive the forecast patterns in subparagraph (i).
- (d) AEMO must accept a forecast pattern provided in accordance with clause 5.2(c) and received by AEMO not later than 50 business days prior to the start of a *MOS period*, unless AEMO reasonably considers that the data and methodology employed are together an inadequate basis for estimating *MOS* allocations for that *STTM pipeline* and *MOS period*, in which case AEMO must provide reasons for not accepting that data.
- (e) An *STTM pipeline operator* may provide to AEMO historical data about day ahead nominations and allocations for the pipeline at the location of the relevant *hub*.
- (f) AEMO must accept historical data provided in accordance with clause 5.2(e) and received by AEMO not later than 50 business days prior to the start of the *MOS period*, unless AEMO reasonably considers that the data forms an inadequate basis for estimating *MOS* allocations for that *STTM pipeline* and *MOS period*, in which case AEMO must provide reasons for not accepting that data.
- (g) Information provided to AEMO under clause 5.2(c) or 5.2(e) is confidential information, subject to the requirement for AEMO to *publish* its *MOS* estimate under rule 397.

- (h) AEMO must *publish* the methodology employed to determine the quantities required by rule 397 for each *STTM pipeline* and must, before making changes to that methodology, consult with:
 - (i) *Trading Participants*; and
 - (ii) any other person AEMO considers would be affected by the proposed changes.

5.3 Request for MOS increase offers and MOS decrease offers

For the purposes of rule 398(2)(d), no other matter is specified.

5.4 MOS increase offers and MOS decrease offers

- (a) For the purposes of rule 400(4), a *MOS increase offer* or *MOS decrease offer* must comply with the requirements of this clause 5.4.
- (b) A *MOS increase offer* must specify at least one and up to ten *price steps* where each *price step* must specify:
 - (i) a single price, expressed in \$/GJ to four decimal places, greater than or equal to zero and less than or equal to the *MOS cost cap*; and
 - (ii) the maximum quantity of gas (excluding that offered in other *price steps*) that the *Trading Participant* is willing to have allocated to it in respect of increased flow to the *hub* at the price specified under paragraph (i), expressed in whole GJ, and being greater than zero.

Note: Price steps for MOS offers do not represent a cumulative quantity of gas.

- (c) A *MOS decrease offer* must specify at least one and up to ten *price steps* where each *price step* must specify:
 - (i) a single price, expressed in \$/GJ to four decimal places, greater than or equal to zero and less than or equal to the *MOS cost cap*; and
 - (ii) the maximum quantity of gas (excluding that provided from other *price steps*) that the *Trading Participant* is willing to have allocated to it in respect of decreased flow to the *hub* at the price specified under paragraph (i), expressed in whole GJ, and being greater than zero.

Note: Price steps for MOS offers do not represent a cumulative quantity of gas.

- (d) No two *price steps* in the same *MOS increase offer* or *MOS decrease offer* may have the same price.
- (e) An *eligible contract holder* must not submit more than one *MOS increase offer* or more than one *MOS decrease offer* in respect of each *STTM pipeline* for a *MOS period* (but may revise a *MOS increase offer* or *MOS decrease offer* in accordance with rule 400(2)).

5.5 MOS Stacks

5.5.1 MOS increase stack

- (a) In determining a *MOS increase stack* for an *STTM pipeline* and a *MOS period* in accordance with rule 401(1), AEMO must include all *price steps* contained in *MOS increase offers* for that *MOS period* and *STTM pipeline* which comply with clause 5.4.
- (b) AEMO must order a *MOS increase stack* as a list from the lowest to the highest priced *price step* contained in *MOS increase offers*, and *price steps* with the same price may be placed in any order.
- (c) For the purpose of rule 401(1), the information to be contained in a *MOS increase stack* is:
 - (i) the unique numeric identifier of that *MOS stack*, where a newer *MOS increase stack* has a higher numeric identifier than an older *MOS increase stack*;
 - (ii) the date range for which the *MOS increase stack* applies;
 - (iii) *price steps* listed in the order determined in clause 5.5.1(b); and
 - (iv) the identifier for each *price step*.

5.5.2 MOS decrease stacks

- (a) In determining a *MOS decrease stack* for an *STTM pipeline* and a *MOS period* in accordance with rule 401(1) AEMO must include all *price steps* contained in *MOS decrease offers* for that *MOS period* and *STTM pipeline* which comply with clause 5.4.
- (b) AEMO must order a *MOS decrease stack* as a list from the lowest to the highest priced *price step* contained in *MOS decrease offers*, where any *price steps* with the same price may be placed in any order.
- (c) For the purpose of rule 401(1), the information to be contained in a *MOS decrease stack* is:
 - (i) the unique numeric *identifier* of that *MOS stack*, where a newer *MOS decrease stack* has a higher numeric *identifier* than an older *MOS decrease stack*;
 - (ii) the date range for which the *MOS decrease stack* applies;
 - (iii) *price steps* listed in the order determined in clause 5.5.2(b); and
 - (iv) the identifier for each *price step*.

5.5.3 Publishing MOS stacks

For the purposes of rule 401(2)(c), no requirements are specified.

CHAPTER 6 - Scheduling and Pricing Algorithm

6.1 The Scheduling and Pricing Algorithm

- (a) The SPA established and maintained by AEMO under rule 404 must satisfy the following requirements in addition to those imposed by rules 404 and 405:
- the inputs for the SPA must be those described in clause 6.4;
- in converting inputs to outputs, the functionality of the SPA must meet the requirements of clause 6.5; and
- the outputs of the SPA must be those described in clause 6.6.
- (b) AEMO must determine that no feasible *scheduling* solution is possible within the constraints imposed under Division 7 of the Rules and the STTM Procedures, as required by rule 405(5), where one or more features required to be implemented by AEMO under clause 6.5.7 indicates that there is no feasible *scheduling* solution.
- (c) AEMO must determine that no feasible *ex post imbalance price* is possible within the constraints imposed under Division 7 of the Rules and the STTM Procedures where one or more features required to be implemented by AEMO under clause 6.5.7 indicates that there is no feasible solution.

6.2 The Mathematical Formulation Document

- (a) AEMO must establish and maintain a *Mathematical Formulation Document* describing in mathematical terms the problem described in clause 6.5 to be solved in the determination of *provisional schedules* and *ex ante market schedules* (including prices) and *ex post imbalance prices* in accordance with clause 6.1(a).
- (b) Subject to paragraph (c), AEMO must make the *Mathematical Formulation Document* available to *Trading Participants* on request, and may make it available to any other person on request.
- (c) AEMO may require a person to execute a confidentiality agreement in a form acceptable to AEMO before the *Mathematical Formulation Document* is made available to that person.
- (d) AEMO must notify *Trading Participants* of any changes made by AEMO to the *Mathematical Formulation Document*.

6.3 Incremental Price Step Quantities

- (a) This clause relates to valid *ex ante offers*, *ex ante bids* and *price taker bids* for a *hub* as at the time specified in rule 415(1)(a) for a *provisional schedule* or *ex ante market schedule*, as applicable.
- (b) The *incremental price step quantity* is:
- (i) for any *price step* in an *ex ante offer*.

- (A) the lesser of the *capacity limit* for the *registered trading right* associated with that *ex ante offer* and the quantity associated with that *price step*; less
- (B) the lesser of the *capacity limit* for the *registered trading right* associated with that *ex ante offer* and the quantity associated with the next lowest priced *price step* in that *ex ante offer* (or zero if there is no next lower priced *price step*);
- (ii) for any *price step* in an *ex ante bid* associated with an *STTM facility*:
 - (A) the lesser of the *capacity limit* for the *registered trading right* associated with that *ex ante bid* and the quantity associated with that *price step*; less
 - (B) the lesser of the *capacity limit* for the *registered trading right* associated with that *ex ante bid* and the quantity associated with the next higher priced *price step* in that *ex ante bid* (or zero if there is no next higher priced *price step*);
- (iii) for any *price taker bid* – the lesser of the quantity specified in that *price taker bid* and the *capacity limit* for the *registered trading right* associated with that *price taker bid*; and
- (iv) for any *price step* in an *ex ante bid* associated with an *STTM distribution system*:
 - (A) the lesser of the *capacity limit* for the *registered trading right* associated with that *ex ante bid* less any quantity determined in subparagraph (iii) for that *registered trading right* and the quantity associated with that *price step*; less
 - (B) the lesser of the *capacity limit* for the *registered trading right* associated with that *ex ante bid* less any quantity determined in subparagraph (iii) for that *registered trading right* and the quantity associated with the next higher priced *price step* in that *ex ante bid* (or zero if there is no next higher priced *price step*).

6.4 SPA Inputs

6.4.1 Provisional schedules and ex ante market schedules

The data to be processed by the *SPA* to produce a *provisional schedule* or an *ex ante market schedule* for a *hub* and a *gas day* are:

- (a) valid *ex ante offers*, *ex ante bids* and *price taker bids* for that *hub* as at the time specified in rule 415(1)(a) for a *provisional schedule* or *ex ante market schedule*, as applicable;

- (b) the *incremental price step quantities* determined in clause 6.3 for the valid *ex ante offers*, *ex ante bids* and *price taker bids* described in paragraph (a);
- (c) the *capacity limits* for *registered trading rights* associated with *ex ante offers*, *ex ante bids* and *price taker bids* for that *hub* as at the time specified in rule 415(1)(b) for a *provisional schedule* or *ex ante market schedule* as applicable;
- (d) the available *capacity information* for each *STTM facility* for that *hub* for that *gas day* in accordance with clause 7.1.3C(c);
- (e) the following data for each *registered trading right* associated with *ex ante offers* or *ex ante bids* from *STTM Shippers* for that *hub* as at the time specified in rule 415(1)(d) for a *provisional schedule* or *ex ante market schedule* as applicable:
 - (i) the *STTM facility* associated with that *registered trading right*;
 - (ii) the priority of the *registered facility service* associated with that *registered trading right*; and
 - (iii) the flow direction of the *registered facility service* associated with that *registered trading right*;
- (f) a *market long offer quantity* of zero;
- (g) a *market long offer price* less than *MMP*;
- (h) a *market short bid quantity* of zero;
- (i) a *market short bid price* greater than *MPC*;
- (j) a price, greater than *MPC* but less than the *market short bid price*, to be applied to *price taker bids*; and
- (k) any other *SPA* input parameters required to implement the functionality of the *SPA* determined by AEMO in accordance with clauses 6.5.6 and 6.5.7.

6.4.2 Ex Post Imbalance Price and Provisional Ex Post Imbalance Price

The data to be processed by the *SPA* to produce an *ex post imbalance price* or an *provisional ex post imbalance price* for a *hub* and a *gas day* are:

- (a) valid *ex ante offers*, *ex ante bids* and *price taker bids* for that *hub* as at the time specified in rule 415(1)(a) for that *gas day* for the *provisional schedule* or *ex ante market schedule*, as applicable;
- (b) the *incremental price step quantities* determined in clause 6.3 for the valid *ex ante offers*, *ex ante bids* and *price taker bids* described in paragraph (a);
- (c) the *capacity limits* for *registered trading rights* associated with *ex ante offers*, *ex ante bids* and *price taker bids* for that *hub* as at the time

- specified in rule 415(1)(b) for the *provisional schedule* or *ex ante market schedule* as applicable;
- (d) the available *capacity information* for each *STTM facility* for that *hub* for that *gas day* in accordance with clause 7.1.3C(c);
 - (e) the following data for each *registered trading right* associated with *ex ante offers* or *ex ante bids* from *STTM Shippers* for that *hub* as at the time specified in rule 415(1)(d) for the *provisional schedule* or *ex ante market schedule* as applicable:
 - (i) the *STTM facility* associated with that *registered trading right*
 - (ii) the priority of the *registered facility service* associated with that *registered trading right*; and
 - (iii) the flow direction of the *registered facility service* associated with that *registered trading right*;
 - (f) a *market long offer quantity* equal to the greater of zero and:
 - (i) the sum over all *registered trading rights* that allow flow to the *hub* on *STTM facilities* on that *gas day* of the *market schedule quantity* of each *registered trading right*; less
 - (ii) the sum over all *STTM facilities* serving that *hub* of the *allocated quantities* on *registered facility services* that allow flow to the *hub* on that *gas day* as provided to AEMO under rule 419(1) or substituted under clause 7.2.1C; less
 - (iii) the sum over all *STTM facilities* serving that *hub* of all *MOS gas* on *registered facility services* that allow flow from the *hub* on that *gas day* as provided to AEMO under rule 419(1) or substituted under clause 7.2.1C;
 - (g) a *market long offer price* less than *MMP*;
 - (h) a *market short bid quantity* equal to the greater of zero and:
 - (i) the sum over all *STTM facilities* serving that *hub* of the *allocated quantities* on *registered facility services* that allow flow to the *hub* on that *gas day* as provided to AEMO under rule 419(1) or substituted under clause 7.2.1C; and
 - (ii) the sum over all *STTM facilities* serving that *hub* of all *MOS gas* on *registered facility services* that allow flow from the *hub* on that *gas day* as provided to AEMO under rule 419(1) or substituted under clause 7.2.1C; less
 - (iii) the sum over all *registered trading rights* that allow flow to the *hub* on *STTM facilities* on that *gas day* of the *market schedule quantity* of each *registered trading right*;
 - (i) a *market short bid price* greater than *MPC*;

- (j) a price, greater than *MPC* but less than the *market short bid price*, to be applied to *price taker bids*; and
- (k) any other *SPA* input parameters required to implement the functionality of the *SPA* determined by AEMO in accordance with clauses 6.5.6 and 6.5.7.

6.5 Functionality of the SPA

6.5.1 Quantities to be determined

Subject to clause 6.5.2, the *SPA* determines values for the following quantities:

- (a) the quantity *scheduled* from each *price step* associated with an *ex ante offer*, which must be between zero and the *incremental price step quantity* for that *price step*;
- (b) the quantity *scheduled* from each *price step* associated with an *ex ante bid*, which must be between zero and the *incremental price step quantity* for that *price step*;
- (c) the quantity *scheduled* from each *price taker bid*, which must be between zero and the *incremental price step quantity* for that *price taker bid*;
- (d) the quantity *scheduled* from the *market long offer*, which must be between zero and the *market long offer quantity*; and
- (e) the quantity *scheduled* from the *market short bid*, which must be between zero and the *market short bid quantity*.

6.5.2 Maximisation of Value of Trade

- (a) In determining the quantities to *schedule*, the *SPA* must maximise:
 - (i) the sum over all *price taker bids* of:
 - (A) the quantities *scheduled* from each *price taker bid*;
 - (B) multiplied by the *price taker bid price*;
 - (ii) plus the sum over all *price steps* associated with *ex ante bids* of:
 - (A) the quantities *scheduled* from each *price step*;
 - (B) multiplied by the price of that *price step*, adjusted as required for tie-breaking;
 - (iii) plus the quantity *scheduled* from the *market short bid* multiplied by the *market short bid price*;
 - (iv) less the sum over all *price steps* associated with *ex ante offers* of:
 - (A) the quantities *scheduled* from each *price step*;

- (B) multiplied by the price of that *price step*, adjusted as required for tie-breaking;
- (v) less the quantity *scheduled* from the *market long offer* multiplied by the *market long offer price*,

while satisfying the requirements of clauses 6.5.3, 6.5.4, and 6.5.5.

Note: The above formulation makes no reference to tie-breaking or conflict management. These are addressed elsewhere in the Procedures, but as overlays on the above problem rather than part of the problem. Tie-breaking must produce a solution consistent with the above problem in situations where there is more than one solution. Conflict management is employed where the problem has no solution.

- (b) In implementing the *SPA*, AEMO may:
 - (i) apply adjustments to the *price taker bid* prices and to *price step* prices referenced in clause 6.5.2(a) to implement the required functionality of clause 6.5.6 provided that, after the application of rounding under clause 6.5.9, those adjustments do not cause reported prices to be economically inconsistent with the prices in *scheduled price steps*; and
 - (ii) introduce additional terms beyond those described in clause 6.5.2(a) to implement the requirements of clause 6.5.7.

6.5.3 Maintenance of Energy Balance

- (a) The *SPA* must *schedule* so that the sum of:
 - (i) the quantities *scheduled* from each *price step* associated with an *ex ante offer*, plus
 - (ii) the quantity *scheduled* from the *market long offer*,
 equals the sum of:
 - (iii) the quantities *scheduled* from *price taker bids*; plus
 - (iv) the quantities *scheduled* from each *price step* associated with an *ex ante bid*; plus
 - (v) the quantity *scheduled* from the *market short bid*.
- (b) In implementing the *SPA*, AEMO may include additional terms in the equation described in clause 6.5.3(a) to implement the required functionality of the *SPA* in accordance with clauses 6.5.6 and 6.5.7.

6.5.4 Limits Imposed by Pipeline Capacity

- (a) The *SPA* must *schedule* so that the sum of the quantities *scheduled* from each *price step* associated with an *ex ante offer* on an *STTM facility* does not exceed the *pipeline hub capacity* of that *STTM facility*.
- (b) The *SPA* must *schedule* so that the sum of the quantities *scheduled* from each *price step* associated with an *ex ante bid* associated with a

registered trading right for an *STTM facility* does not exceed the sum of the quantities *scheduled* from each *price step* associated with an *ex ante offer* on that *STTM facility*.

- (c) In implementing the *SPA*, AEMO may include additional terms in the equation described in clauses 6.5.4(a) and 6.5.4(b) to implement the required functionality of the *SPA* in accordance with clauses 6.5.6 and 6.5.7.


6.5.5 Limits Imposed by Registered trading rights

- (a) The *SPA* must *schedule* so that the *capacity limit* of a *registered trading right* associated with an *STTM facility* sets the maximum value that can be taken by the total quantity *scheduled* from the *price steps* associated with any *ex ante offer* associated with that *registered trading right*.
- (b) The *SPA* must *schedule* so that the *capacity limit* of a *registered trading right* associated with an *STTM facility* sets the maximum value that can be taken by the total quantity *scheduled* from the *price steps* associated with any *ex ante bid* associated with that *registered trading right*.
- (c) The *SPA* must *schedule* so that the *capacity limit* of a *registered trading right* associated with an *STTM distribution system* sets the maximum value that can be taken by the sum of:
 - (i) the quantity *scheduled* from any *price taker bid* associated with that *registered trading right*; and
 - (ii) the total quantity *scheduled* from the *price steps* associated with any *ex ante bid* associated with that *registered trading right*.
- (d) In implementing the *SPA*, AEMO may include additional terms in the equation described in clauses 6.5.5(a), 6.5.5(b) and 6.5.5(c) to implement the required functionality of the *SPA* in accordance with clauses 6.5.6 and 6.5.7.

6.5.6 Tie-Breaking

- (a) If the total quantities *scheduled* from *price steps* associated with *ex ante bids* and the total quantities *scheduled* from *price steps* associated with *ex ante offers* can be varied while still satisfying clause 6.5.2(a) but without changing the value to be maximised under clause 6.5.2(a), the *SPA* must select that set of *scheduled* quantities which satisfies clause 6.5.2(a) while maximising the total quantities *scheduled* from *price steps* associated with *ex ante bids*.

Example: The supply and demand curves (whether at the *hub* or on a pipeline) cross on a horizontal segment.



All *ex ante bid price steps* will have a very small adjustment made to the step price (e.g. \$0.000025/GJ) so that it is always more attractive to *scheduled tied offers* to maximise the bids cleared (both at the *hub* and on an *STTM facility*).


- (b) If clause 6.5.3(a) is satisfied but:
- (i) all *scheduled price steps* associated with *ex ante bids*, *price taker bids*, and *market short bids* are either *scheduled* to zero or to the maximum extent allowed by clause 6.5.2(a); and
 - (ii) all *scheduled price steps* associated with *ex ante offers* and *market long offers* are either *scheduled* to zero or to the maximum extent allowed by clause 6.5.2(a),

then, for the purpose of clause 6.5.8(a)(i), the highest priced *price step* associated with *ex ante offers* or *market long offers* with a non-zero *scheduled quantity* will define the *hub price*.

- (c) If clause 6.5.4(a) is satisfied for an *STTM facility* but:
- (i) all *scheduled price steps* associated with *ex ante bids* on that *STTM facility* are either *scheduled* to zero or to the maximum extent allowed by clause 6.5.2(a); and
 - (ii) all *scheduled price steps* associated with *ex ante offers* on that *STTM facility* are either *scheduled* to zero or to the maximum extent allowed by clause 6.5.2(a),

then, for the purpose of clause 6.5.8(a)(ii), the difference between the price of the highest priced *price step* associated with *ex ante offers* with a non-zero *scheduled quantity* on that *STTM facility* and the *hub price* will define the *marginal capacity value* for that *STTM facility*.

Example: The supply and demand curves (at the *hub* or on pipelines) cross on the vertical



If there is any demand to be supplied at the *hub*, a small dummy quantity (0.3 GJ) is inserted in the energy balance equation to reduce total demand fractionally so as to make the last offer *scheduled* marginal, and hence it sets the value.

For an *STTM pipeline*, the capacity of the pipeline will be reduced by a small quantity, (eg 0.2 GJ / number of pipelines - and no more than 100 pipelines are allowed for) so that the pipeline cannot be *scheduled* at the end of an offer curve, allowing that offer to set the value.

- (d) *Price taker bids* are to be *scheduled* by the SPA on a pro rata basis relative to their *incremental price step quantities* except that:
- (i) a *price taker bid* can only be *scheduled* to the maximum level allowed by clause 6.5.2(a); and
 - (ii) a *scheduled* quantity which is limited under subparagraph (i) must be netted from the total quantity to be *scheduled* from those *price taker bids*, which must be pro rated between the other *price taker bids* to the extent permitted under subparagraph (i).
- (e) If two or more *price steps* ("tied steps") associated with *ex ante bids* have the same price (the "tied price"), the SPA must *schedule* them as follows:
- (i) the set of tied steps at each tied price submitted by *STTM Users* are to be treated collectively as a single step (the "STTM User collective step") with a weighting equal to the sum of the *incremental price step quantities* of the individual tied steps at that tied price;
 - (ii) the set of tied steps at each tied price on each *STTM facility* are to be treated collectively as a single step (the "STTM facility collective step") with a weighting equal to the sum of the *incremental price step quantities* of the individual tied steps at that tied price;
 - (iii) the STTM User collective step in subparagraph (i) for a tied price and the STTM facility collective steps for each *STTM facility* in subparagraph (ii) for a tied price are to be *scheduled* on a pro rata basis relative to their weightings except that:

- (A) an STTM User collective step or an STTM facility collective step can only be *scheduled* up to the maximum level allowed by clause 6.5.2(a); and
- (B) a *scheduled* quantity which is limited under subparagraph (A) must be netted from the total quantity to be *scheduled* from those collective steps, which may be *scheduled* between the other collective steps in any manner consistent with clause 6.5.2(a).

Example: Having *scheduled* 25 TJ of consumption from the *hub*, this must be allocated between the bids at the *hub*. Assume the following bids:

- *STTM User Bid A* at *hub* for consumption at *hub* of 6 TJ at \$3/GJ
- *STTM User Bid B* at *hub* for consumption at *hub* of 4 TJ at \$3/GJ
- *STTM Shipper Bid* at *hub* for haulage from the *hub* on pipeline 1 with a low haulage priority of 10 TJ at \$3/GJ.
- *STTM Shipper Bid* at *hub* for haulage from the *hub* on pipeline 1 with a high haulage priority of 10 TJ at \$3/GJ.
- *STTM Shipper Bid* at *hub* for haulage from the *hub* on pipeline 2 with a low haulage priority of 20 TJ at \$3/GJ.

The solution is to *schedule* 5 TJ from the sum of Bid A and Bid B (without allocating this to those bids), 10 TJ from pipeline 1 (without allocating this to bids and ignoring priorities) and 10 TJ to pipeline 2 (again without allocating this to bids and ignoring priorities).

- (f) If two or more *price steps* ("tied steps") associated with *ex ante bids* of an *STTM User* have the same price (the "tied price") the *SPA* must *schedule* them on a pro rata basis relative to their *incremental price step quantities* except that:
 - (i) a tied step can only be *scheduled* to the maximum level allowed by clause 6.5.2(a); and
 - (ii) a *scheduled* quantity which is limited under subparagraph (i) must be netted from the total quantity to be *scheduled* from those tied steps, which must be pro rated between the other tied steps to the extent permitted under subparagraph (i); and
 - (iii) if the tied steps are included in the *STTM User* collective step under clause 6.5.6(e)(i), the total quantity *scheduled* from those tied steps must equal the value determined for that *STTM User* collective step under clause 6.5.6(e)(iii).

Example: In the previous example 5 TJ was *scheduled* from Bid A and Bid B. This step will pro rate them as 3 TJ from Bid A and 2 TJ from Bid B.

- (g) If two or more *price steps* ("tied steps") associated with *ex ante bids* on an *STTM facility* have the same price (the "tied price") then the *SPA* must *schedule* them as follows:

- (i) tied steps associated with *registered trading rights* with higher priority of service must be *scheduled* in their entirety before tied steps associated with *registered trading rights* with lower priority are *scheduled*;

Note: Priority 1 is the highest priority.

- (ii) two or more tied steps associated with *registered trading rights* with the same priority number must be *scheduled* on a pro rata basis relative to their *incremental price step quantities* except that:
 - (A) a tied step can only be *scheduled* to the maximum level allowed by clause 6.5.2(a); and
 - (B) a *scheduled* quantity which is limited under subparagraph (A) must be netted from the quantity to be *scheduled* from those tied steps, which must be pro rated between the other tied steps to the extent permitted under subparagraph (A); and
- (iii) if the tied steps on an *STTM facility* are included in an *STTM facility* collective step under clause 6.5.6(e)(ii), the total quantity *scheduled* from those tied steps must equal the value determined for that *STTM facility* collective step under clause 6.5.6(e)(iii).

Example: In the previous example 10 TJ was allocated to pipeline 1. The high priority haulage would be *scheduled* to 10 TJ and the low priority haulage would be *scheduled* to 0 TJ.

If 10 TJ is to be *scheduled* on the pipeline (from (d)) and there were a firm (priority 1) bid for 4 TJ and two as available (priority 2) bids each for 10 TJ, then the *schedule* will be 4 TJ on the firm bid and 3 TJ on each of the other two bids.

- (h) If two or more *price steps* ("tied steps") associated with *ex ante offers* on different *STTM facilities* have the same price (the "tied price"), the *SPA* must determine the *schedule* of the aggregate of the tied steps for each *STTM facility* as follows:
 - (i) for each *STTM facility*, determine the sum of the *schedule* quantities of all *ex ante bids* on that *STTM facility*, including quantities determined in accordance with clauses 6.5.6(e) and 6.5.6(g);
 - (ii) for each *STTM facility*, determine the sum of the *incremental price step quantities* of *ex ante offer price steps* on that *STTM facility* with prices equal to the tied price;
 - (iii) for each *STTM facility*, determine the sum of the *incremental price step quantities* of *ex ante offer price steps* on that *STTM facility* with prices equal to or less than the tied price;

- (iv) determine the weighting for each *STTM facility* at a tied price, being the greater of zero and the lesser of:
- (A) the quantity determined in subparagraph (ii); and
 - (B) the quantity determined in subparagraph (iii) less the quantity determined in subparagraph (i); then

Note: The weighting is at most the quantity of the tied offers, but may be less if some of those offers are required to serve flow already *scheduled* to be withdrawn from the *hub*.

- (v) the total *scheduled* quantities from tied steps at a tied price on each *STTM facility* is:
- (A) the maximum of:
 - (1) zero; and
 - (2) the quantity determined in subparagraph (i) plus the quantity determined in subparagraph (ii) less the quantity determined in subparagraph (iii);
 - (B) plus a *scheduled* quantity to be pro rated between those *STTM facilities* relative to the weighting determined in (iv) except that:
 - (1) the total *scheduled* quantities from tied steps at a tied price on each *STTM facility* can only be *scheduled* up to the maximum level allowed by clause 6.5.2(a); and
 - (2) a total *scheduled* quantity which is limited under subparagraph (1) must be netted from the total quantity to be *scheduled* from the tied steps at the tied price for all *STTM facilities* at the relevant *hub*, which may be *scheduled* between the total *scheduled* quantities from tied steps at the tied price on the remaining *STTM facilities* in any manner consistent with clause 6.5.2(a).

Example: Suppose that the last bids and offers *scheduled* at the *hub price* must supply demand of 20 TJ at the *hub*.

Offer 1 on pipeline 1 has offered 20 TJ at a cost of \$3/GJ and with low haulage priority.

Pipeline 1 has *scheduled* pipeline flows away from the *hub* of 10 TJ and Offer 1 on pipeline 1 is the only supply source on pipeline 1 that can supply it.

Offer 2 on pipeline 2 has offered 10 TJ at a cost of \$3/GJ and with high haulage priority.

Offer 3 on pipeline 2 has offered 20 TJ at a cost of \$3/GJ and with low haulage priority.

The first 10 TJ of Offer 1 is committed to serving gas flowing from the *hub*, so the tie is between the remaining 10 TJ on pipeline 1 and 30 TJ on pipeline 2. Of the quantity subject to the tie, Pipeline 1 will get 5 TJ and Pipeline 2 will get 15 TJ.

The solution taken is allow 15 TJ of flow from pipeline 1 (offset by 10 TJ of flow away from the *hub*) and 15 TJ on pipeline 2, with a net flow into the *hub* of 20 TJ. This gas is not allocated to individual offers at this step.

- (i) If two or more *price steps* ("tied steps") associated with *ex ante offers* on a single *STTM facility* have the same price (the "tied price"), the *SPA* must *schedule* them as follows:
- (i) tied steps associated with *registered trading rights* with higher priority of service must be *scheduled* in their entirety before tied steps associated with *registered trading rights* with lower priority are *scheduled*;
 - (ii) two or more tied steps associated with *registered trading rights* with the same priority number must be *scheduled* on a pro rata basis relative to their *incremental price step quantities* except that:
 - (A) a tied step can only be *scheduled* to the maximum level allowed by clause 6.5.2(a); and
 - (B) a *scheduled* quantity which is limited under subparagraph (A) must be netted from the quantity to be *scheduled* from those tied steps, which must be pro rated between the other tied steps to the extent permitted under subparagraph (A); and
 - (iii) if the tied steps on an *STTM facility* are included in a tie between *STTM facilities* under clause 6.5.6(h) then the total quantity *scheduled* from those tied steps must equal the value determined for that *STTM facility* under clause 6.5.6(h)(v).
- (j) The *SPA* must determine the solutions to clauses 6.5.6(h) and 6.5.6(i) using *schedules* which are consistent with this clause 6.5.6 for all *price taker bids* and all *ex ante bid price steps*.

Note: This paragraph is included because paragraphs (f) and (g) actually use the solutions to prior steps as inputs – all the requirements of this clause cannot be solved simultaneously.

6.5.7 Conflict Handling

In implementing the *SPA*, AEMO must include additional mathematical terms so as to ensure that the *SPA* can produce quantity and price values where the data presented to the *SPA* means that there would otherwise be no solution that satisfies the requirements of this clause 6.5.

6.5.8 Price Determination by the SPA

- (a) When used to produce *provisional schedules* or *ex ante market schedules*, the SPA must determine the following values:
 - (i) subject to clause 6.5.6(b), a *hub price* which must equal the *marginal cost* of supplying gas to the *hub* given the *scheduled quantities*;
 - (ii) subject to clauses 6.5.6(c) and 6.5.8(b), the *marginal capacity value* for each STTM facility which must equal the *marginal value* of the STTM facility's pipeline hub capacity given the *scheduled quantities*; and
 - (iii) subject to clause 6.5.8(b), the *marginal flow direction value* for each STTM facility which must equal the *marginal value* of the restriction that flow from the *hub* on that STTM facility cannot exceed flow to the *hub* on that STTM facility given the *scheduled quantities*.
- (b) If an SPA solution indicates that both the *marginal capacity value* and the *marginal flow direction value* for an STTM facility have non-zero values then:
 - (i) *marginal capacity value* must be reduced by the value of *marginal flow direction value*; and then
 - (ii) *marginal flow direction value* must be set to zero.
- (c) When used to produce the *ex post imbalance price*, the SPA must produce a *hub price* which, subject to clause 6.5.6(b), must equal the *marginal cost* of supplying gas to the *hub* given the *scheduled quantities*.

6.5.9 Numeric Rounding

- (a) Quantities *scheduled* by the SPA from *price taker bids* and *price steps* of *ex ante offers* and *ex ante bids* in accordance with clause 6.5.1 must be rounded to the nearest whole GJ.
- (b) The SPA is not required to ensure that the total rounded *scheduled ex ante offers* equals the total rounded *scheduled ex ante bids* plus the total rounded *scheduled price taker bids*.
- (c) Values determined in accordance with clause 6.5.8 must be rounded to the nearest \$0.0001/GJ.

6.6 SPA Outputs

6.6.1 Ex ante market schedules and Provisional schedules

- (a) The outputs required from the SPA when used to produce *provisional schedules* or *ex ante market schedules* are:

- (i) the *market schedule quantity*, or forecast *market schedule quantity*, for each *registered trading right*, being the total of the quantities *scheduled* from each *price step* or *price taker bid* associated with that *registered trading right* in accordance with clause 6.5.1, rounded in accordance with clause 6.5.9;
 - (ii) subject to paragraph (b), the *ex ante market price*, or forecast *ex ante market price*, being the *hub price* determined in accordance with clause 6.5.8(a)(i), rounded in accordance with clause 6.5.9;
 - (iii) subject to paragraph (b), the *capacity price*, or forecast *capacity price*, for each *STTM facility*, being the *marginal capacity value* of that *STTM facility* determined in accordance with clause 6.5.8(a)(ii), rounded in accordance with clause 6.5.9; and
 - (iv) the *pipeline flow direction constraint price*, or forecast *pipeline flow direction constraint price*, for each *STTM facility*, being the *marginal flow direction value* for that *STTM facility* determined in accordance with clause 6.5.8(a)(iii), rounded in accordance with clause 6.5.9.
- (b) If:
- (i) a *hub price* referred to in clause 6.6.1(a)(ii) exceeds *MPC*, the *ex ante market price*, or forecast *ex ante market price*, must be set equal to *MPC* for the purpose of clause 6.6.1(a)(ii);
 - (ii) a *hub price* referred to in clause 6.6.1(a)(ii) is less than *MMP*, the *ex ante market price*, or forecast *ex ante market price*, must be set equal to *MMP* for the purpose of clause 6.6.1(a)(ii);
 - (iii) an *ex ante market price*, or forecast *ex ante market price*, for a *hub* is set under subparagraph (i), the *capacity price*, or forecast *capacity price*, of each *STTM facility* serving that *hub* must, for the purpose of clause 6.6, be set to the greater of:
 - (A) zero; and
 - (B) the value of capacity of that *STTM facility* determined under clause 6.6.1(a)(iii), reduced by the same amount by which the *hub price* was reduced under subparagraph (i); and
 - (iv) the *hub price* less the value of capacity for an *STTM facility* serving that *hub* is less than *MMP*, the *capacity price*, or forecast *capacity price*, of that *STTM facility* must be set to the *ex ante market price*, or forecast *ex ante market price*, less *MMP*.

6.6.2 Ex Post Imbalance Price

- (a) For the purpose of rule 426, the *ex post imbalance price* produced by the SPA is the greater of:
 - (i) *MMP*; and
 - (ii) the lesser of *MPC* and the *hub price* determined in clause 6.5.8(c), rounded in accordance with clause 6.5.9.

CHAPTER 7 - GENERAL MARKET OPERATIONS

7.1 Scheduling for the Ex Ante Market

7.1.1 Ex ante offers

- (a) For the purposes of rule 407(2), an *ex ante offer* must specify:
- (i) the *identifier* of the *registered trading right* to which the *ex ante offer* relates; and
 - (ii) the *gas day* to which the *ex ante offer* relates; and
 - (iii) at least one and up to ten *price steps*.
- (b) The *gas day* specified under clause 7.1.1(a)(ii) must be within the range of *gas days* for which the *registered trading right* is *registered*.
- (c) Each *price step* must specify:
- (i) a single price, expressed in \$/GJ to four decimal places, greater than or equal to *MMP* and less than or equal to *MPC*; and
 - (ii) the maximum quantity of gas that the *STTM Shipper* is willing to deliver to the *hub* at the price specified under subparagraph (i), expressed in whole GJ.
- (d) If the price in a *price step* (referred to in this paragraph as the **higher price step**) is greater than the price in any other *price step* in the *ex ante offer*, then the quantity in the higher price step must be greater than the quantity in that other *price step*.
- Note:** The purpose of paragraphs (c) and (d) is to ensure that each *price step* represents a cumulative quantity of gas, and that prices increase with increasing price step quantities.
- (e) A *price step* must not have the same price as any other *price step* in the *ex ante offer*.
- (f) The total quantity for the *ex ante offer* must be less than or equal to the *capacity limit* of the relevant *registered trading right*.

7.1.2 Ex ante bids

- (a) For the purposes of rule 408(2), an *ex ante bid* must specify:
- (i) the *identifier* of the *registered trading right* to which the *ex ante bid* relates; and
 - (ii) the *gas day* to which the *ex ante bid* relates; and
 - (iii) at least one and up to ten *price steps*.
- (b) The *gas day* specified under clause 7.1.2(a)(ii) must be within the range of *gas days* for which the *registered trading right* is *registered*.

- (c) Each *price step* must specify:
- (i) a single price, expressed in \$/GJ to four decimal places, greater than or equal to *MMP* and less than or equal to *MPC*; and
 - (ii) the maximum quantity of gas that the *STTM Shipper* or *STTM User* is willing to withdraw from the *hub* at the price specified under subparagraph (i), expressed in whole GJ.

- (d) If the price in a *price step* (referred to in this paragraph as the **higher price step**) is greater than the price in any other *price step* in the *ex ante bid*, then the quantity in the higher price step must be lower than the quantity in that other *price step*.

Note: The purpose of paragraphs (c) and (d) is to ensure that each *price step* represents a cumulative quantity of gas, and that prices decrease with increasing price step quantities.

- (e) A *price step* must not have the same price as any other *price step* in the *ex ante bid*.
- (f) The total quantity for the *ex ante bid* must be less than or equal to the *capacity limit* of the relevant *registered trading right* less any quantity included in a *price taker bid* for that *registered trading right* for the *gas day*.

7.1.3 Price taker bids

- (a) For the purposes of rule 409(2), a *price taker bid* must specify:
- (i) the *identifier* of the *registered trading right* to which the *price taker bid* relates; and
 - (ii) the *gas day* to which the *price taker bid* relates; and
 - (iii) the total quantity of gas that the *STTM User* expects to withdraw from the *hub*, expressed in whole GJ.
- (b) The *gas day* specified under clause 7.1.3(a)(ii) must be within the range of *gas days* for which the *registered trading right* is *registered*.
- (c) The total quantity for the *price taker bid* must be less than or equal to the *capacity limit* of the relevant *registered trading right* less any quantity included in an *ex ante bid* for that *registered trading right* for the *gas day*.

7.1.3A Validation of capacity information

- (a) For the purposes of rule 414(2A) AEMO must validate information included in a notice provided under rule 414(1), in accordance with the requirements of the *STTM Interface Protocol*.

- (b) AEMO must promptly notify the relevant *STTM facility operator* if information is not provided under rule 414(1), or if information provided under rule 414(1) fails validation.

7.1.3B Validation of capacity information

For the purpose of rule 414(2B), if notified by AEMO, an *STTM facility operator* must:

- (a) update a notice provided under rule 414(1) by 4½ hours after the beginning of a *gas day*; or
- (b) on the *gas day* before the *gas day* to which that information relates, confirm a notice provided under rule 414(1) by 4½ hours after the beginning of a *gas day*.

7.1.3C Validation of capacity information

- (a) If AEMO receives an updated notice under clause 7.1.3B, it must substitute the values provided in that notice for those provided in the original notice provided under rule 414(1).
- (b) If an *STTM facility operator* does not give AEMO a notice in accordance with rule 414(1) and does not subsequently provide an updated notice in accordance with clause 7.1.3B in respect of a *gas day*, then AEMO must use:
 - (i) if available, the *capacity information* provided under rule 414 on the *gas day* that is 2 *gas days* before the *gas day* to which that information relates; otherwise
 - (ii) if available, the *capacity information* provided under rule 414 on the *gas day* that is 3 *gas days* before the *gas day* to which that information relates; otherwise
 - (iii) the registered quantity of gas provided under rule 376(1)(f) or determined under rule 377(2) for that *gas day*.
- (c) For the purposes of 6.4.1, AEMO must use:
 - (i) if available as at 4½ hours after the beginning of a *gas day*, the last notice for that *hub* and *gas day* provided to AEMO in accordance with rule 414(1) or clause 7.1.3B; otherwise
 - (ii) the *capacity information* determined by AEMO in accordance with paragraph (b).

Note: AEMO will determine *capacity information* by using data provided at 3 hours after the beginning of a *gas day* that passes validation, if this is unavailable AEMO will use updated information provided by 4½ hours after the beginning of a *gas day* that passes validation or is confirmed by the *STTM facility operator*. If no data has passed validation or been confirmed AEMO will use the most recently provided data. AEMO will only use a default capacity if the *STTM facility operator* has not provided any data.

7.1.4 Publication of capacity information

For the purpose of rule 414(3), the most recent *capacity information* must be made available to Trading Participants and other persons authorised by AEMO:

- (a) promptly after 3 and 4½ hours after the beginning of a *gas day* that is 3 *gas days* before the *gas day* to which that information relates; and
- (b) promptly after 3 and 4½ hours after the beginning of a *gas day* that is 2 *gas days* before the *gas day* to which that information relates; and
- (c) promptly after 3 and 4½ hours after the beginning of a *gas day* that immediately precedes the *gas day* to which that information relates.

7.1.5 Issue of Schedules

- (a) For the purposes of rule 415(2)(a)(v), no other details are required to be determined for a *schedule* to be taken to be issued.
- (b) For the purposes of rule 415(2)(b)(iv), no other details are required to be made available for a *schedule* to be taken to be issued.
- (c) For the purposes of rule 415(3), AEMO must make available to each *STTM distributor at a hub*, other than the *Brisbane hub*, the following information in relation to a *provisional schedule* or *ex ante market schedule* for that *hub*:
 - (i) the quantity of *gas scheduled* from *ex ante bids* for each *STTM User*;
 - (ii) the quantity of *gas scheduled* from *price taker bids* for each *STTM User*; and
 - (iii) the quantity of *gas not scheduled* from *price taker bids* for each *STTM User*.

7.2 Allocations

7.2.1 Content of STTM facility allocation notices

- (a) For the purposes of rule 419(2)(c), an allocation notice for an *STTM facility* must contain the following additional information:
 - (i) the *gas day* to which the allocation notice relates;
 - (ii) the *identifier* of the *STTM facility* to which the allocation notice relates; and
 - (iii) the *identifier* of each *registered facility service* that is provided by means of the relevant *STTM facility*.
- (b) For the purposes of rule 419(4), a *billing period allocation statement* must be provided to AEMO four business days prior to:

- (i) the date on which AEMO must issue a *preliminary statement*, *final statement* or *revised statement* in accordance with Division 10 of the Rules; or
- (ii) any date in respect of which AEMO advises the relevant *allocation agent* that it intends to issue a *revised statement*.

7.2.1A Validation of STTM facility allocation data

- (a) For the purposes of rule 419(2A) AEMO must validate information included in an allocation notice provided under rule 419(1), in accordance with the *STTM Interface Protocol*.
- (b) AEMO must promptly notify the relevant allocation agent for an *STTM facility* if information is not provided under rule 419(1), or information provided under rule 419(1) fails validation.

7.2.1B Update of facility allocations

For the purpose of rule 419(2B), if notified by AEMO, an *allocation agent* for an *STTM facility* must update or confirm an allocation notice provided under rule 419(1) by 8½ hours after the beginning of a *gas day*.

7.2.1C Substitution of facility allocations

- (a) If AEMO receives an updated allocation notice under clause 7.2.1B it must substitute the values provided in that allocation notice for those provided in the original allocation notice under rule 419(1).
- (b) AEMO must retain the values provided in an earlier allocation notice if it:
 - (i) does not receive an updated allocation notice under clause 7.2.1B; or
 - (ii) the updated allocation notice is rejected in accordance with rule 419(3).
- (c) If:
 - (i) AEMO does not receive a notice in accordance with rule 419(1) and clause 7.2.1B by 3:00pm; or
 - (ii) AEMO rejects an allocation notice under rule 419(3) and has not received another allocation notice for that *STTM facility*,then AEMO must:
 - (iii) determine the *STTM facility allocation* for each *registered facility services* for the *gas day* in respect of that *STTM facility* as if:
 - (A) the quantities of gas supplied to or withdrawn from the *hub* using the *registered facility services* on that *gas day* were equal to the quantities that were scheduled

to be supplied or withdrawn for that service in the *ex ante market schedule* for that *gas day*, and

- (B) no *MOS gas* was allocated to the *registered facility service* for that *gas day*.
- (d) AEMO must notify *Trading Participants* and other persons authorised by AEMO:
- (i) promptly after 4½ hours after the beginning of a *gas day*, if an allocation notice is; not provided under rule 419(1), or is rejected under rule 419(3) or if an allocation notice provided under rule 419(1) fails validation; and
 - (ii) promptly after 8½ hours after the beginning of a *gas day*, of a confirmation or substitution made under paragraphs (a), (b) or (c).

7.2.1D Ex post imbalance price

For the purposes of rule 426(2), AEMO must determine the *ex post imbalance price* for a *hub* for a *gas day* using:

- (a) the inputs used to determine the *ex ante market schedule* for that *hub* and *gas day* in accordance with rule 415(1); and
- (b) the *market scheduled quantities* specified in the *ex ante market schedule* for that *hub* and *gas day*; and
- (c) the *STTM facility allocations* for that *hub* and *gas day*

Note: *STTM facility allocation* refers to the final number that is determined by AEMO in accordance with rule 419 or clause 7.2.1C not to the notices provided by participants under rule 419 or clause 7.2.1B.

7.2.1E Provisional ex post imbalance price

- (a) If AEMO has delayed the publication of the *ex post imbalance price* under rule 426(1A) it must determine a *provisional ex post imbalance price* for the preceding *gas day* using:
 - (i) the inputs used to determine the *ex ante market schedule* for that *hub* and *gas day* in accordance with rule 415(1); and
 - (ii) the *market scheduled quantities* specified in the *ex ante market schedule* for that *hub* and *gas day*; and
 - (iii) any available *STTM facility allocations*; and
 - (iv) if an *STTM facility allocation* is not available for an *STTM facility*, the quantity determined under clause 7.2.1C(c).
- (b) AEMO must make available the *provisional ex post imbalance price* to *Trading Participants* by 5½ hours after the beginning of a *gas day*, and must publish that *provisional ex post imbalance price* as soon as practicable after that time.

Note: in the event the *ex post imbalance price* is deferred from 5½ to 9½ hours after the beginning of a *gas day*, AEMO will determine a *provisional ex post imbalance price*. The *provisional ex post imbalance price* will be used to calculate the cumulative price for tomorrow's *gas day* in accordance with clause 8.1.1 of these Procedures. The *provisional ex post imbalance price* may also be used for prudential monitoring in accordance with clause 11.1 of these Procedures that is, the latest price at the time prudential monitoring is undertaken by AEMO, whether that is the *provisional ex post imbalance price* or the *ex post imbalance price*, will be used for prudential monitoring purposes.

7.2.2 MOS step allocations

For the purposes of rule 419(2)(c), a *MOS step allocation* for an *STTM pipeline* must contain the following additional information:

- (a) the *gas day* to which the *MOS step allocation* relates;
- (b) the *identifier* of the *STTM pipeline* to which the *MOS step allocation* relates; and
- (c) the *identifier* of the *MOS stack* to which the *MOS step allocation* relates.

7.2.3 Registered facility service allocations

For the purposes of rule 420(3)(c), an allocation notice for a *registered facility service* must contain the following additional information:

- (a) the *gas day* to which the allocation notice relates;
- (b) the *identifier* of the *STTM facility* to which the allocation notice relates; and
- (c) the *identifier* of each *registered trading right* that relates to the *registered facility service*.

7.2.4 STTM distribution system allocations

- (a) For the purposes of rule 422(1), subject to clause 7.2.4(a1) the *STTM distribution system allocation* for an *STTM User* is:
 - (i) at the *Sydney hub* – the quantity of gas determined by AEMO, in accordance with the Retail Market Procedures for New South Wales, to have been withdrawn from the *hub* by either:
 - (A) the *trading right holder* in their capacity as a user or self-contracting user; or
 - (B) a user or self-contracting user who is an associate of the *trading right holder*, where AEMO has written authorisation from both parties to use that quantity; or
 - (ii) at the *Adelaide hub* – the quantity of gas determined by AEMO, in accordance with the Retail Market Procedures for South Australia, to have been withdrawn from the *STTM distribution system* at that *hub* by either:

- (A) the *trading right holder* for that *registered distribution service* in their capacity as a user or self-contracting user; or
 - (B) a user or self-contracting user who is an associate of the *trading right holder*, where AEMO has written authorisation from both parties to use that quantity, or
- (iii) at the *Brisbane hub*:
- (A) in the case of a *deemed STTM distribution system*, the quantity of gas determined by AEMO to have been withdrawn from the *hub* by *trading right holders* calculated by reference to the quantities provided by the *STTM facility operator* in accordance with clause 7.2.5; or
 - (B) for all other *STTM distribution systems*, the quantity of gas determined by AEMO to have been withdrawn from the *hub* in accordance with the Retail Market Procedures for Queensland by either:
 - (1) the *trading right holder* in their capacity as a retailer or self contracting user; or
 - (2) a retailer or self contracting user who is an associate of the *trading right holder*, where AEMO has written authorisation from both parties to use that quantity,
- as adjusted by AEMO in accordance with paragraph (b).
- (a1) If, 4½ hours after the beginning of the *gas day*, AEMO is not able to determine the *STTM distribution system allocation* for an *STTM User* at a *hub* for a *gas day* in accordance with clause 7.2.4(a); then AEMO must, as soon as practicable:
- (i) *publish* a notice of this fact; and
 - (ii) determine the *STTM distribution system allocation* for each *STTM User* at that *hub* for that *gas day* as if the quantities of gas withdrawn from the *hub* were equal to the quantities that were scheduled to be withdrawn by that *STTM User* in the *ex ante market schedule* for that *gas day*.
- (b) For the purposes of rule 422(3), AEMO must scale a quantity determined under paragraph (a) by multiplying that quantity by a scaling factor calculated as:
- (i) the sum of all *STTM facility allocations* for flow to the relevant *hub* on the relevant *gas day*, less the sum of all *STTM facility allocations* for flow from that *hub* on that *gas day*;
 - (ii) divided by the sum of all *STTM distribution system allocations* at that *hub* for that *gas day*.

- (c) For the purposes of rule 422(4), AEMO must determine an updated *STTM distribution system allocation* for each *gas day* in a *billing period* prior to the date on which AEMO must issue a *preliminary statement*, *final statement* or *revised statement* in accordance with Division 10 of the Rules, or the date on which it intends to issue a *revised statement*.
- (d) For the purposes of rule 422(5), if AEMO updates the quantity of gas withdrawn by a user or self-contracting user in accordance with the relevant Retail Market Procedures, AEMO must update the *STTM distribution system allocation* for the relevant *registered trading right holder's registered distribution service* as soon as practicable.
- (e) In this clause 7.2.4, the terms **user**, **retailer** and **self contracting user** have the same meanings as in Part 15A of the National gas Rules for the relevant retail gas market.

7.2.5 STTM pipeline operator information

- (a) No later than 3½ hours after the beginning of each *gas day*, each *STTM pipeline operator* whose *STTM pipeline* is connected to more than one *STTM distribution system* at a *hub* must provide to AEMO the total quantity of gas it deems to have been delivered to each *custody transfer point* where gas passes to an *STTM distribution system* that is not a *deemed STTM distribution system* for the immediately preceding *gas day*
- (b) Whenever the *allocation agent* for an *STTM pipeline operator* gives AEMO an allocation notice in accordance with rule 419(1) or an updated allocation notice in accordance with rule 419(4), the *STTM pipeline operator* must, for the relevant *gas day*, provide to AEMO:
 - (i) an update of the quantities provided under subclause (a); and
 - (ii) the quantity or an updated quantity of gas it deems to be withdrawn by each *STTM User* to each *deemed STTM distribution system*.

7.3 Market schedule variations

- (aa) For the purposes of rule 423(1), a market schedule variation is to be submitted:
 - (i) after 6½ hours after the beginning of the immediately preceding gas day; and
 - (ii) before 5:00pm on the 7th gas day after the gas day to which that market schedule variation relates.
- (a) For the purposes of rule 423(2)(a), information required about the nature and quantity of the proposed *market schedule variation* is:
 - (i) the *gas day* to which the proposed *market schedule variation* relates;

- (ii) the quantity of the proposed *market schedule variation*, which must be a positive value expressed in GJ; and
 - (iii) whether the quantity of the proposed *market schedule variation* is to increase or decrease the *modified market schedule quantity* of the *originating STTM Shipper*.
- (b) For the purposes of rule 423(2)(b), the information required about the *originating STTM Shipper* is:
- (i) the *identifier* of the *originating STTM Shipper*;
 - (ii) whether the proposed *market schedule variation* relates to gas:
 - (A) supplied to the *hub*; or
 - (B) withdrawn from the *hub*,by the *originating STTM Shipper*; and
 - (iii) the *STTM facility* in respect of which the *modified market schedule quantity* of the *originating STTM Shipper* is to increase or decrease by the quantity in the proposed *market schedule variation*.
- (c) For the purposes of rule 423(2)(c), the information required about the *receiving Participant* is:
- (i) the *identifier* of the *receiving Participant*;
 - (ii) whether the proposed *market schedule variation* relates to the *receiving Participant* as an:
 - (A) *STTM Shipper* supplying gas to the *hub*; or
 - (B) *STTM Shipper* withdrawing gas from the *hub*; or
 - (C) *STTM User*; and
 - (iii) where the proposed *market schedule variation* relates to gas:
 - (A) supplied to the *hub* by the *originating STTM Shipper*, and
 - (B) withdrawn from the *hub* by the *receiving Participant* as an *STTM Shipper*,the *STTM facility* in respect of which the *modified market schedule quantity* of the *receiving Participant* is to increase or decrease by the quantity in the proposed *market schedule variation*.
- (d) Except in the circumstances described in clause 7.3(c)(iii), AEMO must assume that:

- (i) if the proposed *market schedule variation* relates to the *receiving Participant* as an *STTM User*, the *STTM distribution system* in respect of which the *modified market schedule quantity* of the *receiving Participant* is to increase or decrease under the proposed *market schedule variation* is the *STTM distribution system* at the *hub* to which the *STTM facility* specified under clause 7.3(b)(iii) is connected; or
- (ii) if:
 - (A) the proposed *market schedule variation* relates to the *receiving Participant* as an *STTM Shipper* supplying gas to the *hub*; or
 - (B) the proposed *market schedule variation* relates to both the *originating STTM Shipper* and the *receiving Participant* as *STTM Shippers* withdrawing gas from the *hub*,

the *STTM facility* in respect of which the *modified market schedule quantity* of the *receiving Participant* is to increase or decrease under the proposed *market schedule variation* is the *STTM facility* specified under clause 7.3(b)(iii).
- (e) For the purposes of rule 423(3), when both the *originating STTM Shipper* and the *receiving Participant* are *STTM Shippers* and the proposed *market schedule variation* relates to:
 - (i) one *STTM Shipper* supplying gas to the *hub* and the other *STTM Shipper* withdrawing gas from the *hub*, the *STTM Shipper* that is supplying gas to the *hub* must be the *originating STTM Shipper*, or
 - (ii) both *STTM Shippers* supplying gas to the *hub*, the *STTM Shipper* that is to increase its *modified market schedule quantity* for flow to the *hub* must be the *originating STTM Shipper*, and
 - (iii) both *STTM Shippers* withdrawing gas from the *hub*, the *STTM Shipper* that is to increase its *modified market schedule quantity* for flow from the *hub* must be the *originating STTM Shipper*.
- (f) The *originating STTM Shipper* must ensure that both the *originating STTM Shipper* and the *receiving Participant* have *registered trading rights* that are consistent with the increase or decrease in their respective *modified market schedule quantities* under the proposed *market schedule variation*.

(g) For the purposes of rule 423(5):

- (i) the details to be made available by AEMO to the *receiving Participant* are the details provided for in rule 423(2), which includes those detailed in this clause.

(ii) -the receiving Participant is to confirm the proposed market schedule variation before 5:00pm on the 7th gas day after the gas day to which that market schedule variation relates.

(h) For the purposes of rule 423(6), AEMO must make information regarding the status of a proposed market schedule variation available to the originating STTM Shipper and the receiving Participant until 5:00pm on the 7th gas day after the gas day to which that market schedule variation relates.

7.4 MOS allocation service cost

For the purposes of rule 424(5), reasonable evidence provided to AEMO by an *STTM pipeline operator* must include, but is not limited to:

- (a) the number of *STTM pipelines* operated by that *STTM pipeline operator*;
- (b) the number of *STTM Shippers* and *MOS providers* on each *STTM pipeline*;
- (c) a breakdown of costs by reference to:
 - (i) time allocation to tasks or process steps performed exclusively for *MOS allocation services*;
 - (ii) labour cost rates;
 - (iii) fixed cost allocations; and
 - (iv) any other specified costs; and
- (d) to the extent that the allocation of *MOS* and *overrun MOS* is performed on behalf of an *STTM pipeline operator* by an *allocation agent*, a breakdown of fees payable by the *STTM pipeline operator* to that *allocation agent* by reference to the matters described in paragraph (c).

7.5 Ranked deviation quantities information

- (a) By 4:00 pm on each *gas day* AEMO must, subject to paragraph (b), make available to *Trading Participants* the following information:
 - (i) whether a *Trading Participant* has a *long deviation quantity* or a *short deviation quantity* for each *STTM facility* and *STTM distribution system* at a *STTM Hub*; and
 - (ii) where the *deviation quantity* in paragraph (i) is ranked relative to the *deviation quantities* of other *Trading Participants*.
- (b) AEMO must only:

(i) obtain the information in paragraph (a) from *Trading Participants*, and

(ii) provide the information in paragraph (a) to *Trading Participants*,

who have agreed, in writing, to participate in the information exchange.

(c) AEMO must make available to any party, upon request, a list of those *Trading Participants* that are participating in the information exchange.

7.6 Reporting on validation and substitution of data

(a) AEMO must prepare a report if information to be provided in accordance with:

(i) rule 414, on a gas day for the following *gas day*; or

(ii) rule 419,

is not provided or fails validation.

(b) The report must include:

(i) a description of the event;

(ii) AEMO's assessment of:

(A) the actions taken by *STTM facility operators* and AEMO in relation to the event;

(B) the effect of the event on the operation of the STTM;
and

(iii) any other matter that AEMO considers relevant.

(c) AEMO must publish the report within 30 business days of the conclusion of the event.

CHAPTER 8 – ADMINISTERED MARKET STATES

8.1 Cumulative Price Threshold

- (a) For the purposes of rule 428(1)(b) and 432, the *cumulative price threshold* is exceeded in respect of a *gas day* D if the cumulative price determined under paragraph (b) for *gas day* D exceeds the *cumulative price threshold*.
- (b) The cumulative price based on data available on *gas day* d to apply to a *gas day* D=d+1 is Z(d), being the prior *gas day*'s cumulative price adjusted to include the price contribution of *gas day* d and to exclude the price contribution of *gas day* d-n, calculated as:

$$Z(d) = Z(d-1) + A(d) - A(d-n)$$

where:

- (i) Z(d) is the cumulative price based on data available on *gas day* d;
- (ii) Z(d-1) is the cumulative price based on data available on *gas day* d-1;
- (iii) A(d) is the price contribution determined under paragraph (c) based on data available on *gas day* d, to be added to the cumulative price;
- (iv) A(d-n) is the price contribution determined under paragraph (c) based on data available on *gas day* d-n, to be deducted from the cumulative price because it is no longer within the period to be accumulated; and
- (v) n is the number of days in the *CPT horizon*.
- (c) The price contribution based on data available on *gas day* d, being the value of A(d) in the cumulative price calculation, representing the contribution of prices determined for *gas days* D=d-1, D=d and D=d+1 as known on *gas day* d and which have not already been included in the cumulative price, is calculated as:

$$A(d) = Cx(d) + Cy(d) + Cz(d)$$

where:

- (i) Cx(d) is the contribution of prices determined for *gas day* D=d+1, calculated as $\text{Max}(0, \text{HP}(d))$;
- (ii) Cy(d) is the contribution of prices determined for *gas day* D=d, calculated as $\text{Max}(0, \text{HCGP1}(d) - Cx(d-1))$;
- (iii) Cz(d) is the contribution of prices determined for *gas day* D=d-1, calculated as:

- (A) if $DPFlag(d) = 1$ for *gas day* $D=d-1$, then $Cz(d) = \text{Max}(0, \text{Max}(EPP(d), HCGP2(d), MPC(d-1)) - Cy(d-1) - Cx(d-2))$;
- (B) otherwise, $Cz(d) = \text{Max}(0, \text{Max}(EPP(d), HCGP2(d)) - Cy(d-1) - Cx(d-2))$;
- (iv) $HP(d)$ is, subject to paragraph (d), the *ex ante market price* determined on *gas day* d for the *gas day* $D=d+1$;
- (v) $HCGP1(d)$ is the highest priced *contingency gas offer* scheduled for *gas day* $D=d$ as at 5½ hours after the beginning of *gas day* d , but if no *contingency gas offer* has been scheduled as at that time then $HCGP1(d)=0$;
- (vi) $HCGP2(d)$ is, subject to paragraph (d), the final *high contingency gas price* determined on *gas day* d for *gas day* $D=d-1$, but if no *high contingency gas price* has been determined then $HCGP2(d)=0$;
- (vii) $EPP(d)$ is, subject to paragraph (d) and (e), the *ex post imbalance price* determined on *gas day* d for *gas day* $D=d-1$; and
- (viii) $MPC(d-1)$ is the *MPC* applicable to *gas day* $D=d-1$.
- (d) In determining $A(d)$, if the application of the *administered price cap* under rule 428 results in a price determined by AEMO being lower than it would have been before the application of that price cap, then the uncapped price must be used in the determination of $A(d)$. However, if a price required for the determination of $A(d)$ was determined under the *administered ex post pricing state* or *market administered scheduling state*, then the prices as determined under rule 429 or 430 (as applicable) must be used.

Note: There will only be a raw price if the normal process – such as running the SPA – has been executed and completed normally, otherwise AEMO is defining a price under Rules and hence has no raw price.

- (e) In the event that rule 426(1A) applies:
- (i) a *provisional ex post imbalance price* is to be used for the purposes of defining $EPP(d)$ to determine $A(d)$ for *gas day* $D=d+1$; and
- (ii) the *ex post imbalance price* determined by AEMO in accordance with rule 426(1A) is to be used for the purposes of determining the cumulative price for *gas day* $D=d+2$.

Note: If a notice provided by an *STTM facility operator* in accordance with rule 419(1) is reviewed in accordance with rule 419(2A), a *provisional ex post imbalance price* using default allocations for that *STTM facility* and *gas day* d is to be used for the purposes of determining the cumulative price for *gas day* $D=d+1$. The *ex post imbalance price* made available to *Trading Participants* by 9½ hours after the

beginning of *gas day* d is to be used for the purposes of determining the cumulative price for *gas day* D=d+2.

8.2 Technical or Operational Conditions

8.2.1 General

For the purposes of rule 428(1)(c), AEMO may determine that technical or operational conditions in any pipeline, facility or *STTM distribution system* have materially affected the ability of *Trading Participants* to supply or withdraw gas at a *hub*, or to supply gas to end users in the following circumstances:

- (a) AEMO is notified that *material involuntary curtailment* has occurred in accordance with clause 8.2.2; or
- (b) AEMO has determined that a *significant constraint* affects the *hub* in accordance with clause 8.2.3.

8.2.2 Material involuntary curtailment

- (a) An *STTM distributor* must notify AEMO of any *material involuntary curtailment* of end users connected to its *STTM distribution system* for a *gas day* D:
 - (i) no earlier than the commencement of *gas day* D-1; and
 - (ii) no later than 1½ hours after the beginning of *gas day* D+1.
- (a1) An *STTM pipeline operator* must notify AEMO of any *material involuntary curtailment* it implements for a *gas day* D:
 - (i) no earlier than the commencement of *gas day* D-1; and
 - (ii) no later than 1½ hours after the beginning of *gas day* D+1.

Note: Under the Rules, if a notice is received under paragraph (a) from an *STTM distributor* or under paragraph (a1) from an *STTM pipeline operator* in time for AEMO to make a determination of an *administered price cap state* no later than 6½ hours after the beginning of *gas day* D-1, then the effect of the trigger will be to cap the prices in the *ex ante market schedule* as well as the *ex post* prices. If the determination is made after that time, the effect of the trigger will be to cap only the *ex post* prices.

- (b) A notice given to AEMO under paragraph (a) must include:
 - (i) the *hub* and *gas day* D to which the notice relates;
 - (ii) a statement that *material involuntary curtailment* occurred, or the *STTM distributor* or the *STTM pipeline operator* reasonably expects *material involuntary curtailment* to occur (as applicable), on the *gas day* to which the notice relates;
 - (iii) the time(s) at which *material involuntary curtailment* occurred, or is expected to occur, on *gas day* D; and

- (iv) the basis on which *material involuntary curtailment* was, or will be, initiated.
- (c) If AEMO is notified that ~~Where an administered price cap state applies for a gas day as a result of~~ *material involuntary curtailment* has occurred, AEMO must set the DPFlag(d) to value 1 for the relevant *hub* and *gas day* for the purposes of:
 - (i) calculating the *cumulative price threshold* under clause 8.1; and
 - (ii) running settlements for that *gas day* under Chapter 10.

Note: The DPFlag corresponds with an "Administered Deviation Price Cap State". The settlement rules and procedures implement this design feature through settlement equations rather than through a market administered state.

8.2.3 Significant constraint affecting a hub

Note: These provisions apply where a *Trading Participant* has taken an *ex ante market schedule* position but then becomes unable to flow that gas due to a technical issue in the supply chain. The notice described below requires evidence of the problem to be provided.

- (a) AEMO must decide that a **significant constraint** affects a *hub* for a *gas day D* if:
 - (i) a *Trading Participant* has given a notice to AEMO under clause 8.2.4 that an *operational constraint* in a pipeline, facility or *STTM distribution system* has affected or will affect the ability of that *Trading Participant* to supply or withdraw gas at a *hub*, or to supply gas from the *hub* to end users on *gas day D*; and
 - (ii) subject to paragraphs (b) or (c), AEMO considers that at least one of the following conditions is satisfied in respect of *gas day D*:
 - (A) for the *hub* as a whole, the greater of:
 - (1) the total quantity of gas that cannot be supplied to the *hub* as a result of the notified *operational constraint*; or
 - (2) the total quantity of gas that cannot be withdrawn from the *hub* as a result of the notified *operational constraint*,

exceeds or will exceed 10% of the total quantity *scheduled* for supply to the *hub* by all *Trading Participants* in the most recent *schedule* issued for *gas day D*;
 - (B) for any one *Trading Participant*, the total quantity of gas that cannot be supplied to the *hub* as a result of the notified *operational constraint* exceeds or will

exceed 5TJ and 50% of the quantity *scheduled* for supply to the *hub* by that *Trading Participant* in the most recent *schedule* issued for *gas day D*; or

- (C) for any one *Trading Participant*, the total quantity of gas that cannot be withdrawn from the *hub* exceeds or will exceed 5TJ and 50% of the quantity *scheduled* for withdrawal from the *hub* by that *Trading Participant* in the most recent *schedule* issued for *gas day D*.

Example: Suppose a *hub* has a *scheduled* flow of 200TJ in the *ex ante market schedule*. A shipper with 80TJ is unable to supply all its gas to the *hub*. If that shipper's underdelivery quantity is 8TJ then that shipper alone cannot trigger the state because it has lost only 10% of its flow. However, if the underdelivery is 20TJ, even though it has not hit the 50% individual threshold, it has reached the overall *hub* threshold of 10%, so can trigger the state.

- (b) If a notice given by a *Trading Participant* under paragraph 8.2.4 indicates that the *operational constraint* impacts *as available capacity*, AEMO may only take a related quantity of gas into account for the purposes of paragraph (a)(ii):

- (i) if the *as available capacity* relates to an *STTM pipeline*; and
- (ii) if the status of the relevant *STTM pipeline* on the National Gas Services Bulletin Board was red or orange for *gas day D* at the time the notice was given; and
- (iii) up to the limit of the quantity that was either:
- (A) *scheduled* in the *ex ante market schedule* for that *Trading Participant* on *gas day D*, and for which the relevant *STTM pipeline operator* had accepted a nomination; or
- (B) not *scheduled* in the *ex ante market schedule*, for that *Trading Participant* on *gas day D*, but for which the relevant *STTM pipeline operator* had accepted a nomination,

as supported by acceptable evidence in accordance with clause 8.2.5.

- (c) If a notice given by a *Trading Participant* under clause 8.2.4 indicates that the *operational constraint* affects the ability of a producer to deliver a quantity of gas to an *STTM facility* that was nominated to the producer for a date that would have allowed the gas to reach the *hub* on *gas day D*, AEMO may only take that quantity of gas into account for the purposes of paragraph (a)(ii) to the extent that:

- (i) the relevant quantity of gas would have been supplied to the *hub* on *gas day D* using *firm capacity* in an *STTM pipeline*;

- (ii) on the same *gas day* on which the producer notified the *Trading Participant* of its rejection of the nomination, the *Trading Participant* notified AEMO of that rejection; and

Note: This notice will be required prior to, and in addition to, the notice required by the time in clause 8.2.6. This requires an *STTM Shipper* to notify AEMO on the day that the nomination was rejected if its supply issue is to be considered in triggering a state. The advantage of this is that it ensures early notification of an issue to the market and reflects the core issue – there was a problem at the supply source. While this might be considered onerous, it is difficult to justify an *STTM Shipper* being able to delay notification of such an event until the gas would have arrived at the *hub* (had it flowed).

- (iii) the notice given to AEMO under clause 8.2.4 is supported by acceptable evidence in accordance with clause 8.2.5 that a nomination for that quantity was made to the producer but was rejected as a result of the *operational constraint*.

8.2.4 Notice of operational constraint

- (a) A *Trading Participant* may notify AEMO if it considers that an *operational constraint* affects or will affect a *hub* on a *gas day D* as described in clause 8.2.3(a)(i). The *Trading Participant* must give the notice by the time specified in clause 8.2.6, including the following information:
 - (i) the *hub* and *gas day D* to which the notice relates;
 - (ii) a description of the *operational constraint*;
 - (iii) the quantity of gas in GJ which, as a result of the *operational constraint*, the *Trading Participant*:
 - (A) can no longer supply to the *hub*, using *firm capacity* and separately (if applicable) *as available capacity*; and/or
 - (B) can no longer withdraw from the *hub*, using *firm capacity* and separately (if applicable) *as available capacity*,

on *gas day D* to which the notice relates, together with acceptable evidence under clause 8.2.5; and
- (b) The *Trading Participant* must:
 - (i) ensure that the information in the notice is accurate; and
 - (ii) take all measures within its reasonable control to mitigate the effects of the *operational constraint*.

8.2.5 Acceptable evidence

For the purpose of clause 8.2.4, acceptable evidence includes:

- (a) for an *operational constraint* affecting gas production, written confirmation from the producer indicating, for the *gas day* on which the gas was to be supplied by the producer, the quantity of gas that was nominated by the *Trading Participant* but rejected by the producer; or
- (a1) for an *operational constraint* affecting a *deemed STTM distribution system*, written confirmation from the applicable *STTM pipeline operator* that an *operational constraint* has arisen, including details of the expected impact on *Trading Participants* and the *gas day* on which the *operational constraint* is expected to be rectified; or
- (b) for any other *operational constraint*, written confirmation from the applicable facility operator or *STTM distributor* that an *operational constraint* has arisen, including details of the expected impact on the *Trading Participant* and the *gas day* on which the *operational constraint* is expected to be rectified.

8.2.6 Time for notice

A notice under clause 8.2.4 in respect of a *gas day* D must be given to AEMO:

- (a) in the case of the first *gas day* for which an *operational constraint* affects the *hub*:
 - (i) no earlier than 6½ hours after the beginning of *gas day* D-1; and
 - (ii) no later than 1½ hours after the beginning of *gas day* D+1; and
- (b) in the case of any subsequent consecutive *gas day* for which an *operational constraint* affects the *hub* – no earlier than ½ hour prior to the beginning of *gas day* D-1 and no later than 2½ hours after the beginning of *gas day* D-1.

8.3 Major and Minor Retailer of Last Resort Events

8.3.1 Determination of market share

Where a *retailer of last resort* assumes responsibility for customers of one or more *exiting retailers*, AEMO must calculate the aggregate market share of the *exiting retailers* in respect of a *hub* by following the steps below, using data for the most recent month for which preliminary settlement data is available.

- (a) Step 1: AEMO calculates, for each *STTM User* at the *hub*, the total allocated quantity of gas withdrawn from the *hub* during the month, being the sum of gas allocated as withdrawn by that *STTM User* in *STTM distribution system allocations*.
- (b) Step 2: AEMO calculates the market share for each *exiting retailer* (as a percentage) by dividing the value determined for that *exiting retailer*

in step 1 by the sum of the values determined in step 1 for all *STTM Users* at the same *hub*, and multiplying by 100.

8.3.2 Level of retailer of last resort event

- (a) For the purposes of rule 428(1)(d), AEMO must determine that a **minor retailer of last resort event** has occurred where it calculates that the aggregate market share of the *exiting retailers* at the relevant *hub* under clause 8.3.1(b) is greater than or equal to 3% but less than 6%.
- (b) For the purposes of rules 430(1)(b)(i) and 431(1)(a), AEMO must determine that a **major retailer of last resort event** has occurred where it calculates that the aggregate market share of the *exiting retailers* under clause 8.3.1(b) is greater than or equal to 6%.

8.4 Market Schedule Quantities in Market Administered Scheduling State and Market Administered Settlement State

8.4.1 Principles for determining market schedule quantities

- (a) The *market schedule quantities* referred to in rule 430(2)(a)(iv) and 431(2)(b)(iv) must be revised for each run of the settlement system (whether for prudential monitoring, *preliminary statements*, *final statements* or *revised statements*) for which revised *STTM facility allocation* data is available.
- (b) For each settlement run, AEMO must use available data so as to:
 - (i) produce an *ex ante market schedule* that results in no *deviation payments* or *deviation charges* being applied to a *Trading Participant* for the relevant *gas day*; or
 - (ii) if AEMO is unable to produce this schedule, determine *ad hoc payments* or *ad hoc charges* for a *Trading Participant* so that the effective price per GJ of deviation is equal to the *ex ante market price*.
- (c) If AEMO is required to determine a *registered facility service allocation* under rule 420(5) then, for the purpose of this clause 8.4, AEMO must assume that all quantities of gas supplied or withdrawn in respect of a *registered facility service* were supplied or withdrawn by the *contract holder* for that *registered facility service*.

8.4.2 Matters to be determined

For the purposes of determining *market schedule quantities* under rule 430(2)(a)(iv) or 431(2)(b)(iv), AEMO must first determine the following matters in respect of each *gas day* for which a *market administered scheduling state* or a *market administered settlement state* applies:

- (a) the sum of all *market schedule quantities* for the *registered trading rights* of each *Trading Participant* for the supply of gas to the *hub* on an *STTM facility*, calculated as:

- (i) the total *allocated quantities* across all *registered trading rights* of that *Trading Participant* for supply to the *hub* on that *STTM facility*;
- (ii) less quantities *scheduled* under *contingency gas offers* by that *Trading Participant* using that *STTM facility*;
- (iii) plus quantities *scheduled* under *contingency gas bids* by that *Trading Participant* using that *STTM facility*;
- (iv) less quantities of *MOS gas* allocated to the *Trading Participant* for that *STTM facility* that increase the total quantity of gas supplied to the *hub* by that *Trading Participant*;
- (v) plus quantities of *MOS gas* allocated to the *Trading Participant* for that *STTM facility* that decrease the total quantity of gas supplied to the *hub* by that *Trading Participant*;
- (vi) less the quantity of gas associated with *market schedule variations* that increase the amount taken to have been supplied to the *hub* by the *Trading Participant* on that *STTM facility*;
- (vii) plus the quantity of gas associated with *market schedule variations* that decrease the amount taken to have been supplied to the *hub* by the *Trading Participant* on that *STTM facility*;

Example: If a shipper is allocated 10TJ of flow to the *hub* on a pipeline, but decreased flow to the *hub* by 2TJ due to *contingency gas bids* being *scheduled*, provided 1TJ of *MOS increase offer*, and used an *MSV* for decreased flow to the *hub* to reflect a reduction of 3TJ in its pipeline schedule then the value to be determined is: $10-(0)+(2)-(1)+(0)-(0)+(3) = 14\text{TJ}$. That is, the *ex ante market schedule* for that shipper on that pipeline is deemed to be 14TJ of flow to the *hub*. After decreasing by 2TJ for *contingency gas*, increasing it by 1TJ for *MOS*, and decreasing it by 3TJ for *MSVs* the settlement equations will produce a *modified market schedule* of 10TJ. This matches the allocation so there is no deviation.

- (b) the sum of all *market schedule quantities* for the *registered trading rights* of each *Trading Participant* for the withdrawal of gas from the *hub* on an *STTM facility*, calculated as:
 - (i) the total *allocated quantities* across all *registered trading rights* of that *Trading Participant* for withdrawal from the *hub* on that *STTM facility*;
 - (ii) plus quantities *scheduled* under *contingency gas offers* by that *Trading Participant* using that *STTM facility*;
 - (iii) less quantities *scheduled* under *contingency gas bids* by that *Trading Participant* using that *STTM facility*;

- (iv) plus quantities of *MOS gas* allocated to the *Trading Participant* for that *STTM facility* that increase the total quantity of gas supplied to the *hub* by that *Trading Participant*;
- (v) less quantities of *MOS gas* allocated to the *Trading Participant* for that *STTM facility* that decrease the total quantity of gas supplied to the *hub* by that *Trading Participant*;
- (vi) less the quantity of gas associated with *market schedule variations* that increase the amount taken to have been withdrawn from the *hub* by the *Trading Participant* on that *STTM facility*;
- (vii) plus the quantity of gas associated with *market schedule variations* that decrease the amount taken to have been withdrawn from the *hub* by the *Trading Participant* on that *STTM facility*; and

Example: If a shipper is allocated 10TJ of flow from the *hub* on a pipeline, but increased flow from the *hub* by 2TJ due to *contingency gas bids* being *scheduled*, provided 1TJ of *MOS increase offer* (by reducing its offtake), and used an *MSV* for decreased flow from the *hub* to reflect a reduction of 3TJ in its pipeline schedule then the value to be determined is: $10+(0)-(2)+(1)-(0)-(0)+(3)=12\text{TJ}$. That is, the *ex ante market schedule* for that shipper on that pipeline is deemed to be 12TJ of flow from the *hub*. After increasing off-take by 2TJ through contingency gas, decreasing flow by 1TJ to supply *MOS* to the *hub*, and decreasing it by 3TJ for *MSVs* the settlement equations will produce a modified market schedule of 10TJ of flow from the *hub*. This matches the allocation so there is no deviation.

- (c) the sum of all *market schedule quantities* for the *registered trading rights* of each *Trading Participant* for the withdrawal of gas from the *hub* using a *registered distribution service*, calculated as:
 - (i) the total *allocated quantities* across all *registered trading rights* associated with the *registered distribution service*;
 - (ii) plus quantities *scheduled* under *contingency gas offers* by that *Trading Participant* using the relevant *STTM distribution system*;
 - (iii) less quantities *scheduled* under *contingency gas bids* by that *Trading Participant* using the relevant *STTM distribution system*;
 - (iv) less the quantity of gas associated with *market schedule variations* that increase the amount taken to have been withdrawn from the *hub* by the *Trading Participant* on the *STTM distribution system*;
 - (v) plus the quantity of gas associated with *market schedule variations* that decrease the amount taken to have been withdrawn from the *hub* by the *Trading Participant* on the *STTM distribution system*.

8.4.3 Market schedule quantities

- (a) Subject to paragraphs (b) and (c), AEMO must determine the *market schedule quantity* for each *registered trading right* of a *Trading Participant* for a *gas day D* for which a *market administered scheduling state* or *market administered settlement state* applies by (as applicable):
- (i) allocating the value determined under clauses 8.4.2(a) or (b) for *gas day D* to a *registered trading right* of the *Trading Participant* that relates to an *STTM facility service* for the relevant *STTM facility* and flow direction; and
 - (ii) allocating the value determined under clause 8.4.2(c) for *gas day D* to a *registered trading right* of the *Trading Participant* that relates to the *hub*.
- (b) AEMO may allocate a value under paragraphs (a)(i) or (ii) to any one or more relevant *registered trading rights* in any proportions determined by AEMO.
- (c) If a value determined under clauses 8.4.2(a), (b) or (c) is negative, the *market schedule quantity* for each relevant *registered trading right* is zero.

8.4.4 Ad hoc payments and charges

If a value determined under clauses 8.4.2(a), (b) or (c) for a *Trading Participant* is negative, AEMO must determine the *ad hoc payment* (AHP(p,d)) or *ad hoc charge* (AHC(p,d)) for that *Trading Participant* and *gas day*, calculated as:

- (a) the *deviation charge* for that *Trading Participant* for that *gas day* (DevC(p,d)) calculated in accordance with clause 10.8.11(f); less
- (b) the *deviation payment* for that *Trading Participant* for that *gas day* (DevP(p,d)) calculated in accordance with clause 10.8.11(e); plus
- (c) the *ex ante market price* for that *hub* and *gas day* (HP(d)) multiplied by:
 - (i) any negative value determined in clause 8.4.2(a); less
 - (ii) any negative value determined in clause 8.4.2(b); less
 - (iii) any negative value determined in clause 8.4.2(c),

and the result of that calculation will be an *ad hoc payment* if it is a positive amount and an *ad hoc charge* if it is a negative amount.

CHAPTER 9 – CONTINGENCY GAS

9.1 Contingency Gas Offers and Bids

9.1.1 Contingency gas offers

- (a) For the purposes of rule 435(3)(b), a *contingency gas offer* must specify:
- (i) the *identifier* of the *Trading Participant* submitting the *contingency gas offer*, and
 - (ii) the *gas day* to which the *contingency gas offer* relates; and
 - (iii) either:
 - (A) the *identifier* of the *STTM distribution system*; or
 - (B) the *identifier* of the *STTM facility* and the direction of flow,
 to which the *contingency gas offer* relates; and
 - (iv) at least one and up to ten *price steps*.
- (b) Each *price step* must specify:
- (i) a single price, expressed in \$/GJ to four decimal places, greater than or equal to *MMP* and less than or equal to *MPC*; and
 - (ii) the maximum quantity of *contingency gas* that the *Trading Participant* is willing to provide to the *hub* at the price specified under subparagraph (i), expressed in whole GJ.
- (c) If the price in a *price step* (referred to in this paragraph as the **higher price step**) is greater than the price in any other *price step* in the *contingency gas offer*, then the quantity in the higher price step must be greater than the quantity in that other *price step*.
- Note:** The purpose of paragraphs (c) and (d) is to ensure that each *price step* represents a cumulative quantity of gas, and that prices increase with increasing *price step* quantities.
- (d) A *price step* must not have the same price as any other *price step* in the *contingency gas offer*.
- (e) For the purposes of rule 435(5), the quantity of gas specified in a *contingency gas offer* for a *gas day* should not exceed:
- (i) for an *STTM Shipper* offering to increase the supply of gas to the *hub* from an *STTM facility*:
 - (A) the aggregate of its *capacity limits* under all *registered trading rights* for flow to the *hub* from the relevant *STTM facility*;

- (B) less any gas it is *scheduled* to supply to the *hub* from the relevant *STTM facility* in the *ex ante market schedule* for that *gas day*;
 - (C) plus any additional gas it reasonably expects to be able to supply to the *hub* from the relevant *STTM facility* on that *gas day*;
- (ii) for an *STTM Shipper* offering to decrease the withdrawal of gas from the *hub* on an *STTM pipeline*:
- (A) the quantity of gas it is *scheduled* to withdraw from the *hub* on the relevant *STTM pipeline* in the *ex ante market schedule* for that *gas day*;
 - (B) plus any additional quantity of gas it reasonably expects to withdraw from the *hub* on the relevant *STTM pipeline* on the *gas day*; or
- (iii) for an *STTM User* offering to decrease the withdrawal of gas from the *hub* into the *STTM distribution system*, the maximum reduction in the quantity of gas consumption that it reasonably expects to be achieved by the *STTM User* or its interruptible customers within the *gas day*.

9.1.2 Contingency gas bids

- (a) For the purposes of rule 436(3)(b), a *contingency gas bid* must specify:
- (i) the *identifier* of the *Trading Participant* submitting the *contingency gas bid*; and
 - (ii) the *gas day* to which the *contingency gas bid* relates; and
 - (iii) either:
 - (A) the *identifier* of the *STTM distribution system*; or
 - (B) the *identifier* of the *STTM facility* and the direction of flow,
 to which the *contingency gas bid* relates; and
 - (iv) at least one and up to ten *price steps*.
- (b) Each *price step* must specify:
- (i) a single price, expressed in \$/GJ to four decimal places, greater than or equal to *MMP* and less than or equal to *MPC*; and
 - (ii) the maximum quantity of *contingency gas* that the *Trading Participant* is willing to provide to the *hub* at the price specified under subparagraph (i), expressed in whole GJ.

- (c) If the price in a *price step* (referred to in this paragraph as the **higher price step**) is greater than the price in any other *price step* in the *contingency gas bid*, then the quantity in the higher price step must be less than the quantity in that other *price step*.

Note: The purpose of paragraphs (c) and (d) is to ensure that each *price step* represents a cumulative quantity of gas, and that prices decrease with increasing *price step* quantities.

- (d) A *price step* must not have the same price as any other *price step* in the *contingency gas bid*.
- (e) For the purposes of rule 436(5), the quantity of gas specified in a *contingency gas bid* for a *gas day* should not exceed:
- (i) for an *STTM Shipper* bidding to decrease the supply of gas to the *hub* from an *STTM facility*:
 - (A) the quantity of gas it is *scheduled* to supply to the *hub* from the relevant *STTM facility* in the *ex ante market schedule* for that *gas day*;
 - (B) plus any additional quantity of gas it reasonably expects to supply to the *hub* from the relevant *STTM facility* on the *gas day*; or
 - (ii) for an *STTM Shipper* bidding to increase the withdrawal of gas from the *hub* on an *STTM pipeline*:
 - (A) the aggregate of its *capacity limits* under all *registered trading rights* for flow from the *hub* on the relevant *STTM pipeline*;
 - (B) less any gas it is *scheduled* to withdraw from the *hub* on the relevant *STTM pipeline* in the *ex ante market schedule* for that *gas day*;
 - (C) plus any additional gas it reasonably expects to be able to withdraw from the *hub* on the relevant *STTM pipeline* on that *gas day*;
 - (iii) for an *STTM User* bidding to increase the withdrawal of gas from the *hub* into the *STTM distribution system*:
 - (A) the aggregate of its *capacity limits* under all *registered trading rights* for the withdrawal of gas from the *hub*;
 - (B) less any gas it is *scheduled* to withdraw from the *hub* in the *ex ante market schedule* for that *gas day*;
 - (C) plus any additional gas it reasonably expects to be able to withdraw from the *hub* on that *gas day*.

9.1.3 Publication of contingency gas offers and contingency gas bids

- (a) For the purposes of rule 435(8), AEMO must make the following information for each *contingency gas offer* submitted for a *gas day* available to each *Trading Participant* after the end of that *gas day* and before 11:00 am on the next *gas day*:
 - (i) the identity of the relevant *Trading Participant*; and
 - (ii) the *hub* and the *STTM distribution system* or *STTM facility* and flow direction to which the *contingency gas offer* relates; and
 - (iii) the prices and quantities in each *price step*.
- (b) For the purposes of rule 436(8), AEMO must make the following information for each *contingency gas bid* submitted for a *gas day* available to each *Trading Participant* after the end of that *gas day* and before 11:00 am on the next *gas day*:
 - (i) the identity of the relevant *Trading Participant*; and
 - (ii) the *hub* and the *STTM distribution system* or *STTM facility* and flow direction to which the *contingency gas bid* relates; and
 - (iii) the prices and quantities in each *price step*.
- (c) If AEMO is unable to make the information specified in paragraphs (a) and (b) available to each *Trading Participant* by 11:00 am on the next *gas day*, AEMO must do so as soon as practicable.
- (d) AEMO must *publish* the information specified in paragraphs (a) and (b) as soon as practicable after that information is provided to *Trading Participants*.

9.2 Contingency Gas Benchmark Information

9.2.1 Benchmark information for STTM facilities

- (a) The benchmark information to be provided to AEMO by an *STTM pipeline operator* for *contingency gas* purposes under rule 376(1)(j) is the *linepack range* for that *STTM pipeline*, being the minimum and maximum quantity of *linepack* which the *STTM pipeline operator* considers, after consultation with the *STTM distributor* at the relevant *hub*, is required to ensure the safe and reliable flow of gas through that *STTM pipeline*, taking into account:
 - (i) the contractual entitlements of each user of the *STTM pipeline* to capacity in that *STTM pipeline*;
 - (ii) the *STTM pipeline operator's* forecasts of the quantities of gas likely to be injected into and withdrawn from the *STTM pipeline*;
 - (iii) the operational requirements for the *STTM pipeline*;

- (iv) the time required for *Trading Participants* that have submitted *contingency gas offers* or *contingency gas bids* to provide that *contingency gas*;
 - (v) the time required to curtail withdrawals of gas from the *STTM pipeline*;
 - (vi) the time required by any *STTM distributor* to curtail withdrawals of gas from an *STTM distribution system* that is supplied with gas from the *STTM pipeline*; and
 - (vii) the acceptable pressure range for the *custody transfer points* of the *STTM distribution system* that are supplied with gas from the *STTM pipeline*; and
 - (viii) the ability of the *STTM pipeline* to deliver gas to the *hub*.
- (b) The benchmark information to be provided to AEMO by an *STTM facility operator* in respect of an *STTM storage facility* or *STTM production facility* for *contingency gas* purposes under rule 376(1)(j) is the daily delivery capacity to deliver gas to the *hub* from that *STTM facility*, as determined by that *STTM facility operator* after consultation with the *STTM distributor* at the relevant *hub*.

9.2.2 Benchmark information for STTM distribution systems

- (a) The benchmark information to be provided to AEMO by an *STTM distributor* for *contingency gas* purposes under rule 376(2)(f) is:
- (i) the acceptable pressure range for the *custody transfer points* of the *STTM distribution system*; and
 - (ii) the requirements (if any) for minimum and maximum flows for the *custody transfer points* of the *STTM distribution system*; and
 - (iii) the range of times required by the *STTM distributor* to curtail withdrawals of gas from the *STTM distribution system*,
- as determined by that *STTM distributor* after consultation with all *STTM facility operators* at the relevant *hub*.
- (b) This clause does not apply to *deemed STTM distributors*.

9.2.3 Updating benchmark information

For the purposes of rule 378(1)(b), an *STTM facility operator* or *STTM distributor* must provide updated benchmark information to AEMO:

- (a) on 15 May of each year, or if that day is not a business day, the first business day following that day; and
- (b) on 15 October of each year, or if that day is not a business day, the first business day following that day.

9.3 Contingency Gas Trigger Events

9.3.1 Information about contingency gas trigger events

- (a) As soon as practicable after a request by AEMO under rule 440(2)(b), a *Trading Participant*, *STTM distributor* or *STTM facility operator* must provide all information available to it regarding:
 - (i) the type of *contingency gas trigger event* that has occurred; and
 - (ii) any *hub*, *STTM facility* and/or *STTM distribution system* that is affected by a *contingency gas trigger event*.
- (b) A person required to provide information under paragraph (a) must use reasonable endeavours to do so within any time specified by AEMO in its request.

9.3.2 Notification and communication

- (a) A notice *published* by AEMO under rule 441(1) regarding a *contingency gas trigger event* must:
 - (i) either:
 - (A) if AEMO was notified of the *contingency gas trigger event* under rule 440(2)(a) – identify the party that notified AEMO; or
 - (B) state that AEMO considers that the *contingency gas trigger event* has occurred as contemplated in rule 441(1)(b); and
 - (ii) specify the date and time at which the notification was received or AEMO decided that the *contingency gas trigger event* had occurred; and
 - (iii) identify the relevant *contingency gas trigger event*, and
 - (iv) include any information provided to AEMO under clause 9.3.1(a)(ii).
- (b) AEMO will chair the *CG assessment conference* convened in accordance with rule 441(1)(d).
- (c) AEMO must convene an additional *CG assessment conference* prior to updating a *contingency gas requirement* in accordance with rule 444(4).

9.3.3 Notice before material involuntary curtailment

For the purposes of rule 442(5), an *STTM distributor* or an *STTM pipeline operator* must notify AEMO before commencing *material involuntary curtailment* in respect of the *hub* to which the *contingency gas trigger event* relates.

9.3.4 Determination of contingency gas requirement

- (a) For the purposes of rule 444(3)(b), no other details are specified.
- (b) For the purposes of rule 444(4)(b), if AEMO receives a notice from an *STTM distributor* or an *STTM pipeline operator* under clause 9.3.3, AEMO must determine under rule 444(1) that *contingency gas* is no longer needed at the relevant *hub*.

9.4 Calling and Scheduling Contingency Gas

9.4.1 Confirmation of availability

- (a) For the purpose of rule 445, prior to *scheduling contingency gas*, AEMO must determine the last time by which it can receive confirmation of availability from *Trading Participants*, taking into account the time at which *contingency gas* is required.
- (b) If AEMO has not completed the confirmation process under this clause by the time determined in paragraph (a), it may commence *scheduling contingency gas* using the quantities that it has confirmed at that time.
- (c) If the *contingency gas requirement* includes:
 - (i) a requirement for increased net supply at the *hub* then AEMO must produce a provisional *contingency gas offer stack* from the *price steps* of *contingency gas offers* for the applicable *hub*, in order of increasing price; or
 - (ii) a requirement for decreased net supply at the *hub* then AEMO must produce a provisional *contingency gas bid stack* from the *price steps* of *contingency gas bids* for the applicable *hub* in order of decreasing price.
- (d) In producing the provisional *contingency gas offer stack* or provisional *contingency gas bid stack*, if there is more than one *price step* with the same price, then AEMO may place those tied *price steps* in any order.
- (e) If the *STTM facility* or *STTM distribution system* indicated in a *contingency gas offer* or *contingency gas bid* is not consistent with the location for the *contingency gas requirement*, then AEMO must set the availability of the *price steps* of that *contingency gas offer* or *contingency gas bid* to zero in the relevant provisional *contingency gas stack*.
- (f) Subject to paragraph (b), AEMO must contact the *Trading Participants* in the provisional *contingency gas offer stack* and/or provisional *contingency gas bid stack*, except those *Trading Participants* whose *price steps* have been set to zero availability under paragraph (e), using the contact details provided under rule 434 and request confirmation of:

- (i) the total quantity of *contingency gas* that can be provided by the time specified in the *contingency gas requirement* (whether less than, equal to, or greater than the total quantity specified in the applicable *contingency gas offer* or *contingency gas bid*); and
 - (ii) the time at which any additional *contingency gas* would be available and the quantity of gas available at that time,
- by the time and in the manner specified by AEMO in its request.
- (g) For the purposes of rule 445(2)(c), no other information is required to be provided by a *Trading Participant*.
 - (h) If the total quantity of *contingency gas* that a *Trading Participant* confirms can be provided by the time specified in the *contingency gas requirement* is:
 - (i) less than the quantity specified in that *Trading Participant's contingency gas offer*, AEMO must set the availability of that *Trading Participant's price steps* in the relevant provisional *contingency gas offer stack* by reducing the quantities in *price steps* in order of decreasing price so that the total quantity across all *price steps* equals the reduced quantity available;

Note: A reduced quantity includes zero availability in the required timeframe, in which case the whole offer will be marked as unavailable and will not be *scheduled*.

- (ii) greater than the quantity specified in that *Trading Participant's contingency gas offer*, AEMO must set the availability of that *Trading Participant's highest priced price step* in the relevant provisional *contingency gas offer stack* so that the total quantity across all *price steps* equals the increased quantity available;
- (iii) less than the quantity specified in that *Trading Participant's contingency gas bid*, AEMO must set the availability of that *Trading Participant's price steps* in the relevant provisional *contingency gas bid stack* by reducing the quantities in *price steps* in order of increasing price so that the total across all *price steps* equals the reduced quantity available; or
- (iv) greater than the quantity specified in that *Trading Participant's contingency gas bid*, AEMO must set the availability of that *Trading Participant's lowest priced price step* in the relevant provisional *contingency gas bid stack* so that the total across all *price steps* equals the increased quantity available.

9.4.2 Scheduling contingency gas

- (a) For the purposes of rule 446(1):

- (i) the *contingency gas offer stack* is the provisional *contingency gas offer stack* created in accordance with clause 9.4.1, excluding any *price steps* with zero availability; and
- (ii) the *contingency gas bid stack* is the provisional *contingency gas bid stack* created in accordance with clause 9.4.1, excluding any *price steps* with zero availability,

as at the time at which AEMO *schedules contingency gas* for the relevant *gas day*.

- (b) For the purpose of rule 446(2)(a), AEMO must *schedule contingency gas* in accordance with clauses 9.4.2(c) to (f).
- (c) Subject to paragraph (e), if the *contingency gas requirement* includes a requirement for increased net supply at the *hub*, AEMO must *schedule price steps*, in whole or in part, from the *contingency gas offer stack*, in increasing order of price, until:
 - (i) the total quantity *scheduled* equals the quantity required; or
 - (ii) all of the available *price steps* in the stack have been *scheduled*.
- (d) Subject to paragraph (e), if the *contingency gas requirement* includes a requirement for decreased net supply at the *hub*, AEMO must *schedule price steps*, in whole or in part, from the *contingency gas bid stack*, in decreasing order of price, until:
 - (i) the total quantity *scheduled* equals the quantity required; or
 - (ii) all of the available *price steps* in the stack have been *scheduled*.
- (e) If two or more *price steps* in a *contingency gas offer stack* or *contingency gas bid stack* specify the same price, AEMO must *schedule* those *price steps* in proportion to the quantity confirmed as available for each *price step*.
- (f) Subject to paragraph (g), where AEMO revises the *contingency gas requirement* for a *gas day*, *contingency gas offer price steps* and *contingency gas bid price steps* already *scheduled* must remain *scheduled*.

Note: This paragraph is required so that, if a low cost *contingency gas* provider is not able to provide gas in the time needed under the initial *contingency gas requirement*, and so a higher cost, but quicker responding *contingency gas* provider is *scheduled* instead, the low cost *contingency gas* provider is not able to “bump” the previously *scheduled* high cost provider if the *contingency gas requirement* is revised at a later stage.

- (g) In the circumstances contemplated in rule 444(5), AEMO may contact *Trading Participants* for the purpose of requesting agreement not to provide *contingency gas* as *scheduled* and, if AEMO does so:

- (i) in relation to a requirement to increase net supply to the *hub*, AEMO must contact relevant *Trading Participants* scheduled in decreasing order of their *scheduled price steps*;
- (ii) in relation to a requirement to decrease net supply to the *hub*, AEMO must contact the *Trading Participants* previously *scheduled* in increasing order of their *scheduled price steps*;
- (iii) no *Trading Participant* is obliged to agree to revise its *scheduled quantity of contingency gas*; and
- (iv) if that *Trading Participant* agrees to revise its *scheduled quantity*, it is not entitled to claim or receive any compensation under Division 9 of the rules as a result of that revision.

Note: This might occur if the quantity of *contingency gas* required is reduced before voluntary curtailment occurs, and the *Trading Participant* would rather continue to withdraw gas than receive the payment for providing *contingency gas*.

CHAPTER 10 - SETTLEMENT

10.1 Settlement Equation Definitions

10.1.1 Terms

The following table defines the indices used to identify different terms in the settlement equations.

Term	Definition
$c(k)$	Denotes a <i>registered trading right</i> on <i>market facility</i> k . A <i>registered trading right</i> $c(k)$ can be for supply of gas to the <i>hub</i> (represented by $ct(k)$) or for withdrawal of gas from the <i>hub</i> (represented by $cf(k)$).
$cf(k)$	Denotes a <i>registered trading right</i> that allows withdrawal of gas from the <i>hub</i> on <i>market facility</i> k . See $c(k)$.
$ct(k)$	Denotes a <i>registered trading right</i> that allows supply of gas to the <i>hub</i> on <i>market facility</i> k . See $c(k)$.
d	Denotes a <i>gas day</i> .
f	Denotes a step of the <i>variation settlement function</i> . Each step corresponds to a variation percentage range and variation quantity range described in rule 463. A finite number of steps are defined where each step must have a $PVarR(f)$ value and a $PVarF(f)$ value (for the <i>percentage method</i>) or a $GVarR(f)$ value and a $GVarF(f)$ value (for the <i>quantity method</i>). When comparing one step with another, the term f' may be used to indicate a step other than f .
f'	Denotes a step of the <i>variation settlement function</i> . See f .
fd	Denotes an index representing flow direction and takes the value “to” or “from” for terms relating to gas flows to or from the <i>hub</i> respectively. For an <i>STTM Shipper</i> supplying the <i>hub</i> on an <i>STTM facility</i> ($k \in SP$) $fd = \text{“to”}$. For an <i>STTM Shipper</i> withdrawing gas from the <i>hub</i> on an <i>STTM facility</i> ($k \in SP$) $fd = \text{“from”}$. For an <i>STTM User</i> withdrawing gas from the <i>hub</i> ($k \in SN$) $fd = \text{“from”}$.
g	Denotes a step of the <i>deviation settlement function</i> . A finite number of steps are defined for each direction of deviation (the <i>positive deviation range</i> and the <i>negative deviation range</i>). Each step of the <i>positive deviation range</i> corresponds to a deviation percentage range and deviation quantity range described in rule 462 with a positive percentage or positive GJ deviation, though only includes the positive range of the deviation percentage range and deviation quantity range that includes a zero percentage or zero GJ deviation. Each step of the <i>negative deviation range</i> corresponds to a deviation

Term	Definition
	percentage range and deviation quantity range described in rule 462 with a negative percentage or negative GJ deviation, though only includes the negative range of the deviation percentage range and deviation quantity range that includes a zero percentage or zero GJ deviation. For the <i>percentage method</i> , each step of the <i>positive deviation range</i> must have a PDevPR(g) value and a PDevPF(g) value and each step of the <i>negative deviation range</i> must have a PDevNR(g) value and a PDevNF(g) value. For the <i>quantity method</i> , each step of the <i>positive deviation range</i> must have a GDevPR(g) value and a GDevPF(g) value and each step of the <i>negative deviation range</i> must have a GDevNR(g) value and a GDevNF(g) value.
	When comparing one step with another, the term g' may be used to indicate a step other than g.
g'	Denotes a step of the <i>deviation settlement function</i> . See g.
j	Denotes a <i>price step</i> of a <i>MOS increase offer</i> or <i>MOS decrease offer</i> .
k	Denotes a <i>market facility</i> .
m(k)	Denotes a <i>MOS increase offer</i> or a <i>MOS decrease offer</i> that is included by AEMO in a <i>MOS increase stack</i> or <i>MOS decrease stack</i> for <i>STTM pipeline k</i> for a <i>MOS period</i> .
p	Denotes a <i>Trading Participant</i> . Note that a term being calculated for <i>Trading Participant p</i> may include references to other <i>Trading Participants</i> (eg. summations over all <i>Trading Participants</i>). In such instances p' is used to denote a member of the set of <i>Trading Participants</i> , and can be interpreted identically to p except that <i>Trading Participant p'</i> may be <i>Trading Participant p</i> or another <i>Trading Participant</i> .
p'	Denotes a <i>Trading Participant</i> . See p.

10.1.2 Sets

The following table defines the sets used in the settlement equations.

Term	Definition
AH	Denotes the set of <i>registered trading rights</i> for <i>as available capacity</i> that allow the supply of gas to a <i>hub</i> . This set does not include <i>registered trading rights</i> that allow withdrawal of gas from the <i>hub</i> .
BP	Denotes the set of <i>gas days</i> in a <i>billing period</i> .

Term	Definition
FH	Denotes the set of <i>registered trading rights</i> for <i>firm haulage</i> that allow the supply of gas to a <i>hub</i> . This set does not include <i>registered trading rights</i> that allow withdrawal of gas from the <i>hub</i> .
SN	Denotes the set containing a single member representing all of the <i>STTM distribution systems</i> for a <i>hub</i> .
SP	Denotes the set of <i>STTM facilities</i> serving a <i>hub</i> .

10.1.3 Mathematical terms

The following table defines all the mathematical terms used in the settlement equations.

Term	Definition
AHC(p,d)	An <i>ad hoc charge</i> for <i>Trading Participant p</i> for <i>gas day d</i> , being an amount payable by that <i>Trading Participant</i> for the purposes of rule 464(2)(c) and to be accounted for in the settlement shortfall and surplus calculation in clause 10.10.
AHP(p,d)	An <i>ad hoc payment</i> for <i>Trading Participant p</i> for <i>gas day d</i> , being an amount payable to that <i>Trading Participant</i> for the purposes of rule 464(2)(d) and to be accounted for in the settlement shortfall and surplus calculation in clause 10.10.
AllCAP	The <i>settlement surplus cap</i> .
AQ ^S (p,d,c(k))	The <i>allocated quantity</i> (including <i>MOS gas</i>) for the supply of gas to the <i>hub</i> ; or withdrawal of gas from the <i>hub</i> by <i>Trading Participant p</i> (as an <i>STTM Shipper</i>) on <i>gas day d</i> on <i>registered trading right c(k)</i> on <i>market facility k</i> ∈ SP (an <i>STTM facility</i>). This value is determined in accordance with rule 420.
AQ ^U (p,d,c(k))	The <i>allocated quantity</i> for the withdrawal of gas from the <i>hub</i> by <i>Trading Participant p</i> (as an <i>STTM User</i>) on <i>gas day d</i> on <i>registered trading right c(k)</i> on <i>market facility k</i> ∈ SN. This value is determined in accordance with rule 422.
CAP(p,d,c(k))	The <i>capacity limit</i> of <i>registered trading right c(k)</i> on <i>market facility k</i> registered to <i>Trading Participant p</i> for <i>gas day d</i> . This value is determined in accordance with rules 384, 385 and 386 (as applicable).
CGC(p,d)	The <i>contingency gas charge</i> amount payable by <i>Trading Participant p</i> for a <i>hub</i> for <i>gas day d</i> determined in clause 10.6(b).
CGP(p,d)	The <i>contingency gas payment</i> amount payable to <i>Trading Participant p</i> for a <i>hub</i> for <i>gas day d</i> determined in clause 10.6(a).

Term	Definition
CGPH(d)	The <i>high contingency gas price</i> for a <i>hub</i> for <i>gas day d</i> . This term is null (i.e. has no impact on settlement) unless <i>contingency gas</i> was <i>scheduled</i> to increase net supply to the <i>hub</i> on <i>gas day d</i> . This value is determined in accordance with rule 447.
CGPL(d)	The <i>low contingency gas price</i> for a <i>hub</i> for <i>gas day d</i> . This term is null (i.e. has no impact on settlement) unless <i>contingency gas</i> was <i>scheduled</i> to decrease net supply to the <i>hub</i> on <i>gas day d</i> . This value is determined in accordance with rule 448.
CP(d,k)	The <i>capacity price</i> for <i>market facility</i> $k \in SP$ (an <i>STTM facility</i>) on <i>gas day d</i> . This term is greater than or equal to zero. This value is determined in accordance with rule 417.
$CQ^S(p,d,k,fd)$	The quantity of <i>contingency gas scheduled</i> by AEMO under rule 446 for <i>Trading Participant p</i> (as an <i>STTM Shipper</i>) for <i>gas day d</i> on <i>market facility</i> $k \in SP$ (an <i>STTM facility</i>) and in flow direction <i>fd</i> . This term may be positive or negative, where a positive value for supply to the <i>hub</i> increases net supply to the <i>hub</i> , while a positive value for withdrawal from the <i>hub</i> decreases net supply to the <i>hub</i> . This value is determined in accordance with rule 446.
CQT(d,k)	The capacity quantity traded between <i>Trading Participants</i> with <i>available capacity</i> and <i>Trading Participants</i> with <i>firm capacity</i> on <i>market facility</i> $k \in SP$ (an <i>STTM facility</i>) for <i>gas day d</i> . This value is determined in clause 10.9.1(e).
$CQ^U(p,d,k,fd)$	The quantity of <i>contingency gas scheduled</i> by AEMO under rule 446 for <i>Trading Participant p</i> (as an <i>STTM User</i>) for <i>gas day d</i> on <i>market facility</i> $k \in SN$ and in flow direction <i>fd</i> (<i>fd</i> = "from" only). This term may be positive or negative, where a positive value for withdrawal from the <i>hub</i> decreases net supply to the <i>hub</i> . This value is determined in accordance with rule 446.
CSC(p,d,k,fd)	The change, due to <i>market schedule variations</i> , to be applied to the <i>market schedule quantity</i> in forming the <i>modified market schedule quantity</i> for <i>Trading Participant p</i> on <i>gas day d</i> for <i>market facility k</i> for flows in direction <i>fd</i> , where the change is subject to <i>variation charges</i> . This value is determined in clause 10.5.1.
DevC(p,d)	The <i>deviation charge</i> amount payable by <i>Trading Participant p</i> for a <i>hub</i> for <i>gas day d</i> determined in clause 10.8.11(f).
DevP(p,d)	The <i>deviation payment</i> amount payable to <i>Trading Participant p</i> for a <i>hub</i> for <i>gas day d</i> determined in clause 10.8.11(e).
DevNFA(p,d,k)	The settlement amount for <i>Trading Participant p</i> for negative deviations in withdrawals from the <i>hub</i> on <i>market facility k</i> on <i>gas day d</i> determined in clause 10.8.11(b).
DevNTA(p,d,k)	The settlement amount for <i>Trading Participant p</i> for negative deviations in gas supplied to the <i>hub</i> on <i>gas day d</i> determined in

Term	Definition
	clause 10.8.11(d).
DevPFA(p,d,k)	The settlement amount for <i>Trading Participant</i> p for positive deviations in withdrawals from the <i>hub</i> on <i>market facility</i> k on <i>gas day</i> d determined in clause 10.8.11(a).
DevPTA(p,d,k)	The settlement amount for <i>Trading Participant</i> p for positive deviations in gas supplied to the <i>hub</i> on <i>gas day</i> d determined in clause 10.8.11(c).
DPFlag(d)	The DPFlag(d) can be 0 or 1 for a <i>hub</i> and a <i>gas day</i> . It is set by AEMO in accordance with clause 8.2.2(c). If it is 0, then settlement calculations are unaffected. If it is 1, then all positive deviations are settled at the <i>ex ante market price</i> , while all negative deviations are settled at the maximum price applicable to <i>gas day</i> d (MAXP(d)).
DQB(p)	The billing period deviation quantity for <i>Trading Participant</i> p for a <i>hub</i> determined in clause 10.10.2.
DQF(p,d,k)	The total GJ deviation of <i>Trading Participant</i> p withdrawing gas from the <i>hub</i> on <i>market facility</i> k on <i>gas day</i> d. If it is positive, the <i>Trading Participant</i> is long with respect to <i>market facility</i> k; if it is negative, the <i>Trading Participant</i> is short with respect to <i>market facility</i> k. This is determined in clauses 10.8.2(a) and 10.8.2(b).
DQT(p,d,k)	The total GJ deviation of <i>Trading Participant</i> p supplying gas to the <i>hub</i> on <i>market facility</i> k on <i>gas day</i> d. If it is positive, the <i>Trading Participant</i> is long with respect to <i>market facility</i> k; if it is negative, the <i>Trading Participant</i> is short with respect to <i>market facility</i> k. This is determined in clauses 10.8.2(c) and 10.8.2(d).
DVA(p)	The settlement shortfall or settlement surplus allocation on <i>deviation quantities</i> for a <i>hub</i> and a <i>billing period</i> to <i>Trading Participant</i> p. This is determined in clause 10.10.3.
EAQ ^S (p,d,ct(k))	The effective allocated quantity for <i>Trading Participant</i> p and <i>gas day</i> d for <i>registered trading right</i> ct(k) which allows the supply of gas to the <i>hub</i> on <i>market facility</i> k _∈ SP (an <i>STTM facility</i>). This is the total <i>allocated quantity</i> for that <i>registered trading right</i> corrected to remove the allocation of <i>MOS gas</i> to that <i>registered trading right</i> . This is determined in clause 10.9.1(a).
ECCA(d,k)	The effective capacity charge rate for <i>registered trading rights</i> for <i>as available capacity</i> on <i>gas day</i> d and <i>market facility</i> k _∈ SP (an <i>STTM facility</i>). This is determined in clause 10.9.2(a).
ECPF(d,k)	The effective capacity payment rate for <i>registered trading rights</i> for <i>firm capacity</i> on <i>gas day</i> d and <i>market facility</i> k _∈ SP (an <i>STTM facility</i>). This is determined in clause 10.9.2(b).
FDCP(d,k)	The <i>pipeline flow direction constraint price</i> for <i>gas day</i> d on <i>market facility</i> k _∈ SP (an <i>STTM facility</i>). This price is positive in value if the

Term	Definition
	constraint restricts flow and is zero otherwise. This value is determined in accordance with rule 417.
FGO(p,d,ct(k))	The deemed firm gas offered to be supplied to the <i>hub</i> by <i>Trading Participant p</i> (as an <i>STTM Shipper</i>) for <i>gas day d</i> on <i>registered trading right ct(k)</i> for <i>firm capacity on market facility k</i> $k \in SP$ (an <i>STTM facility</i>). This is determined in clause 10.9.1(b).
FSC(p,d,k,fd)	The change, due to <i>market schedule variations</i> , to be applied to the <i>market schedule quantity</i> for <i>Trading Participant p</i> for <i>gas day d</i> for <i>market facility k</i> for flows in direction <i>fd</i> , where the change is not subject to <i>variation charges</i> . This value is determined in clause 10.5.1.
GDevNF(g)	The factor for step <i>g</i> of the <i>quantity method negative deviation range</i> of the <i>deviation settlement function</i> . This equals GRefDevNF(g) if the <i>ex ante market price</i> for the <i>hub</i> is positive or zero (≥ 0), otherwise it equals GRefDevPF(g). This value is determined in clauses 10.8.7(a) and 10.8.7(b).
GDevNFA(p,d,k)	The <i>quantity method deviation settlement amount</i> for <i>Trading Participant p</i> for negative deviations which increase withdrawal from the <i>hub</i> on <i>market facility k</i> on <i>gas day d</i> . This value is determined in clause 10.8.10(b).
GDevNQF(p,d,k,g)	The <i>deviation quantity</i> (in GJ) of negative deviation step <i>g</i> for <i>Trading Participant p</i> on <i>gas day d</i> for withdrawals from the <i>hub</i> on <i>market facility k</i> determined using the <i>quantity method</i> . This term is greater than or equal to zero. This value is determined in clause 10.8.8(b).
GDevNQT(p,d,k,g)	The <i>deviation quantity</i> (in GJ) of negative deviation step <i>g</i> for <i>Trading Participant p</i> on <i>gas day d</i> for supply to the <i>hub</i> on <i>market facility k</i> determined using the <i>quantity method</i> . This term is greater than or equal to zero. This value is determined in clause 10.8.8(d).
GDevNR(g)	The GJ boundary between step <i>g</i> and step <i>g+1</i> of the <i>quantity method negative deviation range</i> of the <i>deviation settlement function</i> . This equals GRefDevNR(g) if the <i>ex ante market price</i> is positive or zero (≥ 0), otherwise it equals $-1 \times GRefDevPR(g)$. This term is neither defined nor used for $g = \text{Max}g$. This value is determined in clauses 10.8.7(a) and 10.8.7(b).
GDevNTA(p,d,k)	The <i>quantity method deviation settlement amount</i> for <i>Trading Participant p</i> for negative deviations which decrease supply to the <i>hub</i> on <i>market facility k</i> on <i>gas day d</i> . This value is determined in clause 10.8.10(d).

Term	Definition
GDevPF(g)	The factor for step g of the <i>quantity method positive deviation range</i> of the <i>deviation settlement function</i> . This equals GRefDevPF(g) if the <i>ex ante market price</i> is positive or zero (≥ 0), otherwise it equals GRefDevNF(g). This value is determined in clauses 10.8.7(a) and 10.8.7(b).
GDevPFA(p,d,k)	The <i>quantity method deviation settlement amount</i> for <i>Trading Participant p</i> for positive deviations which decrease withdrawal from the <i>hub</i> on <i>market facility k</i> on <i>gas day d</i> . This value is determined in clause 10.8.10(a).
GDevPQF(p,d,k,g)	The <i>deviation quantity</i> (in GJ) of positive deviation step g for <i>Trading Participant p</i> on <i>gas day d</i> for withdrawals from the <i>hub</i> on <i>market facility k</i> determined using the <i>quantity method</i> . This term is greater than or equal to zero. This value is determined in clause 10.8.8(a).
GDevPQT(p,d,k,g)	The <i>deviation quantity</i> (in GJ) of positive deviation step g for <i>Trading Participant p</i> on <i>gas day d</i> for supply to the <i>hub</i> on <i>market facility k</i> determined using the <i>quantity method</i> . This term is greater than or equal to zero. This value is determined in clause 10.8.8(c).
GDevPR(g)	The GJ boundary between step g and step g+1 of the <i>quantity method positive deviation range</i> of the <i>deviation settlement function</i> . This equals GRefDevPR(g) if the <i>ex ante market price</i> is positive or zero (≥ 0), otherwise it equals $-1 \times$ GRefDevNR(g). This term is neither defined nor used for $g = \text{Max}g$. This value is determined in clauses 10.8.7(a) and 10.8.7(b).
GDevPTA(p,d,k)	The <i>quantity method deviation settlement amount</i> for <i>Trading Participant p</i> for positive deviations which increase supply to the <i>hub</i> on <i>market facility k</i> on <i>gas day d</i> . This value is determined in clause 10.8.10(c).
GMI	The gross market income for a <i>hub</i> for a <i>billing period</i> . This is the total amount, excluding <i>variation charges</i> , received by AEMO for a <i>hub</i> for a <i>billing period</i> . This value is determined in clause 10.10.1(a).
GMO	Gross market outgoings for a <i>hub</i> for a <i>billing period</i> . This is the total amount paid by AEMO for a <i>hub</i> for a <i>billing period</i> . This value is determined in clause 10.10.1(b).
GPDevNF(p,d,k,g)	The deviation price of <i>quantity method negative deviation range</i> step g for <i>Trading Participant p</i> on <i>gas day d</i> for withdrawals from the <i>hub</i> on <i>market facility k</i> . This value is determined in clause 10.8.9(b).
GPDevNT(p,d,k,g)	The deviation price of <i>quantity method negative deviation range</i> step g for <i>Trading Participant p</i> on <i>gas day d</i> for supply to the <i>hub</i> on <i>market facility k</i> . This value is determined in clause 10.8.9(d).
GPDevPF(p,d,k,g)	The deviation price of <i>quantity method positive deviation range</i> step g for <i>Trading Participant p</i> on <i>gas day d</i> for withdrawals from the <i>hub</i> on

Term	Definition
	<i>market facility k</i> . This value is determined in clause 10.8.9(a).
GPDevPT(p,d,k,g)	The deviation price of <i>quantity method positive deviation range</i> step g for <i>Trading Participant p</i> on <i>gas day d</i> for supply to the <i>hub</i> on <i>market facility k</i> . This value is determined in clause 10.8.9(c).
GRefDevNF(g)	The factor for step g of the <i>quantity method negative deviation range</i> of the <i>deviation settlement function</i> (assuming the <i>ex ante market price</i> is positive or zero). These factors increase with increasing negative deviation and are the factors for the deviation quantity range (specified in GJ) in rule 462 corresponding to step g.
GRefDevNR(g)	The GJ boundary between step g and step g+1 of the <i>quantity method negative deviation range</i> of the <i>deviation settlement function</i> (assuming the <i>ex ante market price</i> is positive or zero). These terms are negative valued and correspond to the most negative values specified in the deviation quantity range (specified in GJ) in rule 462 corresponding to step g. This term is neither defined nor used for g=Maxg.
GRefDevPF(g)	The factor for step g of the <i>quantity method positive deviation range</i> of the <i>deviation settlement function</i> (assuming the <i>ex ante market price</i> is positive or zero). These factors decline with increasing positive deviation and are the factors for the deviation quantity range (specified in GJ) in rule 462 corresponding to step g.
GRefDevPR(g)	The GJ boundary between step g and step g+1 for the <i>quantity method positive deviation range</i> of the <i>deviation settlement function</i> (assuming the <i>ex ante market price</i> is positive or zero). These terms are positive valued and correspond to the most positive values specified in the deviation quantity range (specified in GJ) in rule 462 corresponding to step g. This term is neither defined nor used for g=Maxg.
GVarC(p,d)	The <i>variation charge</i> for <i>Trading Participant p</i> for a <i>hub</i> for <i>gas day d</i> determined using the <i>quantity method</i> . This term is greater than or equal to zero. This value is determined in clause 10.5.4(b).
GVarF(f)	The factor for step f of the <i>quantity method variation settlement function</i> . These factors increase with increasing variation quantity and are the factors for the variation quantity range (specified in GJ) in rule 463 corresponding to step f.
GVarR(f)	The GJ boundary between step f and step f+1 for the <i>quantity method variation settlement function</i> . These terms are positive valued and correspond to the most positive values specified in the variation quantity range (specified in GJ) in rule 463 corresponding to step f. This term is neither defined nor used for f=Maxf.
GVarU(p,d,f)	The variation quantity of step f for <i>Trading Participant p quantity method</i> variations for a <i>hub</i> on <i>gas day d</i> . This term is greater than or

Term	Definition
	equal to zero. This value is determined in clause 10.5.4(a).
HP(d)	The <i>ex ante market price</i> for a <i>hub</i> for <i>gas day</i> d. This value is determined in accordance with rule 417.
IHP(d)	The <i>ex post imbalance price</i> for a <i>hub</i> for <i>gas day</i> d. This value is determined in accordance with rule 426.
LD(d,k)	A value of 0 or 1 to control whether or not a <i>Trading Participant's</i> deviation for <i>gas day</i> d which decreases net supply (i.e. supply less consumption) to a <i>hub</i> is included in the allocation of settlement surpluses and shortfalls for the <i>billing period</i> containing <i>gas day</i> d. The daily deviation is included if LD(d,k) = 1, but not if LD(d,k) = 0. The value of LD(d,k) is determined in clause 10.10.2.
LI(d,k)	A value of 0 or 1 to control whether or not a <i>Trading Participant's</i> deviation for <i>gas day</i> d which increases net supply (i.e. supply less consumption) at a <i>hub</i> is included in the allocation of settlement surpluses and shortfalls for the <i>billing period</i> containing <i>gas day</i> d. The daily deviation is included if LI(d,k) = 1, but not if LI(d,k) = 0. The value of LI(d,k) is determined in clause 10.10.2.
MAQ ^S (p,d,cf(k))	The quantity of <i>MOS gas</i> (excluding <i>overrun MOS</i>) allocated to flow from the <i>hub</i> on <i>registered trading right</i> cf(k) on <i>market facility</i> k \in SP (an <i>STTM facility</i>) on <i>gas day</i> d by <i>Trading Participant</i> p. This value may be positive or negative. A positive value indicates increased net flow to the <i>hub</i> implying a decreased flow from the <i>hub</i> on the <i>registered trading right</i> . This value is determined for a <i>registered facility service</i> in accordance with rule 421 and is associated with the <i>registered trading right</i> of the <i>contract holder</i> for that <i>registered facility service</i> .
MAQ ^S (p,d,ct(k))	The quantity of <i>MOS gas</i> (excluding <i>overrun MOS</i>) allocated to flow to the <i>hub</i> on <i>registered trading right</i> ct(k) on <i>market facility</i> k \in SP (an <i>STTM facility</i>) on <i>gas day</i> d by <i>Trading Participant</i> p. This value may be positive or negative. A positive value indicates increased net flow to the <i>hub</i> implying an increased flow to the <i>hub</i> on the <i>registered trading right</i> . This value is determined for a <i>registered facility service</i> in accordance with rule 421 and is associated with the <i>registered trading right</i> of the <i>contract holder</i> for that <i>registered facility service</i> .
Maxf	The last step (f = Maxf) of the <i>variation settlement function</i> , being the step with the greatest value of PVarF(f) (for the <i>percentage method</i>) or GVarF(f) (for the <i>quantity method</i>).
Maxg	The last step (g= Maxg) of the <i>deviation settlement function</i> , being the step with the most extreme values of PDevNF(g) and PDevPF(g) (for the <i>percentage method</i>) and GDevNF(g) and GDevPF(g) (for the <i>quantity method</i>).
MAXP(d)	The maximum deviation price to be applied in the settlement of <i>gas day</i> d for a <i>hub</i> . This will normally be <i>MPC</i> but will be the

Term	Definition
	<i>administered price cap</i> when either an <i>administered price cap state</i> , <i>administered ex post pricing state</i> , <i>market administered scheduling state</i> or <i>market administered settlement state</i> applies to gas day d.
MCCC(p,d)	The MOS cash-out charge for <i>Trading Participant p</i> for a <i>hub</i> for gas day d for the restoration of MOS gas provided under one or more MOS decrease offers. This is determined in clause 10.7.4(b).
MCCP(p,d)	The MOS cash-out payment to <i>Trading Participant p</i> for a <i>hub</i> for gas day d for the restoration of MOS gas provided under one or more MOS increase offers. This is determined in clause 10.7.4(a).
MCOC(p,d)	The MOS cash-out charge for <i>Trading Participant p</i> for a <i>hub</i> for gas day d for the restoration of MOS gas provided as overrun MOS. This is determined in clause 10.7.4(d).
MCOP(p,d)	The MOS cash-out payment to <i>Trading Participant p</i> for a <i>hub</i> for gas day d for the restoration of MOS gas provided as overrun MOS. This is determined in clause 10.7.4(c).
MCP(p,d)	The payment to <i>Trading Participant p</i> for the provision of MOS to a <i>hub</i> on gas day d. This payment excludes settlement of gas flowed (or not flowed) or any payments or charges for overrun MOS. This is determined in clause 10.7.3(a).
MINP(d)	The minimum deviation price to be applied in the settlement of gas day d for a <i>hub</i> . This will be MMP for that gas day.
MktC(p,d)	The <i>ex ante market charge</i> for <i>Trading Participant p</i> for a <i>hub</i> for gas day d. This is determined in clause 10.3(b).
MktP(p,d)	The <i>ex ante market payment</i> for <i>Trading Participant p</i> for a <i>hub</i> for gas day d. This is determined in clause 10.3(a).
MMSQ ^S (p,d,k,fd)	The <i>modified market schedule quantity</i> for <i>Trading Participant p</i> acting as an <i>STTM Shipper</i> on <i>market facility k</i> ∈ SP (an <i>STTM facility</i>) for flow in direction fd on gas day d. This is determined in clause 10.8.1(a).
MMSQ ^U (p,d,k,fd)	The <i>modified market schedule quantity</i> for <i>Trading Participant p</i> acting as an <i>STTM User</i> on <i>market facility k</i> ∈ SN for flow in direction fd (which must be to the <i>hub</i>) on gas day d. This is determined in clause 10.8.1(b).
MOP(p,d)	The payment to <i>Trading Participant p</i> for the provision of MOS to a <i>hub</i> as overrun MOS on gas day d. This payment excludes settlement for gas flowed (or not flowed). This is determined in clause 10.7.3(b).
MOSAD ^S (p,d,m(k),j)	The quantity of MOS gas allocated to the j th price step of <i>Trading Participant p</i> 's MOS decrease offer m(k) on gas day d on <i>market facility k</i> . This is a positive value. This value is determined for a

Term	Definition
	<i>registered facility service</i> in accordance with rule 421.
$MOSAI^S(p,d,m(k),j)$	The quantity of <i>MOS gas</i> allocated to the j^{th} <i>price step</i> of <i>Trading Participant p's MOS increase offer m(k) on gas day d on market facility k</i> . This is a positive value. This value is determined for a <i>registered facility service</i> in accordance with rule 421.
$MosC(p,d)$	The <i>MOS charge</i> to <i>Trading Participant p</i> for a <i>hub</i> for <i>gas day d</i> . This is determined in clause 10.7.5(b).
$MOSDC^S(p,d,m(k),j)$	The <i>MOS price</i> for <i>price step j</i> contained in a <i>MOS decrease offer m(k) for Trading Participant p on gas day d on market facility $k \in SP$ (an STTM facility)</i> . This value is specified in the <i>MOS decrease offer</i> submitted in accordance with rule 400.
$MOSFP(p,d,m(k))$	A fixed payment (if any) for <i>gas day d</i> to <i>Trading Participant p</i> for <i>MOS increase offer or MOS decrease offer m(k) on market facility $k \in SP$</i> .
$MOSIC^S(p,d,m(k),j)$	The <i>MOS price</i> for <i>price step j</i> contained in a <i>MOS increase offer m(k) for Trading Participant p on gas day d on market facility $k \in SP$ (an STTM facility)</i> . This value is specified in the <i>MOS increase offer</i> submitted in accordance with rule 400.
$MosP(p,d)$	The <i>MOS payment</i> to <i>Trading Participant p</i> for a <i>hub</i> for <i>gas day d</i> . This is determined in clause 10.7.5(a).
$MOSRD(d,k)$	The estimated maximum <i>MOS decrease</i> (in GJ) on <i>market facility k</i> for <i>gas day d</i> . This is a positive value but will be zero for <i>facilities</i> which do not provide <i>MOS</i> (e.g. <i>STTM distribution systems</i> and <i>STTM facilities other than STTM pipelines</i>). This value relates to a <i>MOS period</i> . This value is determined in accordance with rule 397.
$MOSRI(d,k)$	The estimated maximum <i>MOS increase</i> (in GJ) on <i>market facility k</i> for <i>gas day d</i> . This is a positive value but will be zero for <i>facilities</i> which do not provide <i>MOS</i> (e.g. <i>STTM distribution systems</i> and <i>STTM facilities other than STTM pipelines</i>). This value relates to a <i>MOS period</i> . This value is determined in accordance with rule 397.
$MQ^S(p,d,cf(k))$	The <i>market schedule quantity</i> for gas withdrawn from the <i>hub</i> by <i>Trading Participant p</i> as an <i>STTM Shipper</i> on <i>gas day d</i> on <i>registered trading right cf(k) for market facility $k \in SP$ (an STTM facility)</i> . This value is determined in accordance with rule 417.
$MQ^S(p,d,ct(k))$	The <i>market schedule quantity</i> for gas supplied to the <i>hub</i> by <i>Trading Participant p</i> as an <i>STTM Shipper</i> on <i>gas day d</i> on <i>registered trading right ct(k) for market facility $k \in SP$ (an STTM facility)</i> . This value is determined in accordance with rule 417.
$MQ^U(p,d,cf(k))$	The <i>market schedule quantity</i> for gas withdrawn from the <i>hub</i> by <i>Trading Participant p</i> as an <i>STTM User</i> on <i>gas day d</i> on <i>registered trading right cf(k) for market facility $k \in SN$</i> . This value is determined

Term	Definition
	in accordance with rule 417.
MSV[d,(sp,sk,sfd), (cp,ck,cfd)]	The quantity associated with a <i>market schedule variation</i> for gas day d, submitted by <i>Trading Participant</i> p=sp under rule 423 and pertaining to the schedules of <i>Trading Participant</i> p=sp on <i>market facility</i> k=sk for flows in direction fd=sfd, with this quantity offset against the schedule of <i>Trading Participant</i> p=cp on <i>market facility</i> k=ck for flows in direction fd=cfd. This value is determined in accordance with rule 423.
NMB	The settlement surplus or shortfall for a <i>hub</i> for a <i>billing period</i> excluding the impact of <i>variation charges</i> . If this is positively valued then a market surplus is allocated based on <i>billing period deviation quantities</i> . If this is negatively valued then a market shortfall is allocated based on <i>billing period deviation quantities</i> . This is determined in clause 10.10.1(c).
OMAS ^S (p,d,cf(k))	The quantity of <i>MOS gas</i> that is <i>overrun MOS</i> allocated to flow from the <i>hub</i> on <i>registered trading right</i> cf(k) on <i>market facility</i> k∈SP (an <i>STTM facility</i>) on <i>gas day</i> d by <i>Trading Participant</i> p. This value may be positive or negative. A positive value indicates increased net flow to the <i>hub</i> implying a decreased flow from the <i>hub</i> on the <i>registered trading right</i> . This value is determined for a <i>registered facility service</i> in accordance with rule 421 and is associated with the <i>registered trading right</i> of the <i>contract holder</i> for that <i>registered facility service</i> .
OMAS ^S (p,d,ct(k))	The quantity of <i>MOS gas</i> that is <i>overrun MOS</i> allocated to flow to the <i>hub</i> on <i>registered trading right</i> ct(k) on <i>market facility</i> k∈SP (an <i>STTM facility</i>) on <i>gas day</i> d by <i>Trading Participant</i> p. This value may be positive or negative. A positive value indicates increased net flow to the <i>hub</i> implying an increased flow to the <i>hub</i> on the <i>registered trading right</i> . This value is determined for a <i>registered facility service</i> in accordance with rule 421 and is associated with the <i>registered trading right</i> of the <i>contract holder</i> for that <i>registered facility service</i> .
OQF ^S (p,d,c(k))	The quantity of gas offered by <i>Trading Participant</i> p on <i>registered trading right</i> c(k) with <i>firm capacity</i> on <i>market facility</i> k to be supplied to the <i>hub</i> on <i>gas day</i> d. This value is determined in accordance with rule 407.
ORPD(d,k)	The <i>overrun MOS</i> decrease price for <i>market facility</i> k on <i>gas day</i> d. This is determined in clause 10.7.2(b).
ORPI(d,k)	The <i>overrun MOS</i> increase price for <i>market facility</i> k on <i>gas day</i> d. This is determined in clause 10.7.1(b).
PDevNF(g)	The factor for step g of the <i>percentage method negative deviation range</i> of the <i>deviation settlement function</i> . This equals PRefDevNF(g) if the <i>ex ante market price</i> is positive or zero (≥0), otherwise it equals PRefDevPF(g). This value is determined in clauses 10.8.3(a) and 10.8.3(b).

Term	Definition
PDevNFA(p,d,k)	The <i>percentage method</i> deviation settlement amount for <i>Trading Participant p</i> for negative deviations which increase withdrawal from the <i>hub</i> on <i>market facility k</i> on <i>gas day d</i> . This value is determined in clause 10.8.6(b).
PDevNQF(p,d,k,g)	The <i>deviation quantity</i> (in GJ) of negative deviation step <i>g</i> for <i>Trading Participant p</i> on <i>gas day d</i> for withdrawals from the <i>hub</i> on <i>market facility k</i> determined using the <i>percentage method</i> . This term is greater than or equal to zero. This value is determined in clause 10.8.4(b).
PDevNQT(p,d,k,g)	The deviation (in GJ) of negative deviation step <i>g</i> for <i>Trading Participant p</i> on <i>gas day d</i> for supply to the <i>hub</i> on <i>market facility k</i> determined using the <i>percentage method</i> . This term is greater than or equal to zero. This value is determined in clause 10.8.4(d).
PDevNR(g)	The percentage boundary between step <i>g</i> and step <i>g+1</i> of the <i>percentage method negative deviation range</i> of the <i>deviation settlement function</i> . These equal PRefDevNR(g) if the <i>ex ante market price</i> is positive or zero (≥ 0), otherwise it equals $-1 \times \text{PRefDevPR}(g)$. This term is neither defined nor used for $g=\text{Maxg}$. This value is determined in clauses 10.8.3(a) and 10.8.3(b).
PDevNTA(p,d,k)	The <i>percentage method</i> deviation settlement amount for <i>Trading Participant p</i> for negative deviations which decrease supply to the <i>hub</i> on <i>market facility k</i> on <i>gas day d</i> . This value is determined in clause 10.8.6(d).
PDevPF(g)	The factor for step <i>g</i> of the <i>percentage method positive deviation range</i> of the <i>deviation settlement function</i> . This equals PRefDevPF(g) if the <i>ex ante market price</i> is positive or zero (≥ 0), otherwise it equals PRefDevNF(g). This value is determined in clauses 10.8.3(a) and 10.8.3(b).
PDevPFA(p,d,k)	The <i>percentage method</i> deviation settlement amount for <i>Trading Participant p</i> for positive deviations which decrease withdrawal from the <i>hub</i> on <i>market facility k</i> on <i>gas day d</i> . This value is determined in clause 10.8.6(a).
PDevPQF(p,d,k,g)	The <i>deviation quantity</i> (in GJ) of positive deviation step <i>g</i> for <i>Trading Participant p</i> on <i>gas day d</i> for withdrawals from the <i>hub</i> on <i>market facility k</i> determined using the <i>percentage method</i> . This term is greater than or equal to zero. This value is determined in clause 10.8.4(a).
PDevPQT(p,d,k,g)	The <i>deviation quantity</i> (in GJ) of positive deviation step <i>g</i> for <i>Trading Participant p</i> on <i>gas day d</i> for supply to the <i>hub</i> on <i>market facility k</i> determined using the <i>percentage method</i> . This term is greater than or equal to zero. This value is determined in clause 10.8.4(c).
PDevPR(g)	The percentage boundary between step <i>g</i> and step <i>g+1</i> of the <i>percentage method positive deviation range</i> of the <i>deviation</i>

Term	Definition
	<i>settlement function</i> . This equals PRefDevPR(g) if the <i>ex ante market price</i> is positive or zero (≥ 0), otherwise it equals $-1 \times \text{PRefDevNR}(g)$. This term is neither defined nor used for $g=\text{Max}g$. This value is determined in clauses 10.8.3(a) and 10.8.3(b).
PDevPTA(p,d,k)	The <i>percentage method</i> deviation settlement amount for <i>Trading Participant</i> p for positive deviations which increase supply to the <i>hub</i> on <i>market facility</i> k on <i>gas day</i> d. This value is determined in clause 10.8.6(c).
PFDCC(p,d)	The <i>pipeline flow direction constraint charge</i> payable by <i>Trading Participant</i> p for the withdrawal of gas from a <i>hub</i> on <i>gas day</i> d. This value is determined in clause 10.4(b).
PFDCP(p,d)	The <i>pipeline flow direction constraint payment</i> payable to <i>Trading Participant</i> p for the supply of gas to a <i>hub</i> on <i>gas day</i> d. This value is determined in clause 10.4(a).
PPDevNF(p,d,k,g)	The deviation price of <i>percentage method</i> negative deviation step g for <i>Trading Participant</i> p on <i>gas day</i> d for withdrawals from the <i>hub</i> on <i>market facility</i> k. This value is determined in clause 10.8.5(b).
PPDevNT(p,d,k,g)	The deviation price of <i>percentage method</i> negative deviation step g for <i>Trading Participant</i> p on <i>gas day</i> d for supply to the <i>hub</i> on <i>market facility</i> k. This value is determined in clause 10.8.5(d).
PPDevPF(p,d,k,g)	The deviation price of <i>percentage method</i> positive deviation step g for <i>Trading Participant</i> p on <i>gas day</i> d for withdrawals from the <i>hub</i> on <i>market facility</i> k. This value is determined in clause 10.8.5(a).
PPDevPT(p,d,k,g)	The deviation price of <i>percentage method</i> positive deviation step g for <i>Trading Participant</i> p on <i>gas day</i> d for supply to the <i>hub</i> on <i>market facility</i> k. This value is determined in clause 10.8.5(c).
PRefDevNF(g)	The factor for step g of the <i>percentage method negative deviation range</i> of the <i>deviation settlement function</i> (assuming the <i>ex ante market price</i> is positive or zero). These factors increase with increasing negative deviation and are the factors for the deviation percentage range in rule 462 corresponding to step g.
PRefDevNR(g)	The percentage boundary between step g and step g+1 of the <i>percentage method negative deviation range</i> of the <i>deviation settlement function</i> (assuming the <i>ex ante market price</i> is positive or zero). These are negative values and correspond to the most negative values specified in the deviation percentage range in rule 462 corresponding to step g. This term is neither defined nor used for $g=\text{Max}g$.
PRefDevPF(g)	The factor for step g of the <i>percentage method positive deviation range</i> of the <i>deviation settlement function</i> (assuming the <i>ex ante market price</i> is positive or zero). These factors decline with increasing positive deviation and are the factors for the deviation

Term	Definition
	percentage range in rule 462 corresponding to step g.
PRefDevPR(g)	The percentage boundary between step g and step g+1 for the <i>percentage method positive deviation range</i> of the <i>deviation settlement function</i> (assuming the <i>ex ante market price</i> is positive or zero). These are positive values and correspond to the most positive values specified in the deviation percentage range in rule 462 corresponding to step g. This term is neither defined nor used for g=Maxg.
PVarC(p,d)	The <i>variation charge</i> for <i>Trading Participant p</i> for <i>gas day d</i> for a <i>hub</i> , determined using the <i>percentage method</i> . This term is greater than or equal to zero. This value is determined in clause 10.5.3(b).
PVarF(f)	The factor for step f of the <i>percentage method variation settlement function</i> . These factors increase with increasing variation quantity and are the factors for the variation percentage range in rule 463 corresponding to step f.
PVarR(f)	The percentage boundary between step f and step f+1 for the <i>percentage method variation settlement function</i> . These are positive values and correspond to the most positive values specified in the variation percentage range in rule 463 corresponding to step f. This term is neither defined nor used for f=Maxf.
PVarU(p,d,f)	The variation quantity of step f for <i>Trading Participant p</i> <i>percentage method variations</i> on <i>gas day d</i> for a <i>hub</i> . This term is greater than or equal to zero. This value is determined in clause 10.5.3(a).
S (superscript)	Indicates an <i>STTM Shipper</i> specific term.
SCC(p,d)	The <i>capacity charge</i> for <i>Trading Participant p</i> as an <i>STTM Shipper</i> for a <i>hub</i> for <i>gas day d</i> . This is determined in clause 10.9.3(a).
SCP(p,d)	The <i>capacity payment</i> for <i>Trading Participant p</i> as an <i>STTM Shipper</i> for a <i>hub</i> for <i>gas day d</i> . This is determined in clause 10.9.3(b).
SSC(p)	The <i>settlement shortfall charge</i> payable by <i>Trading Participant p</i> for a <i>hub</i> for a <i>billing period</i> . This is determined in clause 10.10.5(b).
SSP(p)	The <i>settlement surplus payment</i> payable to <i>Trading Participant p</i> for a <i>hub</i> for a <i>billing period</i> . This is determined in clause 10.10.5(a).
TAFGQ(d,k)	The total quantity of gas allocated to <i>registered trading rights</i> for <i>available capacity</i> on <i>gas day d</i> on <i>market facility k</i> ∈ SP (an <i>STTM facility</i>). This is determined in clause 10.9.1(c).
TCMDQ(d,k)	The total quantity of decreased gas flow allocated as <i>MOS gas</i> (excluding <i>overrun MOS</i>) on <i>market facility k</i> ∈ SP (an <i>STTM facility</i>) on <i>gas day d</i> . This is determined in clause 10.7.2(a).
TCMIQ(d,k)	The total quantity of increased gas flow allocated as <i>MOS gas</i> (excluding <i>overrun MOS</i>) on <i>market facility k</i> ∈ SP (an <i>STTM facility</i>)

Term	Definition
	and <i>gas day d</i> . This is determined in clause 10.7.1(a).
TFGNQ(d,k)	The total quantity of gas offered to be supplied to the <i>hub</i> under <i>registered trading rights</i> for <i>firm capacity</i> but not allocated as flowed for <i>gas day d</i> on $k \in SP$ (an <i>STTM facility</i>). This is determined in clause 10.9.1(d).
U (superscript)	Indicates an <i>STTM User</i> specific term.
VarC(p,d)	The <i>variation charge</i> for <i>Trading Participant p</i> for <i>gas day d</i> for a <i>hub</i> . This is determined in clause 10.5.5.
VQ(p,d)	The total GJ variation of <i>Trading Participant p</i> for <i>gas day d</i> for a <i>hub</i> . This term is greater than or equal to zero. This is determined in clause 10.5.2.
WDA(p)	The settlement shortfall or surplus amount for a <i>hub</i> for a <i>billing period</i> allocated to <i>Trading Participant p</i> as a result of its allocated withdrawals from the <i>hub</i> over the <i>billing period</i> (whether as an <i>STTM Shipper</i> or as an <i>STTM User</i>). This amount includes a share of <i>variation charges</i> applied to <i>Trading Participants</i> over the <i>billing period</i> and any settlement surplus not included in the value of DVA(p) as a result of application of the AICAP limit (i.e. <i>settlement surplus cap</i>). This is determined in clause 10.10.4.

10.2 Amounts for gas days

- (a) For the purposes of rule 461(1), the *modified market schedule* for each *hub* for each *gas day* to be determined by AEMO is the set of *modified market schedule quantities* for that *hub* and *gas day* for all *Trading Participants*, where each *Trading Participant* has a *modified market schedule quantity* for:
- (i) flow to the *hub* on each *STTM facility*, described by $MMSQ^S(p,d,k,fd)$ where fd denotes flow to the *hub* in clause 10.8.1(a);
 - (ii) flow from the *hub* on each *STTM facility*, described by $MMSQ^S(p,d,k,fd)$ where fd denotes flow from the *hub* in clause 10.8.1(a); and
 - (iii) flow from the *hub* on the *STTM distribution system*, described by $MMSQ^U(p,d,k,fd)$ in clause 10.8.1(b);
- (b) For the purposes of rule 461(2)(a), the sum across all *hubs* of the *ex ante market charge* payable by a *Trading Participant* at each *hub* is to be determined by AEMO for each *gas day* by summing over all *hubs* the value of $MktC(p,d)$ determined in accordance with clause 10.3(b).
- (c) For the purposes of rule 461(2)(a), the sum across all *hubs* of the *ex ante market payment* payable to a *Trading Participant* at each *hub* is to be determined by AEMO for each *gas day* by summing over all

- hubs* the value of $MktP(p,d)$ determined in accordance with clause 10.3(a).
- (d) For the purposes of rule 461(2)(b), the sum across all *hubs* of the *variation charges* payable by a *Trading Participant* in respect of *market schedule variations* at each *hub* is to be determined by AEMO for each *gas day* by summing over all *hubs* the value of $VarC(p,d)$ determined in accordance with clause 10.5.5.
 - (e) For the purposes of rule 461(2)(c), the sum across all *hubs* of the *pipeline flow direction constraint charge* payable by a *Trading Participant* (as an *STTM Shipper*) at each *hub* is to be determined by AEMO for each *gas day* by summing over all *hubs* the value of $PFDC(p,d)$ determined in accordance with clause 10.4(b).
 - (f) For the purposes of rule 461(2)(c), the sum across all *hubs* of the *pipeline flow direction constraint payment* payable by a *Trading Participant* (as an *STTM Shipper*) at each *hub* is to be determined by AEMO for each *gas day* by summing over all *hubs* the value of $PFDCP(p,d)$ determined in accordance with clause 10.4(a).
 - (g) For the purposes of rule 461(2)(d), the sum across all *hubs* of the amount payable to a *Trading Participant* (as an *STTM Shipper*) (whether in its capacity as *MOS provider* or otherwise) for the provision of *MOS* or *overrun MOS* at each *hub* is to be determined by AEMO for each *gas day* by summing over all *hubs* the sum of the value of $MCP(p,d)$ determined in accordance with clause 10.7.3(a) and the value of $MOP(p,d)$ determined in accordance with clause 10.7.3(b).
 - (h) For the purposes of rule 461(2)(e), the sum across all *hubs* of the amount payable to a *Trading Participant* (as an *STTM Shipper*) for the restoration of *MOS gas* provided at each *hub* on the second *gas day* before that *gas day* is to be determined by AEMO for each *gas day* by summing over all *hubs* the sum of the value of $MCCP(p,d)$ determined in accordance with clause 10.7.4(a) and the value of $MCOP(p,d)$ determined in accordance with clause 10.7.4(c).
 - (i) For the purposes of rule 461(2)(e), the sum across all *hubs* of the amount payable by a *Trading Participant* (as an *STTM Shipper*) for the restoration of *MOS gas* provided at each *hub* on the second *gas day* before that *gas day* is to be determined by AEMO for each *gas day* by summing over all *hubs* the sum of the value of $MCCC(p,d)$ determined in accordance with clause 10.7.4(b) and the value of $MCOC(p,d)$ determined in accordance with in clause 10.7.4(d).
 - (j) For the purposes of rule 461(2)(f), the sum across all *hubs* of the *capacity charge* payable by a *Trading Participant* (as an *STTM Shipper*) at each *hub* is to be determined by AEMO for each *gas day* by summing over all *hubs* the value of $SCP(p,d)$ determined in accordance with clause 10.9.3(b).

- (k) For the purposes of rule 461(2)(f), the sum across all *hubs* of the *capacity payment* payable to a *Trading Participant* (as an *STTM Shipper*) at each *hub* is to be determined by AEMO for each *gas day* by summing over all *hubs* the value of $SCC(p,d)$ determined in accordance with clause 10.9.3(a).
- (l) For the purposes of rule 461(2)(g), the sum across all *hubs* of the *deviation charge* payable by a *Trading Participant* at each *hub* is to be determined by AEMO for each *gas day* by summing over all *hubs* the value of $DevC(p,d)$ determined in accordance with clause 10.8.11(f).
- (m) For the purposes of rule 461(2)(g), the sum across all *hubs* of the *deviation payment* payable to a *Trading Participant* at each *hub* is to be determined by AEMO for each *gas day* by summing over all *hubs* the value of $DevP(p,d)$ determined in accordance with clause 10.8.11(e).
- (n) For the purposes of rule 461(2)(h), the sum across all *hubs* of the amount payable to a *Trading Participant* in respect of *contingency gas* is to be determined by AEMO for each *gas day* by summing over all *hubs* the value of $CGP(p,d)$ determined in accordance with clause 10.6(a).
- (o) For the purposes of rule 461(2)(h), the sum across all *hubs* of the amount payable by a *Trading Participant* in respect of *contingency gas* is to be determined by AEMO for each *gas day* by summing over all *hubs* the value of $CGC(p,d)$ determined in accordance with clause 10.6(b).

10.3 Ex Ante Market Payments And Charges

Explanatory Note

This clause describes how AEMO determines the *ex ante market payment* and *ex ante market charge* for a *Trading Participant* at a *hub* for a *gas day* for the purposes of rule 461(2)(a). The *ex ante market payment* is determined in accordance with clause 10.3(a), by multiplying the *ex ante market price* by the sum of that *Trading Participant's market schedule quantities* for the supply of gas to the *hub*. The *ex ante market charge* is determined in accordance with clause 10.3(b), by multiplying the *ex ante market price* by the sum of that *Trading Participant's market schedule quantities* for the withdrawal of gas from the *hub*.

- (a) The *ex ante market payment* for *Trading Participant* p for *gas day* d for the *hub* is:

$$MktP(p,d) = HP(d) \times \sum_{k \in SP} \sum_{ct(k)} MQ^S(p,d,ct(k))$$

- (b) The *ex ante market charge* for *Trading Participant* p for *gas day* d for the *hub* is:

$$MktC(p,d) = HP(d) \times \{ \sum_{k \in SP} \sum_{cf(k)} MQ^S(p,d,cf(k)) + \sum_{k \in SN} \sum_{cf(k)} MQ^U(p,d,cf(k)) \}$$

10.4 Pipeline Flow Direction Constraint Payments and Charges

Explanatory Note

This clause describes how AEMO determines the *pipeline flow direction constraint payment* and *pipeline flow direction constraint charge* for a *Trading Participant* on each *STTM pipeline* for a *gas day* for the purposes of rule 461(2)(c). The *pipeline flow direction constraint payment* is determined in accordance with clause 10.4(a) by multiplying the *pipeline flow direction constraint price* for the *STTM pipeline* by the sum of that *Trading Participant's market schedule quantities* for the supply of gas to the *hub* on that *STTM pipeline*. The *pipeline flow direction constraint charge* is determined in accordance with clause 10.4(b) by multiplying the *pipeline flow direction constraint price* for the *STTM pipeline* by the sum of that *Trading Participant's market schedule quantities* for the withdrawal of gas from the *hub* on that *STTM pipeline*.

These payments and charges will only arise where there is a non-zero *pipeline flow direction constraint price*. This is expected to be rare, and will only occur if the *scheduled flows* to and from the *hub* on the *STTM pipeline* are equal.

- (a) The *pipeline flow direction constraint payment* to *Trading Participant p* for the ex ante market supply of gas to the *hub* for *gas day d* is:

$$PFDCP(p,d) = \sum_{k \in SP} \{FDCP(d,k) \times \sum_{ct(k)} MQ^S(p,d,ct(k))\}$$

- (b) The *pipeline flow direction constraint charge* to *Trading Participant p* for the ex ante market withdrawal of gas from the *hub* for *gas day d* is:

$$PFDCC(p,d) = \sum_{k \in SP} \{FDCP(d,k) \times \sum_{cf(k)} MQ^S(p,d,cf(k))\}$$

Note: These payments and charges result in those *STTM Shippers* shipping gas to the *hub* receiving payments from those *STTM Shippers* withdrawing gas from the *hub*. These amounts ensure that all *STTM Shippers* on a *facility* are paid or pay consistently with their bids and offers, even when ex ante market scheduled withdrawals from the *hub* on a pipeline are limited by and equal to the ex ante market scheduled flows to the *hub* on that pipeline.

10.5 Variation Charges

Explanatory Note

This clause describes how AEMO determines *variation charges* for a *Trading Participant* for the purposes of rule 461(2)(b). *Variation charges* are calculated in accordance with clauses 10.5.1 to 10.5.5, by:

- (a) determining the quantity of *market schedule variations* that incur a *variation charge*, being those *market schedule variations* relating to the withdrawal of gas from the *hub* for which the *Trading Participant* was the *receiving Participant*;
- (b) calculating charges for that quantity using both the percentage method and the quantity method under which the charge rate increases, with reference to the tables in rule 463, as the effect of the quantity of applicable variations increases; and
- (c) determining the lesser of the charge calculated using the percentage method and charge calculated using the quantity method, which is to be the *variation charge* for that *Trading Participant*.

10.5.1 Processing of market schedule variations

- (a) In processing a valid *market schedule variation*, for each combination of *Trading Participant* p , *gas day* d , *market facility* k and flow direction fd :
- (i) first set $FSC(p,d,k,fd) = 0$ and $CSC(p,d,k,fd)=0$; and then
 - (ii) for each valid *market schedule variation* for *gas day* d which involves *Trading Participant* p and *market facility* k :
 - (A) add or subtract the *market schedule variation* quantity to $FSC(p,d,k,fd)$ using the rules described in paragraph (c); and
 - (B) add or subtract the *market schedule variation* quantity to $CSC(p,d,k,fd)$ using the rules described in paragraph (c).
- (b) Each valid *market schedule variation* is described as $MSV[d,(op,ok,ofd),(rp,rk,rfd)]$ where
- (i) 'op' denotes the *originating STTM Shipper*;
 - (ii) 'ok' denotes the *originating STTM Shipper's STTM facility*;
 - (iii) 'ofd' denotes the direction of flow of the *originating STTM Shipper* for the purpose of the *market schedule variation*;
 - (iv) 'rp' denotes the *receiving Participant*;
 - (v) 'rk' denotes the *receiving Participant's market facility*;
 - (vi) 'rfd' denotes the direction of flow of the *receiving Participant* for the purpose of the *market schedule variation*;
 - (vii) $FSC(op,d,ok,ofd)$ is identical to $FSC(p,d,k,fd)$ with $p=op$, $k=ok$ and $fd=ofd$;
 - (viii) $FSC(rp,d,rk,rfd)$ is identical to $FSC(p,d,k,fd)$ with $p=rp$, $k=rk$ and $fd=rfd$;
 - (ix) $CSC(op,d,ok,ofd)$ is identical to $CSC(p,d,k,fd)$ with $p=op$, $k=ok$ and $fd=ofd$; and
 - (x) $CSC(rp,d,rk,rfd)$ is identical to $CSC(p,d,k,fd)$ with $p=rp$, $k=rk$ and $fd=rfd$.
- (c) The rules as to how $FSC(p,d,k,fd)$ and $CSC(p,d,k,fd)$ for *Trading Participant* p , *gas day* d , *market facility* k and flow direction fd are updated for the purposes of paragraph (a)(ii) are described in the following table:

Originating STTM Shipper Facility	Originating STTM Shipper Direction	Receiving Participant Facility	Receiving Participant Direction	Sign of MSV[d, (op,ok,ofd), (rp,rk,rfd)]	Update to Apply to the FSC and CSC terms
ok \in SP	ofd='to'	rk \in SP [rk=ok in this case]	rfd='to'	>0	$\text{FSC}(\text{op},\text{d},\text{ok},\text{ofd}) = \text{FSC}(\text{op},\text{d},\text{ok},\text{ofd}) + \text{MSV}[\text{d}, (\text{op},\text{ok},\text{ofd}), (\text{rp},\text{rk},\text{rfd})]$ $\text{FSC}(\text{rp},\text{d},\text{rk},\text{rfd}) = \text{FSC}(\text{rp},\text{d},\text{rk},\text{rfd}) - \text{MSV}[\text{d}, (\text{op},\text{ok},\text{ofd}), (\text{rp},\text{rk},\text{rfd})]$
ok \in SP	ofd='to'	rk \in SP or rk \in SN	rfd='from'	If MSV is to increase the <i>modified market schedule</i> of the <i>originating STTM Shipper</i> , >0 If MSV is to decrease the <i>modified market schedule</i> of the <i>originating STTM Shipper</i> , <0	$\text{FSC}(\text{op},\text{d},\text{ok},\text{ofd}) = \text{FSC}(\text{op},\text{d},\text{ok},\text{ofd}) + \text{MSV}[\text{d}, (\text{op},\text{ok},\text{ofd}), (\text{rp},\text{rk},\text{rfd})]$ $\text{CSC}(\text{rp},\text{d},\text{rk},\text{rfd}) = \text{CSC}(\text{rp},\text{d},\text{rk},\text{rfd}) + \text{MSV}[\text{d}, (\text{op},\text{ok},\text{ofd}), (\text{rp},\text{rk},\text{rfd})]$
ok \in SP	ofd='from'	rk \in SP [rk=ok in this case]	rfd='from'	>0	$\text{FSC}(\text{op},\text{d},\text{ok},\text{ofd}) = \text{FSC}(\text{op},\text{d},\text{ok},\text{ofd}) + \text{MSV}[\text{d}, (\text{op},\text{ok},\text{ofd}), (\text{rp},\text{rk},\text{rfd})]$ $\text{FSC}(\text{rp},\text{d},\text{rk},\text{rfd}) = \text{FSC}(\text{rp},\text{d},\text{rk},\text{rfd}) - \text{MSV}[\text{d}, (\text{op},\text{ok},\text{ofd}), (\text{rp},\text{rk},\text{rfd})]$
ok \in SP	ofd='from'	rk \in SN	rfd='from'	If MSV is to increase the <i>modified market schedule</i> of the <i>originating STTM Shipper</i> , >0 If MSV is to decrease the <i>modified market schedule</i> of the <i>originating STTM Shipper</i> , <0	$\text{FSC}(\text{op},\text{d},\text{ok},\text{ofd}) = \text{FSC}(\text{op},\text{d},\text{ok},\text{ofd}) + \text{MSV}[\text{d}, (\text{op},\text{ok},\text{ofd}), (\text{rp},\text{rk},\text{rfd})]$ $\text{FSC}(\text{rp},\text{d},\text{rk},\text{rfd}) = \text{FSC}(\text{rp},\text{d},\text{rk},\text{rfd}) - \text{MSV}[\text{d}, (\text{op},\text{ok},\text{ofd}), (\text{rp},\text{rk},\text{rfd})]$

10.5.2 Variation quantity

The total GJ variation quantity for *Trading Participant* p on *gas day* d for the *hub* is:

$$\text{VQ}(p,\text{d}) = \text{ABS}(\sum_k \sum_{\text{fd}} \text{CSC}(p,\text{d},k,\text{fd}))$$

Note: This is the absolute value of the component of the cumulative changes to the market schedule due to *market schedule variations* which are subject to *variation charges*.

Note: Each *Trading Participant* will have a single variation quantity (in GJ) for a *hub* for a *gas day*. If the *Trading Participant* is both an *STTM User* and an *STTM Shipper* hauling from the *hub*, then $VQ(p, d)$ will reflect the net change in its withdrawals from the *hub* that are subject to variation changes. The actual total change in its market schedule (inclusive of all its *market schedule variations*) may be different, as MSVs which do not incur a charge (because they imply no net change in *hub* withdrawal) are not included in $VQ(p, d)$.

10.5.3 Allocation to steps – Percentage method

Note: The total GJ variation volume is allocated to a number of steps reflecting different percentages of change relative to the market schedule.

- (a) The variation quantity of *Trading Participant* p variations assigned to step f is defined as follows, starting from step $f = 1$ and then increasing f :

For $f=1$:

$$PVarU(p, d, f) = \text{MIN}(VQ(p, d), PVarR(f) \times \sum_k \{ \sum_{cf(k)} MQ^U(p, d, cf(k)) + \sum_{cf(k)} MQ^S(p, d, cf(k)) \})$$

For $f > 1$ and $f < \text{Maxf}$:

$$PVarU(p, d, f) = \text{MIN}(VQ(p, d), PVarR(f) \times \sum_k \{ \sum_{cf(k)} MQ^U(p, d, cf(k)) + \sum_{cf(k)} MQ^S(p, d, cf(k)) \}) - \sum_{f' < f} PVarU(p, d, f')$$

For $f = \text{Maxf}$:

$$PVarU(p, d, f) = VQ(p, d) - \sum_{f' < f} PVarU(p, d, f')$$

Note: That is, the total of variations is assigned to steps, where each step is defined as a fraction of the *ex ante market schedule* for *STTM Users* and *STTM Shippers* withdrawing from the *hub*. Thus if the *ex ante market schedule* is $\sum_k \{ \sum_{cf(k)} MQ^U(p, d, cf(k)) + \sum_{cf(k)} MQ^S(p, d, cf(k)) \} = 100$, the first step is $PVarR(1)=3\%$ of the market schedule, the second step is $PVarR(2)=10\%$ of the market schedule, and the third step is $PVarR(3)=80\%$ of the market schedule; and the raw variation is $= -50$, then $VQ(p, d) = \text{ABS}(-50)$ or $+50$, $PVarU(p, d, 1) = \text{min}(50, 0.03 \times 100) = 3$, $PVarU(p, d, 2) = \text{min}(50, 0.1 \times 100) - 3 = 7$, and $PVarU(p, d, 3) = \text{min}(50, .8 \times 100) - 10 = 40$. Thus the total of *market schedule variations* of 50 is allocated into 3 steps of 3, 7, and 40. In the *variation charge* calculation, each of these steps is settled using its factor ($PVarF(f) < 1$) and is applied to the *ex ante market price* for the *hub*.

The last step (with $f = \text{Maxf}$) is used where there is no *ex ante market schedule* for withdrawal from the *hub* for the *Trading Participant*, which means that the entire variation quantity is associated with the final step. The maximum variation factor (ie. charge) will apply to this step.

- (b) The percentage *variation charge* to *Trading Participant* p for *market schedule variations* for *gas day* d is:

If $VQ(p, d) = 0$

$$PVarC(p,d) = 0$$

Else

$$PVarC(p,d) = VQ(p,d) \times \text{MIN}(\text{MAXP}(d) - \text{HP}(d), \text{ABS}(\text{HP}(d)) \times \{\sum_f (PVarU(p,d,f) \times PVarF(f))\} / VQ(p,d))$$

Note: This equation states that if there is no variation then there is no *variation charge*. However, if there is a variation, then we calculate the per GJ cost of the total *variation charge*. If this charge rate is greater than the amount by which the maximum market price exceeds the *ex ante market price* then the raw *variation charge* rate is capped at the amount by which the maximum price exceeds the *ex ante market price*. The final rate is multiplied by the variation quantity. This approach effectively caps the average charge applied to be no greater than the applicable maximum market price less the *ex ante market price*. The maximum price allowed in the *ex ante* market for *gas day* *d* is *MAXP*(*d*) (which will either be *MPC*, or *APC* if prices are administered).

This ensures that a Trading Participant who traded its MSV quantity at the *ex ante* market price will never have a *variation charge* which would bring its total \$/GJ payment for that gas to exceed the applicable maximum price in the market.

The absolute value of the *hub* price is used in defining the raw value so as to ensure that the *variation charge* is positive valued if *HP*(*d*) is negative.

10.5.4 Allocation to steps – Quantity method

- (a) The variation quantity of *Trading Participant* *p* variations assigned to step *f* is defined as follows, starting from step *f* = 1 and then increasing *f*:

For *f*=1:

$$GVarU(p,d,f) = \text{MIN}(VQ(p,d), GVarR(f))$$

For *f*>1 and *f* <Max*f*:

$$GVarU(p,d,f) = \text{MIN}(VQ(p,d), GVarR(f)) - \sum_{f' < f} GVarU(p,d,f')$$

For *f* = Max*f*:

$$GVarU(p,d,f) = VQ(p,d) - \sum_{f' < f} GVarU(p,d,f')$$

Note: That is, the total of variations is assigned to steps, where each step is an absolute GJ quantity. Thus if the raw variation is -50GJ and the step boundaries are 10GJ, 60GJ and 80GJ then $VQ(p,d) = \text{ABS}(-50)$ or 50, $GVarU(p,d,1) = \text{min}(50,10) = 10$, $GVarU(p,d,2) = \text{min}(50,60) - 10 = 40$, and $GVarU(p,d,3) = \text{min}(50,80) - 10 - 40 = 0$. Thus the total of *market schedule variations* of 50 is allocated into 3 steps of 10, 40 and 0. In the *variation charge* calculation, each of these steps is settled using its factor ($GVarF(f) < 1$) and is applied to the *ex ante market price* for the *hub*.

The last step (with *f* = Max*f*) has the otherwise unassigned variation associated with it.

- (b) The GJ *variation charge* to *Trading Participant* *p* for *market schedule variations* for *gas day* *d* is:

If $VQ(p,d) = 0$

$$GVarC(p,d) = 0$$

Else

$$GVarC(p,d) = VQ(p,d) \times \text{MIN}(\text{MAXP}(d) - \text{HP}(d) , \text{ABS}(\text{HP}(d))) \\ \times \{ \sum_f (GVarU(p,d,f) \times GVarF(f)) \} / VQ(p,d)$$

Note: This last equation works in much the same way as the corresponding equation for the percentage based approach.

The maximum price allowed in the ex ante market for *gas day* d is $\text{MAXP}(d)$ (which will either be *MPC* or *APC* if prices are administered).

10.5.5 Variation charge

- (a) Subject to paragraph (b), the *variation charge* for *Trading Participant* p for *market schedule variations* for *gas day* d for the *hub* is:

$$VarC(p,d) = \text{MIN}(PVarC(p,d), GVarC(p,d)).$$

- (b) If a *market administered scheduling state* or a *market administered settlement state* applies for *gas day* d at a *hub*, the *variation charge* for each *Trading Participant* p for *market schedule variations* at that *hub* will be zero.

10.6 Contingency Gas Payments and Charges

Explanatory Note

This clause describes how AEMO determines amounts payable by or to a *Trading Participant* in respect of *contingency gas* at a *hub* for the purposes of rule 461(2)(h). Amounts payable to a *Trading Participant* are determined in accordance with clause 10.6(a), by multiplying the *high contingency gas price* by the quantity of *contingency gas scheduled* for that *Trading Participant* to increase net supply of gas to the *hub*. Amounts payable by a *Trading Participant* are determined in accordance with clause 10.6(b), by multiplying the *low contingency gas price* by the quantity of *contingency gas scheduled* for that *Trading Participant* to decrease net supply of gas to the *hub*.

The amounts paid by *Trading Participants* are not intended to equal the amounts paid to *Trading Participants*. Cost recovery for these amounts is achieved through *deviation charges*, *settlement shortfall charges* or *settlement surplus payments*. Rather, *Trading Participants* make payments for *contingency gas* where there is a surplus of gas supply at the *hub*, and those *Trading Participants* are effectively bidding to buy gas back from the market on the *gas day*. This is expected to be a rare occurrence.

- (a) The payment to *Trading Participant* p for *gas day* d when *contingency gas* is *scheduled* to increase net supply to the *hub* is:

$$\text{CGP}(p,d) = \text{CGPH}(d) \times \{ \sum_{k \in \text{SP}} \text{MAX}(0, \text{CQ}^{\text{S}}(p,d,k, \text{fd}=\text{"to"})) \\ + \sum_{k \in \text{SN}} \text{MAX}(0, -1 \times \text{CQ}^{\text{U}}(p,d,k, \text{fd}=\text{"from"})) + \sum_{k \in \text{SP}} \text{MAX}(0, -1 \\ \times \text{CQ}^{\text{S}}(p,d,k, \text{fd}=\text{"from"})) \}$$

Note: The quantities in these equations are the changes to *scheduled* flows due to *contingency gas* being called which increase the quantity shipped to the *hub* or decrease the quantity withdrawn from the *hub*. The latter quantities are negative, so must be multiplied by negative one.

This section relates to *contingency gas* usage producing positive changes in flows to the *hub* and negative changes in flows from the *hub*. The MAX() functions in the following equations extract either the positive or negative changes as required and convert it to a positive value.

- (b) The charge payable by *Trading Participant p* for *gas day d* when *contingency gas* is called to decrease net supply to the *hub* is:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{CGC}(p,d) = & \text{CGPL}(d) \times \{ \sum_{k \in \text{SP}} \text{MAX}(0, -1 \times \text{CQ}^{\text{S}}(p,d,k, \text{fd}=\text{"to"})) \\ & + \sum_{k \in \text{SN}} \text{MAX}(0, \text{CQ}^{\text{U}}(p,d,k, \text{fd}=\text{"from"})) + \sum_{k \in \text{SP}} \\ & \text{MAX}(0, \text{CQ}^{\text{S}}(p,d,k, \text{fd}=\text{"from"})) \} \end{aligned}$$

Note: The quantities in these equations are the changes to *scheduled* flows due to *contingency gas* being called which decrease the quantity shipped to the *hub* or increase the quantity withdrawn from the *hub*. The former quantities are negative, so must be multiplied by negative one.

10.7 Market Operator Service

Explanatory Note

This clause describes how AEMO determines the amount payable to an *STTM Shipper* for the provision of *MOS* or *overrun MOS* at a *hub* for the purposes of rule 461(2)(d), and the amounts payable either to or by an *STTM Shipper* for the restoration of *MOS gas* for the purposes of rule 461(2)(e).

The amount payable to an *STTM Shipper* for the provision of *MOS* or *overrun MOS* is determined in accordance with clauses 10.7.1 to 10.7.3 by:

- (a) determining the price for *overrun MOS* for increased or decreased flows to the *hub* (as applicable) for each *STTM pipeline*, where:
- (i) if no *MOS* is allocated to *MOS providers* under *MOS increase offers* or *MOS decrease offers* (as applicable), the price for *overrun MOS* is zero; or
 - (ii) if the quantity of *MOS* allocated to *MOS providers* under *MOS increase offers* or *MOS decrease offers* (as applicable) is greater than zero but less than the relevant *MOS* estimate determined by AEMO in accordance with clause 5.2, the price for *overrun MOS* is the weighted average of the *MOS price* of each *price step* in the applicable *MOS stack* to which *MOS* is allocated; or
 - (iii) if the quantity of *MOS* allocated to *MOS providers* under *MOS increase offers* or *MOS decrease offers* (as applicable) is greater than the relevant *MOS* estimate determined by AEMO in accordance with clause 5.2, the price for *overrun MOS* is equal to the *MOS price* of the highest priced *price step* in the applicable *MOS stack* to which *MOS* is allocated; and
- (b) determining the amount payable to an *STTM Shipper* for the provision of *MOS* under one or more *MOS increase offers* or *MOS decrease offers* using a pay-as-bid principle, with the

quantity allocated to each of the *STTM Shipper's price steps* multiplied by the price of that *price step*; and

- (c) determining the amount payable to an *STTM Shipper* for the provision of *overrun MOS* on each *STTM pipeline* by multiplying the relevant price for *overrun MOS* by the quantity of *overrun MOS* allocated to the *STTM Shipper* on that *STTM pipeline*.

The amount payable to an *STTM Shipper* for the restoration of *MOS gas* provided at a *hub* on *gas day d-2* is determined in accordance with clause 10.7.4 by multiplying the *ex ante market price* for *gas day d* by the quantity of *MOS* allocated to that *STTM Shipper* under a *MOS increase offer* or as *overrun MOS* for increased flow to the *hub* on *gas day d-2*.

The amount payable by an *STTM Shipper* for the restoration of *MOS gas* provided at a *hub* on *gas day d-2* is determined in accordance with clause 10.7.4 by multiplying the *ex ante market price* for *gas day d* by the quantity of *MOS* allocated to that *STTM Shipper* under a *MOS decrease offer* or as *overrun MOS* for decreased flow to the *hub* on *gas day d-2*.

10.7.1 Price for overrun MOS for increased flows to the hub

- (a) The total *MOS* increased gas flows to the *hub* allocated under *MOS increase offers* on *market facility* $k \in SP$ is:

$$TCMIQ(d,k) = \sum_p \sum_{m(k)} \sum_j MOSAI^S(p,d,m(k),j)$$

- (b) The value of $ORPI(d,k)$, the price for *overrun MOS* for increased gas flows to the *hub* for *market facility* $k \in SP$ and *gas day d*, is determined as:

If $TCMIQ(d,k) = 0$

$$ORPI(d,k) = 0$$

If $TCMIQ(d,k) > 0$ and $TCMIQ(d,k) \leq MOSRI(d,k)$ then

$$ORPI(d,k) = \{ \sum_p \sum_{m(k)} \sum_j MOSIC^S(p,d,m(k),j) \times MOSAI^S(p,d,m(k),j) \} / TCMIQ(d,k)$$

If $TCMIQ(d,k) > 0$ and $TCMIQ(d,k) > MOSRI(d,k)$ then

$ORPI(d,k)$ is the maximum price $MOSIC^S(p,d,m(k),j)$ of any step j in the *MOS increase stack* for any *MOS increase offer* $m(k)$ for any *Trading Participant* p which is allocated *MOS* ($MOSAI^S(p,d,m(k),j) > 0$) on *gas day d*.

10.7.2 Price for overrun MOS for decreased flows to the hub

- (a) The total *MOS* decrease gas flows to the *hub* allocated under *MOS decrease offers* on *market facility* $k \in SP$ is:

$$TCMDQ(d,k) = \sum_p \sum_{m(k)} \sum_j MOSAD^S(p,d,m(k),j)$$

- (b) The value of $ORPD(d,k)$, the price for *overrun MOS* for decreased gas flows to the *hub* for *market facility* $k \in SP$ and *gas day d*, is determined as:

If $TCMDQ(d,k) = 0$

$$\text{ORPD}(d,k) = 0$$

If $\text{TCMDQ}(d,k) > 0$ and $\text{TCMDQ}(d,k) \leq \text{MOSRD}(d,k)$ then

$$\text{ORPD}(d,k) = \{ \sum_p \sum_{m(k)} \sum_j \text{MOSDC}^S(p,d,m(k),j) \times \text{MOSAD}^S(p,d,m(k),j) \} / \text{TCMDQ}(d,k)$$

If $\text{TCMDQ}(d,k) > 0$ and $\text{TCMDQ}(d,k) > \text{MOSRD}(d,k)$ then

$\text{ORPD}(d,k)$ is the maximum price $\text{MOSDC}^S(p,d,m(k),j)$ of any step j in the *MOS decrease stack* for any *MOS decrease offer* $m(k)$ for any *Trading Participant* p which is allocated *MOS* ($\text{MOSAD}^S(p,d,m(k),j) > 0$) on gas day d .

10.7.3 MOS settlement

- (a) The payment to *Trading Participant* p for *MOS* provided to the *hub* under one or more *MOS increase offers* or *MOS decrease offers* for gas day d is:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{MCP}(p,d) = & \sum_{k \in \text{SP}} \sum_{m(k)} \text{MOSFP}(p,d,m(k)) \\ & + \sum_{k \in \text{SP}} \sum_{m(k)} \sum_j (\text{MOSIC}^S(p,d,m(k),j) \times \\ & \text{MOSAI}^S(p,d,m(k),j)) \\ & + \sum_{k \in \text{SP}} \sum_{m(k)} \sum_j (\text{MOSDC}^S(p,d,m(k),j) \times \\ & \text{MOSAD}^S(p,d,m(k),j)) \end{aligned}$$

Note: This payment includes a fixed charge for *MOS increase offers* and *MOS decrease offers* included in a *MOS stack* (which will be zero at market commencement) and payments for *MOS increases* and *decreases* under *MOS increase offers* and *MOS decrease offers* based on the quantities allocated to those *MOS increase offers* and *MOS decrease offers*.

- (b) The payment to *Trading Participant* p for *overrun MOS* provided to the *hub* for gas day d is:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{MOP}(p,d) = & \sum_{k \in \text{SP}} (\text{ORPI}(d,k) \times \text{MAX}(0, \sum_{c(k)} \{ \text{OMAQ}^S(p,d,ct(k)) \\ & + \text{OMAQ}^S(p,d,cf(k)) \})) + \sum_{k \in \text{SP}} (\text{ORPD}(d,k) \times -1 \times \text{MIN}(0, \sum_{c(k)} \{ \\ & \text{OMAQ}^S(p,d,ct(k)) + \text{OMAQ}^S(p,d,cf(k)) \})) \end{aligned}$$

Note: *MOS overrun* payments for *increases* and *decreases* under *registered trading rights* are based on allocations for *overrun MOS* to *registered contracts* which will be associated by AEMO in settlement with the *registered trading right* of the *contract holder* for that *registered contract*. The *overrun price* for *increases* is applied to quantities that *increase net flow* to the *hub* while the *overrun prices* for *decreases* is applied to quantities that *decrease net flow* to the *hub*.

10.7.4 Restoration of MOS gas

- (a) The *MOS cash-out* payment for the *hub* for *Trading Participant* p as a *MOS provider* at the gas day d price for *MOS gas* provided on gas day $d-2$ is:

$$\text{MCCP}(p,d) = \text{HP}(d) \times \sum_{k \in \text{SP}} [\sum_{ct(k)} \text{MAX}(0, \text{MAQ}^S(p,d-2,ct(k))) + \sum_{cf(k)} \text{MAX}(0, \text{MAQ}^S(p,d-2,cf(k)))]$$

- (b) The MOS cash-out charge for the *hub* for *Trading Participant p* as a *MOS provider* at the *gas day d* price for *MOS gas* provided on *gas day d-2* is:

$$MCCC(p,d) = HP(d) \times \sum_{k \in SP} [\sum_{cf(k)} \text{MAX}(0, -1 \times \text{MAQ}^S(p,d-2,cf(k))) + \sum_{ct(k)} \text{MAX}(0, -1 \times \text{MAQ}^S(p,d-2,ct(k)))]$$

- (c) The MOS cash-out payment for the *hub* for *Trading Participant p* for providing *overrun MOS* at the *gas day d* price for *MOS gas* provided on *gas day d-2* is:

$$MCOP(p,d) = HP(d) \times \sum_{k \in SP} [\sum_{ct(k)} \text{MAX}(0, \text{OMAS}^S(p,d-2,ct(k))) + \sum_{cf(k)} \text{MAX}(0, \text{OMAS}^S(p,d-2,cf(k)))]$$

- (d) The MOS cash-out charge for the *hub* for *Trading Participant p* for providing *overrun MOS* at the *gas day d* price for *MOS gas* provided on *gas day d-2* is:

$$MCOC(p,d) = HP(d) \times \sum_{k \in SP} [\sum_{cf(k)} \text{MAX}(0, -1 \times \text{OMAS}^S(p,d-2,cf(k))) + \sum_{ct(k)} \text{MAX}(0, -1 \times \text{OMAS}^S(p,d-2,ct(k)))]$$

Note: Whether a payment or charge applies depends on whether the change in net gas allocated to flow to the *hub* is positive or negative.

10.7.5 Net MOS settlement

- (a) The MOS payment to *Trading Participant p* for *gas day d* for the *hub* is:

$$\text{MosP}(p,d) = \text{MCP}(p,d) + \text{MOP}(p,d) + \text{MCCP}(p,d) + \text{MCOP}(p,d)$$

- (b) The MOS charge on *Trading Participant p* for *gas day d* for the *hub* is:

$$\text{MosC}(p,d) = \text{MCCC}(p,d) + \text{MCOC}(p,d)$$

10.8 Deviations

Explanatory Note

This clause describes how AEMO determines the *deviation payment* and *deviation charge* for a *Trading Participant* at a *hub* for the purposes of rule 461(2)(g). They are calculated in accordance with clauses 10.8.1 to 10.8.11 by:

- (a) calculating the *modified market schedule quantity* for the *Trading Participant* for each *STTM facility* and flow direction, and the *hub*, being the aggregate of the relevant:
- (i) *market schedule quantities*; and
 - (ii) *allocations of MOS and overrun MOS*; and
 - (iii) *scheduled quantities of contingency gas*; and
 - (iv) *market schedule variations*; and

- (b) calculating *deviation quantities* for the *Trading Participant* for each *STTM facility* and flow direction, and the *hub*, being the difference between the relevant *modified market schedule quantity* and the corresponding *allocation quantity*; and
- (c) calculating payments or charges for each *deviation quantity* using both the percentage method and the quantity method under which:
- (i) the deviation price for a *short deviation quantity* increases as that *deviation quantity* increases, and the deviation price for a *long deviation quantity* decreases as that *deviation quantity* increases; and
- (ii) deviation prices are calculated by reference to:
- (A) the *ex ante market price* as modified by the factors in the tables in rule 462; and
- (B) the *ex post imbalance price*; and
- (C) the applicable *high contingency gas price* or *low contingency gas price* (if any),
for the *gas day*; and
- (iii) an exception is made where an *administered price cap state* applies by reason of *material involuntary curtailment*, in which case *deviation charges* are priced at the *administered price cap* and *deviation payments* are priced at the *ex ante market price* for the *gas day*; and
- (d) determining, for each *short deviation quantity* at the *hub*, the lesser of the charge calculated using the percentage method and the charge calculated using the quantity method, the sum of those lesser charges being the *deviation charge* for that *Trading Participant* at that *hub*; and
- (e) determining, for each *long deviation quantity* at the *hub*, the greater of the payment calculated using the percentage method and the payment calculated using the quantity method, the sum of those greater payments being the *deviation payment* for that *Trading Participant* at that *hub*.

10.8.1 Modified market schedule quantities

Note: The *modified market schedule quantity* used in settlements for *STTM Shippers* and *STTM Users* reflects what AEMO expects to have *scheduled* if that *STTM Shipper* or *STTM User* is to have no *deviation payments* or charges.

- (a) The *modified market schedule quantity* for *Trading Participant p* on *gas day d* in its role as an *STTM Shipper* on *market facility k* ∈ SP with flow direction *fd* is:

For *fd* = 'from':¹

$$\text{MMSQ}^S(p,d,k,fd) = \sum_{cf(k)} \{ \text{MQ}^S(p,d,cf(k)) - \text{MAQ}^S(p,d,cf(k)) - \text{OMAQ}^S(p,d,cf(k)) \} + \text{CQ}^S(p,d,k,fd) + \text{FSC}(p,d,k,fd) + \text{CSC}(p,d,k,fd)$$

¹ As positive *MOS* flow for an *STTM Shipper* flowing gas from the *hub* implies reduced flow from the *hub*, a positive *MOS* flow must decrease the *modified market schedule quantity* for that *STTM Shipper*.

For $fd = \text{'to'}$:

$$\text{MMSQ}^S(p,d,k,fd) = \sum_{ct(k)} \{ \text{MQ}^S(p,d,ct(k)) + \text{MAQ}^S(p,d,ct(k)) + \text{OMAQ}^S(p,d,ct(k)) \} + \text{CQ}^S(p,d,k,fd) + \text{FSC}(p,d,k,fd) + \text{CSC}(p,d,k,fd)$$

- (b) The *modified market schedule quantity* for *Trading Participant* p on *gas day* d in its role as an *STTM User* on *market facility* $k \in \text{SN}$ with flow direction fd is:

For $fd = \text{'from'}$:

$$\text{MMSQ}^U(p,d,k,fd) = \sum_{cf(k)} \{ \text{MQ}^U(p,d,cf(k)) \} + \text{CQ}^U(p,d,k,fd) + \text{FSC}(p,d,k,fd) + \text{CSC}(p,d,k,fd)$$

For $fd = \text{'to'}$ there cannot be a *modified market schedule quantity* as *STTM Users* can only withdraw from the *hub* so:

$$\text{MMSQ}^U(p,d,k,fd) = 0$$

- (c) The terms $\text{MMSQ}^S(p,d,k,fd)$ and $\text{MMSQ}^U(p,d,k,fd)$ may be positive or negative.

10.8.2 Deviation quantities

- (a) The total *GJ deviation quantity* for *Trading Participant* p for its withdrawals from the *hub* as an *STTM User* on *market facility* $k \in \text{SN}$ on *gas day* d is:

$$\text{DQF}(p,d,k) = \text{MMSQ}^U(p,d,k,fd=\text{'from'}) - \sum_{cf(k)} \text{AQ}^U(p,d,cf(k))$$

- (b) The total *GJ deviation quantity* for *Trading Participant* p for its withdrawals from the *hub* as an *STTM Shipper* on *market facility* $k \in \text{SP}$ on *gas day* d is:

$$\text{DQF}(p,d,k) = \text{MMSQ}^S(p,d,k,fd=\text{'from'}) - \sum_{cf(k)} \text{AQ}^S(p,d,cf(k))$$

- (c) The total *GJ deviation quantity* for *Trading Participant* p for its supply to the *hub* as an *STTM Shipper* on *market facility* $k \in \text{SP}$ on *gas day* d is:

$$\text{DQT}(p,d,k) = \sum_{ct(k)} \text{AQ}^S(p,d,ct(k)) - \text{MMSQ}^S(p,d,k,fd=\text{'to'})$$

- (d) The total *GJ deviation quantity* for *Trading Participant* p for its supply to the *hub* as an *STTM User* on *market facility* $k \in \text{SN}$ on *gas day* d is by definition:

$$\text{DQT}(p,d,k) = 0$$

- (e) The values of $\text{DQF}(p,d,k)$ and $\text{DQT}(p,d,k)$ may be positive or negative.

10.8.3 Definition of steps – Percentage method

Note: This section defines the boundaries and factors to be applied to deviations when calculating the deviation price.

- (a) If $HP(d) \geq 0$ then for each value of g :

$$PDevPR(g) = PRefDevPR(g)$$

$$PDevPF(g) = PRefDevPF(g)$$

$$PDevNR(g) = PRefDevNR(g)$$

$$PDevNF(g) = PRefDevNF(g)$$

- (b) If $HP(d) < 0$ then for each value of g :

$$PDevPR(g) = -1 \times PRefDevNR(g)$$

$$PDevPF(g) = PRefDevNF(g)$$

$$PDevNR(g) = -1 \times PRefDevPR(g)$$

$$PDevNF(g) = PRefDevPF(g)$$

10.8.4 Allocation to steps – Percentage method

Note: The next four equations allocate positive and negative *deviation quantities* between steps g for each of the deviations in flow to the *hub* or from the *hub* on *facility* k .

- (a) The positive *deviation quantity* for withdrawals from the *hub* by *Trading Participant* p on *market facility* k assigned to step g is calculated as follows, starting from step $g = 1$ and then increasing g :

For $g=1$

$$PDevPQF(p,d,k,g) = \text{MAX}(0, \text{MIN}(\text{DQF}(p,d,k), PDevPR(g) \times \{ \text{ABS}(\text{MMSQ}^U(p,d,k,fd="from")) + \text{ABS}(\text{MMSQ}^S(p,d,k,fd="from")) + \sum_{cf(k)} \{ \text{MAQ}^S(p,d,cf(k)) + \text{OMAQ}^S(p,d,cf(k)) \} \}))$$

For $g>1$ and $g < \text{Max}g$

$$PDevPQF(p,d,k,g) = \text{MAX}(0, \text{MIN}(\text{DQF}(p,d,k), PDevPR(g) \times \{ \text{ABS}(\text{MMSQ}^U(p,d,k,fd="from")) + \text{ABS}(\text{MMSQ}^S(p,d,k,fd="from")) + \sum_{cf(k)} \{ \text{MAQ}^S(p,d,cf(k)) + \text{OMAQ}^S(p,d,cf(k)) \} \}) - \sum_{g'<g} PDevPQF(p,d,k,g'))$$

For $g= \text{Max}g$

$$PDevPQF(p,d,k,g) = \text{MAX}(0, \text{DQF}(p,d,k) - \sum_{g'<g} PDevPQF(p,d,k,g'))$$

Note: This and subsequent equations combine terms involving *STTM User* and *STTM Shipper* quantities. As we are only dealing (in this case) with flows from the *hub* and since *STTM Shippers* and *STTM Users* must be flowing on different *facilities* k , it follows that for a given value of k only one set of terms – *STTM Shipper* or *STTM User* – will be non-zero. This equation, therefore, represents two sets of independent equations: one for *STTM Shippers* and one for *STTM Users*.

The last step (with $g=Maxg$) has the otherwise unassigned deviation associated with it. If there is no *modified market schedule quantity* then the entire deviation is associated with the final step. The maximum deviation cost will apply to this step.

- (b) The negative *deviation quantity* for withdrawals from the *hub* by *Trading Participant* p on *market facility* k assigned to step g is calculated as follows, starting from step $g = 1$ and then increasing g :

For $g=1$

$$PDevNQF(p,d,k,g) = \text{MAX}(0, \text{MIN}(-1 \times DQF(p,d,k), -1 \times PDevNR(g) \times \{ \text{ABS}(MMSQ^U(p,d,k,fd="from")) + \text{ABS}(MMSQ^S(p,d,k,fd="from")) + \sum_{cf(k)} \{ \text{MAQ}^S(p,d,cf(k)) + \text{OMAQ}^S(p,d,cf(k)) \} \}))$$

For $g>1$ and $g < Maxg$

$$PDevNQF(p,d,k,g) = \text{MAX}(0, \text{MIN}(-1 \times DQF(p,d,k), -1 \times PDevNR(g) \times \{ \text{ABS}(MMSQ^U(p,d,k,fd="from")) + \text{ABS}(MMSQ^S(p,d,k,fd="from")) + \sum_{cf(k)} \{ \text{MAQ}^S(p,d,cf(k)) + \text{OMAQ}^S(p,d,cf(k)) \} \}) - \sum_{g'<g} PDevNQF(p,d,k,g')$$

For $g= Maxg$

$$PDevNQF(p,d,k,g) = \text{MAX}(0, -1 \times DQF(p,d,k) - \sum_{g'<g} PDevNQF(p,d,k,g')$$

Note: The last step (with $g=Maxg$) has the otherwise unassigned deviation associated with it. If there is no *modified market schedule quantity* then the entire deviation is associated with the final step. The maximum deviation cost will apply to this step. The negative deviation is also converted into a positive quantity.

- (c) The positive *deviation quantity* for gas supplied to the *hub* by *Trading Participant* p on *market facility* k assigned to step g is calculated as follows, starting from step $g = 1$ and then increasing g :

For $g=1$

$$PDevPQT(p,d,k,g) = \text{MAX}(0, \text{MIN}(DQT(p,d,k), PDevPR(g) \times \text{ABS}(MMSQ^S(p,d,k,fd="to")) - \sum_{ct(k)} \{ \text{MAQ}^S(p,d,ct(k)) + \text{OMAQ}^S(p,d,ct(k)) \}))$$

For $g>1$ and $g < Maxg$

$$PDevPQT(p,d,k,g) = \text{MAX}(0, \text{MIN}(DQT(p,d,k), PDevPR(g) \times \text{ABS}(MMSQ^S(p,d,k,fd="to")) - \sum_{ct(k)} \{ \text{MAQ}^S(p,d,ct(k)) + \text{OMAQ}^S(p,d,ct(k)) \}) - \sum_{g'<g} PDevPQT(p,d,k,g')$$

For $g= Maxg$

$$PDevPQT(p,d,k,g) = \text{MAX}(0, DQT(p,d,k) - \sum_{g'<g} PDevPQT(p,d,k,g')$$

Note: The last step (with $g=Maxg$) has the otherwise unassigned deviation associated with it. If there is no *modified market schedule quantity* then the entire deviation is associated with the final step. The maximum deviation cost will apply to this step.

- (d) The negative *deviation quantity* for gas supplied to the *hub* by *Trading Participant* p on *market facility* k assigned to step g is calculated as follows, starting from step $g = 1$ and then increasing g :

For $g=1$

$$PDevNQT(p,d,k,g) = \text{MAX}(0, \text{MIN}(-1 \times DQT(p,d,k), -1 \times PDevNR(g) \times \text{ABS}(\text{MMSQ}^S(p,d,k,fd="to") - \sum_{ct(k)} \{ \text{MAQ}^S(p,d,ct(k)) + \text{OMAQ}^S(p,d,ct(k)) \}))$$

For $g>1$ and $g < Maxg$

$$PDevNQT(p,d,k,g) = \text{MAX}(0, \text{MIN}(-1 \times DQT(p,d,k), -1 \times PDevNR(g) \times \text{ABS}(\text{MMSQ}^S(p,d,k,fd="to") - \sum_{ct(k)} \{ \text{MAQ}^S(p,d,ct(k)) + \text{OMAQ}^S(p,d,ct(k)) \})) - \sum_{g'<g} PDevNQT(p,d,k,g')$$

For $g= Maxg$

$$PDevNQT(p,d,k,g) = \text{MAX}(0, -1 \times DQT(p,d,k) - \sum_{g'<g} PDevNQT(p,d,k,g'))$$

Note: The last step (with $g=Maxg$) has the otherwise unassigned deviation associated with it. If there is no *modified market schedule quantity* then the entire deviation is associated with the final step. The maximum deviation cost will apply to this step. The negative deviation is also converted into a positive quantity.

10.8.5 Deviation prices – Percentage method

Note: This section determines the deviation price by *Trading Participant* p for each step g .

The maximum price allowed in the ex ante market for *gas day* d is $MAXP(d)$ (which will either be *MPC* or *APC* if prices are administered).

The minimum price allowed in the ex ante market for *gas day* d is $MINP(d)$ (which will be the *MMP*).

The $DPFlag(d)$ is set to 1 in response to the *administered price cap state* triggered by material involuntary curtailment, and is otherwise set to 0. If it is 0, settlement calculations are unaffected. If it is 1, all positive deviations are settled at the *ex ante market price*, while all negative deviations are settled at the maximum price applicable to *gas day* d , ie. $MAXP(d)$. This protects *STTM Users* who are involuntarily curtailed from *deviation charges* and gives *STTM Shippers* who over-supply a higher payment than they would otherwise receive.

- (a) For *Trading Participant* p with a positive *deviation quantity* for withdrawals from the *hub* (i.e. lower withdrawal than expected) on *market facility* k on *gas day* d , the deviation price on deviation step g is:

$$\text{If } DPFlag(d) = 0$$

$$\text{PPDevPF}(p,d,k,g) = \text{MAX}(\text{MINP}(d), \text{MIN}(\text{MAXP}(d), \text{HP}(d) \times \text{PDevPF}(g), \text{IHP}(d), \text{CGPL}(d)))$$

If $\text{DPFlag}(d) = 1$

$$\text{PPDevPF}(p,d,k,g) = \text{HP}(d)$$

- (b) For *Trading Participant* p with a negative *deviation quantity* for withdrawals from the *hub* (i.e. higher withdrawal than expected) on *market facility* k on *gas day* d , the deviation price on deviation step g is:

If $\text{DPFlag}(d) = 0$

$$\text{PPDevNF}(p,d,k,g) = \text{MIN}(\text{MAXP}(d), \text{MAX}(\text{MINP}(d), \text{HP}(d) \times \text{PDevNF}(g), \text{IHP}(d), \text{CGPH}(d)))$$

If $\text{DPFlag}(d) = 1$

$$\text{PPDevNF}(p,d,k,g) = \text{MAXP}(d)$$

- (c) For *Trading Participant* p with a positive *deviation quantity* for gas supplied to the *hub* (i.e. higher supply than expected) on *market facility* k on *gas day* d , the deviation price on deviation step g is:

If $\text{DPFlag}(d) = 0$

$$\text{PPDevPT}(p,d,k,g) = \text{MAX}(\text{MINP}(d), \text{MIN}(\text{MAXP}(d), \text{HP}(d) \times \text{PDevPF}(g), \text{IHP}(d), \text{CGPL}(d)))$$

If $\text{DPFlag}(d) = 1$

$$\text{PPDevPT}(p,d,k,g) = \text{HP}(d).$$

- (d) For *Trading Participant* p with a negative *deviation quantity* for gas supplied to the *hub* (i.e. lower supply than expected) on *market facility* k on *gas day* d , the deviation price on deviation step g is:

If $\text{DPFlag}(d) = 0$

$$\text{PPDevNT}(p,d,k,g) = \text{MIN}(\text{MAXP}(d), \text{MAX}(\text{MINP}(d), \text{HP}(d) \times \text{PDevNF}(g), \text{IHP}(d), \text{CGPH}(d)))$$

If $\text{DPFlag}(d) = 1$

$$\text{PPDevNT}(p,d,k,g) = \text{MAXP}(d)$$

10.8.6 Percentage method deviation payments and charges

- (a) The settlement amount for *Trading Participant* p for positive deviations in withdrawals from the *hub* (i.e. lower withdrawal than expected) on *market facility* k on *gas day* d is:

$$\text{PDevPFA}(p,d,k) = \sum_g \{ \text{PDevPQF}(p,d,k,g) \times \text{PPDevPF}(p,d,k,g) \}$$

- (b) The settlement amount for *Trading Participant p* for negative deviations in withdrawals from the *hub* (i.e. higher withdrawal than expected) on *market facility k* on *gas day d* is:

$$\text{PDevNFA}(p,d,k) = \sum_g \{ \text{PDevNQF}(p,d,k,g) \times \text{PPDevNF}(p,d,k,g) \}$$

- (c) The settlement amount for *Trading Participant p* for positive deviations in gas supplied to the *hub* (i.e. higher supply than expected) on *market facility k* on *gas day d* is:

$$\text{PDevPTA}(p,d,k) = \sum_g \{ \text{PDevPQT}(p,d,k,g) \times \text{PPDevPT}(p,d,k,g) \}$$

- (d) The settlement amount for *Trading Participant p* for negative deviations in gas supplied to the *hub* (i.e. lower supply than expected) on *market facility k* on *gas day d* is:

$$\text{PDevNTA}(p,d,k) = \sum_g \{ \text{PDevNQT}(p,d,k,g) \times \text{PPDevNT}(p,d,k,g) \}$$

10.8.7 Definition of steps - Quantity method

Note: This section defines the boundaries and factors to be applied to deviations when calculating the deviation price.

- (a) If $\text{HP}(d) \geq 0$ then for each value of g :

$$\text{GDevPR}(g) = \text{GRefDevPR}(g)$$

$$\text{GDevPF}(g) = \text{GRefDevPF}(g)$$

$$\text{GDevNR}(g) = \text{GRefDevNR}(g)$$

$$\text{GDevNF}(g) = \text{GRefDevNF}(g)$$

- (b) If $\text{HP}(d) < 0$ then for each value of g :

$$\text{GDevPR}(g) = -1 \times \text{GRefDevNR}(g)$$

$$\text{GDevPF}(g) = \text{GRefDevNF}(g)$$

$$\text{GDevNR}(g) = -1 \times \text{GRefDevPR}(g)$$

$$\text{GDevNF}(g) = \text{GRefDevPF}(g)$$

10.8.8 Allocation to steps – Quantity method

Note: The next four equations allocate positive and negative *deviation quantities* between steps g for each of the deviations in flow to the *hub* or from the *hub* on *facility k*.

- (a) The positive *deviation quantity* for withdrawals from the *hub* by *Trading Participant p* on *market facility k* assigned to step g is calculated as follows, starting from step $g = 1$ and then increasing g :

For $g=1$

$$\text{GDevPQF}(p,d,k,g) = \text{MAX}(0, \text{MIN}(\text{DQF}(p,d,k) , \text{GDevPR}(g)))$$

For $g > 1$ and $g < \text{Max}g$

$$\text{GDevPQF}(p,d,k,g) = \text{MAX}(0, \text{MIN}(\text{DQF}(p,d,k) , \text{GDevPR}(g))) - \sum_{g' < g} \text{GDevPQF}(p,d,k,g')$$

For $g = \text{Max}g$

$$\text{GDevPQF}(p,d,k,g) = \text{MAX}(0, \text{DQF}(p,d,k) - \sum_{g' < g} \text{GDevPQF}(p,d,k,g'))$$

Note: The last step (with $g = \text{Max}g$) has the otherwise unassigned deviation associated with it. The maximum deviation cost will apply to this step.

- (b) The negative *deviation quantity* for withdrawals from the *hub* by *Trading Participant p* on *market facility k* assigned to step g is calculated as follows, starting from step $g = 1$ and then increasing g :

For $g = 1$

$$\text{GDevNQF}(p,d,k,g) = \text{MAX}(0, \text{MIN}(-1 \times \text{DQF}(p,d,k) , -1 \times \text{GDevNR}(g)))$$

For $g > 1$ and $g < \text{Max}g$

$$\text{GDevNQF}(p,d,k,g) = \text{MAX}(0, \text{MIN}(-1 \times \text{DQF}(p,d,k) , -1 \times \text{GDevNR}(g))) - \sum_{g' < g} \text{GDevNQF}(p,d,k,g')$$

For $g = \text{Max}g$

$$\text{GDevNQF}(p,d,k,g) = \text{MAX}(0, -1 \times \text{DQF}(p,d,k) - \sum_{g' < g} \text{GDevNQF}(p,d,k,g'))$$

Note: The last step (with $g = \text{Max}g$) has the otherwise unassigned deviation associated with it. The maximum deviation cost will apply to this step. The negative deviation is also converted into a positive quantity.

- (c) The positive *deviation quantity* for gas supplied to the *hub* by *Trading Participant p* on *market facility k* assigned to step g is calculated as follows, starting from step $g = 1$ and then increasing g :

For $g = 1$

$$\text{GDevPQT}(p,d,k,g) = \text{MAX}(0, \text{MIN}(\text{DQT}(p,d,k) , \text{GDevPR}(g)))$$

For $g > 1$ and $g < \text{Max}g$

$$\text{GDevPQT}(p,d,k,g) = \text{MAX}(0, \text{MIN}(\text{DQT}(p,d,k) , \text{GDevPR}(g))) - \sum_{g' < g} \text{GDevPQT}(p,d,k,g')$$

For $g = \text{Max}g$

$$\text{GDevPQT}(p,d,k,g) = \text{MAX}(0, \text{DQT}(p,d,k) - \sum_{g' < g} \text{GDevPQT}(p,d,k,g'))$$

Note: The last step (with $g = \text{Max}g$) has the otherwise unassigned deviation associated with it. The maximum deviation cost will apply to this step.

- (d) The negative *deviation quantity* for gas supplied to the *hub* by *Trading Participant p* on *market facility k* assigned to step *g* is calculated as follows, starting from step $g = 1$ and then increasing *g*:

For $g=1$

$$GDevNQT(p,d,k,g) = \text{MAX}(0, \text{MIN}(-1 \times DQT(p,d,k), -1 \times GDevNR(g)))$$

For $g > 1$ and $g < \text{Max}g$

$$GDevNQT(p,d,k,g) = \text{MAX}(0, \text{MIN}(-1 \times DQT(p,d,k), -1 \times GDevNR(g))) - \sum_{g' < g} GDevNQT(p,d,k,g')$$

For $g = \text{Max}g$

$$GDevNQT(p,d,k,g) = \text{MAX}(0, -1 \times DQT(p,d,k) - \sum_{g' < g} GDevNQT(p,d,k,g'))$$

Note: The last step (with $g = \text{Max}g$) has the otherwise unassigned deviation associated with it. The maximum deviation cost will apply to this step. The negative deviation is also converted into a positive quantity.

10.8.9 Deviation prices – Quantity method

Note: This section determines the deviation price by *Trading Participant p* for each step *g*.

The maximum price allowed in the ex ante market for *gas day d* is $\text{MAXP}(d)$ (which will either be *MPC* or *APC* if prices are administered).

The minimum price allowed in the ex ante market for *gas day d* is $\text{MINP}(d)$ (which will be the *MMP*).

The $\text{DPFlag}(d)$ is set to 1 in response to the *administered price cap state* triggered by material involuntary curtailment and is otherwise set to 0. If it is 0, settlement calculations are unaffected. If it is 1, all positive deviations are settled at the *ex ante market price*, while all negative deviations are settled at the maximum price applicable to *gas day d*, i.e. $\text{MAXP}(d)$. This protects *STTM Users* who are involuntarily curtailed from *deviation charges* and gives *STTM Shippers* who over-supply a higher payment than they would otherwise receive.

- (a) For *Trading Participant p* with a positive *deviation quantity* for withdrawals from the *hub* (i.e. lower withdrawal than expected) on *market facility k* on *gas day d*, the deviation price on deviation step *g* is:

If $\text{DPFlag}(d) = 0$

$$GDevPF(p,d,k,g) = \text{MAX}(\text{MINP}(d), \text{MIN}(\text{MAXP}(d), \text{HP}(d) \times GDevPF(g), \text{IHP}(d), \text{CGPL}(d)))$$

If $\text{DPFlag}(d) = 1$

$$GDevPF(p,d,k,g) = \text{HP}(d)$$

- (b) For *Trading Participant p* with a negative *deviation quantity* for withdrawals from the *hub* (i.e. higher withdrawal than expected) on

market facility k on *gas day* d, the deviation price on deviation step g is:

If DPFlag(d) = 0

$$GPDevNF(p,d,k,g) = \text{MIN}(\text{MAXP}(d), \text{MAX}(\text{MINP}(d), \text{HP}(d) \times \text{GDevNF}(g), \text{IHP}(d), \text{CGPH}(d)))$$

If DPFlag(d) = 1

$$GPDevNF(p,d,k,g) = \text{MAXP}(d)$$

- (c) For *Trading Participant* p with a positive *deviation quantity* for gas supplied to the *hub* (i.e. higher supply than expected) on *market facility* k on *gas day* d, the deviation price on deviation step g is:

If DPFlag(d) = 0

$$GPDevPT(p,d,k,g) = \text{MAX}(\text{MINP}(d), \text{MIN}(\text{MAXP}(d), \text{HP}(d) \times \text{GDevPF}(g), \text{IHP}(d), \text{CGPL}(d)))$$

If DPFlag(d) = 1

$$GPDevPT(p,d,k,g) = \text{HP}(d).$$

- (d) For *Trading Participant* p with a negative *deviation quantity* for gas supplied to the *hub* (i.e. lower supply than expected) on *market facility* k on *gas day* d, the deviation price on deviation step g is:

If DPFlag(d) = 0

$$GPDevNT(p,d,k,g) = \text{MIN}(\text{MAXP}(d), \text{MAX}(\text{MINP}(d), \text{HP}(d) \times \text{GDevNF}(g), \text{IHP}(d), \text{CGPH}(d)))$$

If DPFlag(d) = 1

$$GPDevNT(p,d,k,g) = \text{MAXP}(d)$$

10.8.10 Quantity method deviation payments and charges

- (a) The settlement amount for *Trading Participant* p for positive deviations in withdrawals from the *hub* (i.e. lower withdrawal than expected) on *market facility* k on *gas day* d is:

$$GDevPFA(p,d,k) = \sum_g \{GDevPQF(p,d,k,g) \times GPDevPF(p,d,k,g)\}$$

- (b) The settlement amount for *Trading Participant* p for negative deviations in withdrawals from the *hub* (i.e. higher withdrawal than expected) on *market facility* k on *gas day* d is:

$$GDevNFA(p,d,k) = \sum_g \{GDevNQF(p,d,k,g) \times GPDevNF(p,d,k,g)\}$$

- (c) The settlement amount for *Trading Participant* p for positive deviations in gas supplied to the *hub* (i.e. higher supply than expected) on *market facility* k on *gas day* d is:

$$\text{GDevPTA}(p,d,k) = \sum_g \{ \text{GDevPQT}(p,d,k,g) \times \text{GPDevPT}(p,d,k,g) \}$$

- (d) The settlement amount for *Trading Participant* p for negative deviations in gas supplied to the *hub* (i.e. lower supply than expected) on *market facility* k on *gas day* d is:

$$\text{GDevNTA}(p,d,k) = \sum_g \{ \text{GDevNQT}(p,d,k,g) \times \text{GPDevNT}(p,d,k,g) \}$$

10.8.11 Deviation payments and charges

- (a) The settlement amount for *Trading Participant* p for positive deviations in withdrawals from the *hub* (i.e. lower withdrawal than expected) on *market facility* k on *gas day* d is:

$$\text{DevPFA}(p,d,k) = \text{MAX}(\text{PDevPFA}(p,d,k) , \text{GDevPFA}(p,d,k))$$

- (b) The settlement amount for *Trading Participant* p for negative deviations in withdrawals from the *hub* (i.e. higher withdrawal than expected) on *market facility* k on *gas day* d is:

$$\text{DevNFA}(p,d,k) = \text{MIN}(\text{PDevNFA}(p,d,k) , \text{GDevNFA}(p,d,k))$$

- (c) The settlement amount for *Trading Participant* p for positive deviations in gas supplied to the *hub* (i.e. higher supply than expected) on *gas day* d is:

$$\text{DevPTA}(p,d,k) = \text{MAX}(\text{PDevPTA}(p,d,k) , \text{GDevPTA}(p,d,k))$$

- (d) The settlement amount for *Trading Participant* p for negative deviations in gas supplied to the *hub* (i.e. lower supply than expected) on *gas day* d is:

$$\text{DevNTA}(p,d,k) = \text{MIN}(\text{PDevNTA}(p,d,k) , \text{GDevNTA}(p,d,k))$$

- (e) The *deviation payment* to *Trading Participant* p for the *hub* for *gas day* d is:

$$\text{DevP}(p,d) = \sum_k \{ \text{DevPFA}(p,d,k) + \text{DevPTA}(p,d,k) \}$$

- (f) The *deviation charge* to *Trading Participant* p for the *hub* for *gas day* d is:

$$\text{DevC}(p,d) = \sum_k \{ \text{DevNFA}(p,d,k) + \text{DevNTA}(p,d,k) \}$$

10.9 Capacity Settlement

Explanatory Note

This clause describes how AEMO determines the *capacity payment* and *capacity charge* for a *Trading Participant* at a *hub* for the purposes of rule 461(2)(f). They are calculated in accordance with clauses 10.9.1 to 10.9.3 by:

- (a) determining the total quantity of capacity traded across all *Trading Participants* on each *STTM facility*, being the lesser of:

- (i) the total quantity of gas specified in *STTM facility allocations* for that *STTM facility* in respect of *registered facility services* for *as available capacity* (net of allocations of *MOS*); and
 - (ii) the total quantity of gas specified in *ex ante offers* submitted in respect of *registered facility services* for *firm capacity* on that *STTM facility* but not included in *STTM facility allocations* for those *registered facility services* (net of allocations of *MOS* and capped if necessary by the *capacity limit* of relevant *registered trading rights*); and
- (b) for each *STTM facility* at the *hub*, multiplying:
- (i) the capacity charge rate for that *STTM facility*, which is calculated by adjusting the relevant *capacity price* by the ratio of the total quantity of capacity traded on that *STTM facility* to the quantity referred to in paragraph (a)(i); by
 - (ii) the quantity of gas allocated to a *Trading Participant* in respect of *registered facility services* for *as available capacity* (net of allocations of *MOS*),
- the sum of those amounts being the *capacity charge* for that *Trading Participant* at that *hub*; and
- (c) for each *STTM facility* at the *hub*, multiplying:
- (i) the capacity payment rate for that *STTM facility*, which is calculated by adjusting the relevant *capacity price* by the ratio of the total quantity of capacity traded on that *STTM facility* to the quantity referred to in paragraph (a)(ii); by
 - (ii) the quantity of gas specified in *ex ante offers* submitted by a *Trading Participant* in respect of *registered facility services* for *firm capacity* but not allocated to that *Trading Participant* (net of allocations of *MOS* and capped if necessary by the *capacity limit* of relevant *registered trading rights*),
- the sum of those amounts being the *capacity payment* for that *Trading Participant* at that *hub*.

10.9.1 Determining levels of trade

Note: *Capacity charges* to *STTM Shippers* are based on the quantity of gas allocated to *registered trading rights* with *as available capacity* (excluding *MOS* allocations and *overrun MOS* allocations). *Capacity payments* to *STTM Shippers* are based on the quantity of gas not used from *registered trading rights* with *firm capacity* – being the difference between the gas offered and the gas actually flowed (excluding *MOS* allocations and *overrun MOS* allocations) on those *registered trading rights*. *MOS* allocations and *overrun MOS* allocations are removed because they are an allocation of actual pipeline flows and cannot cause an *STTM Shipper* with *firm capacity* to fail to access its pipeline capacity.

- (a) The effective allocated quantity of gas supplied to the *hub* (based on *STTM facility allocations*) by *Trading Participant* *p* on *gas day* *d* on *registered trading right* *ct(k)* on *market facility* $k \in SP$ is:

$$EAQ^S(p,d,ct(k)) = \text{MAX}(0, AQ^S(p,d,ct(k)) - MAQ^S(p,d,ct(k)) - OMAQ^S(p,d,ct(k)))$$

Note: The effective allocated quantity is not limited to the capacity of the *registered trading right*. This ensures that a *Trading Participant* pays for the total quantity allocated to the *registered trading right*, even if that quantity is infeasible according to the data held by AEMO.

If the quantity was limited, a *Trading Participant* which understated its *capacity limit* would be able to flow gas beyond that limit at no *capacity charge*.

- (b) The deemed gas offered on *firm capacity* to be supplied to the *hub* by *Trading Participant p* for *gas day d* on *firm registered trading right ct(k)* on *market facility k* ∈ SP is set to be:

$$FGO(p,d,ct(k)) = \text{MIN}(CAP(p,d,ct(k)), OQF^S(p,d,ct(k)))$$

Note: The *capacity limit* of the *registered trading right* is used to cap the quantity because while it is possible for the *capacity limit* to be less than the quantity offered, a *Trading Participant* will only be *scheduled up to the capacity limit* of the *registered trading right*.

- (c) The total effective quantity of gas flowed via as available *registered trading rights* to the *hub* for *gas day d* on *market facility k* ∈ SP is:

$$TAFGQ(d,k) = \sum_p \sum_{ct(k) \in AH} EAQ^S(p,d,ct(k))$$

- (d) The total quantity of gas offered on *firm registered trading rights* to the *hub* but not flowed (based on the effective allocated quantity of gas flowed) for *gas day d* on *market facility k* ∈ SP is:

$$TFGNQ(d,k) = \sum_p \sum_{ct(k) \in FH} \text{MAX}(0, FGO(p,d,ct(k)) - EAQ^S(p,d,ct(k)))$$

- (e) The capacity quantity traded for *gas day d* on *market facility k* ∈ SP is:

$$CQT(d,k) = \text{MIN}(TAFGQ(d,k) , TFGNQ(d,k))$$

10.9.2 Capacity rates

- (a) The effective capacity charge rate for as available *registered trading rights* on *gas day d* and *market facility k* ∈ SP is:

$$\text{If } TAFGQ(d,k) = 0$$

$$ECCA(d,k) = 0$$

Else

$$ECCA(d,k) = CP(d,k) \times CQT(d,k) / TAFGQ(d,k)$$

- (b) The effective capacity payment rate for *firm registered trading rights* on *gas day d* and *market facility k* ∈ SP is:

$$\text{If } TFGNQ(d,k) = 0$$

$$ECPF(d,k) = 0$$

Else

$$ECPF(d,k) = CP(d,k) \times CQT(d,k) / TFGNQ(d,k)$$

Note: As the quantity of capacity traded cannot exceed the values of TAFGQ(d, k) or TFGNQ(d,k), these equations ensure that neither the capacity charge rate nor the capacity payment rate can exceed the value of the *capacity price*. If the quantity of gas allocated to *registered trading rights* for as available capacity equals the quantity of gas offered but not

used for *registered trading rights* for *firm capacity*, each of the capacity charge rate and capacity payment rate will equal the *capacity price*.

10.9.3 Capacity payments and charges

- (a) The *capacity charge* for *Trading Participant* p on *gas day* d for its gas flows on as available *registered trading rights* for the *hub* is:

$$SCC(p,d) = \sum_{k \in SP} \{ ECCA(d,k) \times \sum_{ct(k) \in AH} EAQ^S(p,d,ct(k)) \}$$

- (b) The *capacity payment* for *Trading Participant* p on *gas day* d for firm *registered trading rights* offered but not utilised for the *hub* are:

$$SCP(p,d) = \sum_{k \in SP} \{ ECPF(d,k) \times \sum_{ct(k) \in FH} \text{MAX}(0, FGO(p,d,ct(k)) - EAQ^S(p,d,ct(k))) \}$$

10.10 Settlement Shortfall Charges and Payments

Explanatory Note

This clause describes how AEMO determines the *settlement surplus payment* and *settlement shortfall charge* for a *Trading Participant* at a *hub* for the purposes of rule 464(2)(b)(i). They are calculated in accordance with clauses 10.10.1 to 10.10.5 by:

- (a) calculating the settlement shortfall or settlement surplus for the *hub*, excluding *variation charges*; and
- (b) calculating the billing period deviation quantity for the *Trading Participant* for the relevant *billing period*, which excludes any *gas days* for which an *administered price cap state* applied by reason of *material involuntary curtailment*; ; and
- (c) allocating the settlement shortfall or settlement surplus in proportion to the *Trading Participant's* share of the total billing period deviation quantity for all *Trading Participants*, but subject to a cap equal to the *settlement surplus cap* multiplied by the *Trading Participant's* billing period deviation quantity; and
- (d) allocating any residual settlement surplus, and any surplus resulting from *variation charges*, to *Trading Participants* in proportion to their share of withdrawals from the *hub* in the *billing period*.

Fees are retained by AEMO and are not part of the settlement surplus or shortfall.

10.10.1 Shortfall or surplus

Note: The settlement surplus and shortfall allocation for a *hub* is not determined for each day but rather is determined for all the days in the *billing period* (or the *billing period* to date – for prudential purposes).

- (a) The gross market income for the *hub* for the *billing period*, excluding participant fees and *variation charges*, before settlement surplus and shortfall allocation, is:

$$GMI = \sum_{d \in BP} \sum_p \{ MktC(p,d) + PFDCC(p,d) + CGC(p,d) + MosC(p,d) + DevC(p,d) + SCC(p,d) + AHC(p,d) \}$$

- (b) The gross market outgoing for the *hub* for the *billing period*, excluding fees and *variation charges*, before settlement surplus and shortfall allocation, is:

$$\text{GMO} = \sum_{d \in \text{BP}} \sum_p \{ \text{MktP}(p,d) + \text{PFDCP}(p,d) + \text{CGP}(p,d) + \text{MosP}(p,d) + \text{DevP}(p,d) + \text{SCP}(p,d) + \text{AHP}(p,d) \}$$

- (c) The settlement surplus or shortfall for the *hub* for a *billing period* (excluding *variation charges*) is

$$\text{NMB} = \text{GMI} - \text{GMO}$$

- (d) If $\text{NMB} > 0$ then the *hub* is in surplus (ignoring *variation charges*), while if $\text{NMB} < 0$ then the *hub* is in shortfall (ignoring *variation charges*).

10.10.2 Billing period deviation quantities

The billing period deviation quantity for *Trading Participant* *p* for the *hub* for the *billing period* is:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{DQB}(p) = & \sum_{d \in \text{BP}} \{ \sum_{k \in \text{SN}} [\text{MAX}(0, \text{DQF}(p,d,k)) \times \text{LI}(d,k) - \\ & \text{MIN}(0, \text{DQF}(p,d,k)) \times \text{LD}(d,k)] \\ & + \sum_{k \in \text{SP}} [\text{MAX}(0, \text{DQF}(p,d,k)) \times \text{LI}(d,k) - \text{MIN}(0, \text{DQF}(p,d,k)) \times \text{LD}(d,k)] \\ & + \text{MAX}(0, \text{DQT}(p,d,k)) \times \text{LI}(d,k) - \text{MIN}(0, \text{DQT}(p,d,k)) \times \text{LD}(d,k) \} \end{aligned}$$

Where:

If $\text{DPFlag}(d) = 0$ then $\text{LI}(d,k) = 1$ and $\text{LD}(d,k) = 1$ for all $k \in \text{SP}$ and all $k \in \text{SN}$

if $\text{DPFlag}(d) = 1$ and $\text{NMB} \geq 0$ then $\text{LI}(d,k) = 1$ and $\text{LD}(d,k) = 1$ for all $k \in \text{SP}$

if $\text{DPFlag}(d) = 1$ and $\text{NMB} < 0$ then $\text{LI}(d,k) = 0$ and $\text{LD}(d,k) = 1$ for all $k \in \text{SP}$

if $\text{DPFlag}(d) = 1$ and $\text{NMB} \geq 0$ then $\text{LI}(d,k) = 1$ and $\text{LD}(d,k) = 1$ for all $k \in \text{SN}$

if $\text{DPFlag}(d) = 1$ and $\text{NMB} < 0$ then $\text{LI}(d,k) = 0$ and $\text{LD}(d,k) = 1$ for all $k \in \text{SN}$

Note: The conditions with $\text{LI}(d,k)=0$ are the only conditions that materially protect *Trading Participants*. It means that if the market is in shortfall over a *billing period*, *Trading Participants* which deviate so as to increase net supply to the *hub* on a *gas day* on which *material involuntary curtailment* occurred do not fund that shortfall.

10.10.3 Surplus and shortfall allocation based on billing period deviations

The shortfall/surplus allocation based on deviations for *Trading Participant* *p* for the *hub* for the *billing period* is:

$$\text{If } \sum_p \text{DQB}(p') = 0$$

$$DVA(p) = 0$$

Otherwise

$$DVA(p) = \text{MIN}(\text{AllCAP} \times \text{DQB}(p) , \text{NMB} \times \{ \text{DQB}(p) / (\sum_{p'} \text{DQB}(p')) \})$$

Note: The last term allocates NMB in proportion to deviations over the *billing period*, while the first term caps the allocation for positive NMB values at a rate of AllCAP, the \$/GJ cap on positive allocations. This cap is intended to stop *Trading Participants* who deviated getting a high proportion of their *deviation charges* returned to them.

10.10.4 Residual surplus and shortfall allocation based on withdrawals

The shortfall/surplus allocation to *Trading Participant p* based on withdrawals for the *hub* for the *billing period* is:

$$\text{If } \sum_{p'} \sum_{d \in \text{BP}} \{ \sum_{k \in \text{SN}} \sum_{\text{cf}(k)} \text{AQ}^{\text{U}}(p', d, \text{cf}(k)) + \sum_{k \in \text{SP}} \sum_{\text{cf}(k)} \text{AQ}^{\text{S}}(p', d, \text{cf}(k)) \} = 0$$

$$\text{WDA}(p) = 0$$

Otherwise

$$\begin{aligned} \text{WDA}(p) = & \{ \text{NMB} - \sum_{p'} \text{DVA}(p') + \sum_d \sum_{p'} \text{VarC}(p', d) \} \\ & \times [\sum_{d \in \text{BP}} \{ \sum_{k \in \text{SN}} \sum_{\text{cf}(k)} \text{AQ}^{\text{U}}(p, d, \text{cf}(k)) + \sum_{k \in \text{SP}} \sum_{\text{cf}(k)} \text{AQ}^{\text{S}}(p, d, \text{cf}(k)) \} \\ & / (\sum_{p'} \sum_{d \in \text{BP}} \{ \sum_{k \in \text{SN}} \sum_{\text{cf}(k)} \text{AQ}^{\text{U}}(p', d, \text{cf}(k)) + \sum_{k \in \text{SP}} \sum_{\text{cf}(k)} \text{AQ}^{\text{S}}(p', d, \text{cf}(k)) \})] \end{aligned}$$

10.10.5 Net surplus and shortfall payments and charges

- (a) The *settlement surplus payment* to *Trading Participant p* for the *hub* for the *billing period* is:

$$\text{SSP}(p) = \text{MAX}(0, \text{DVA}(p)) + \text{MAX}(0, \text{WDA}(p))$$

- (b) The *settlement shortfall charge* to *Trading Participant p* for the *hub* for the *billing period* is:

$$\text{SSC}(p) = \text{MAX}(0, -1 \times \text{DVA}(p)) + \text{MAX}(0, -1 \times \text{WDA}(p))$$

10.11 Determination and Payment of Claims

10.11.1 Interpretation

In this clause 10.11, an **eligible price step** for a *hub* and a *gas day* is:

- (a) in the case of a claim made under rule 433(a) – a *price step* of an *ex ante offer* that:
- (i) is *scheduled* for that *hub* and *gas day*; and
 - (ii) specifies a price that is greater than the *ex ante market price* for that *hub* on that *gas day*; or
- (b) in the case of a claim made under rule 433(b) – a *price step* of a *contingency gas offer* that:
- (i) is *scheduled* for that *hub* and *gas day*; and

- (ii) specifies a price that is greater than the *high contingency gas price* for that *hub* on that *gas day*.

10.11.2 Amounts to be paid to Trading Participants

- (a) The amount to be paid to a *Trading Participant* under rule 466(1) in respect of a claim made under rule 433(a) is:
 - (i) the minimum of:
 - (A) the estimated direct cost of supplying the gas, determined in accordance with clause 10.11.4; and
 - (B) the offered value of the gas supplied, determined in accordance with clause 10.11.5(a);
 - (ii) less the estimated total quantity of gas supplied under the *eligible price steps* (determined in accordance with clause 10.11.5(b)) multiplied by the *ex ante market price*.
- (b) The amount to be paid to a *Trading Participant* under rule 466(1) in respect of a claim made under rule 433(b) is:
 - (i) the minimum of:
 - (A) the estimated direct cost of supplying the gas, determined in accordance with clause 10.11.4; and
 - (B) the offered value of the gas supplied, determined in accordance with clause 10.11.6(a);
 - (ii) less the estimated total quantity of gas supplied under the *eligible price steps* (determined in accordance with clause 10.11.6(b)) multiplied by the *high contingency gas price*.
- (c) If a compensation amount determined under this clause is zero or a negative amount, then no compensation is to be paid.

10.11.3 Amounts to be paid by Trading Participants

- (a) The amount to be paid by a *Trading Participant* under rule 466(1)(b) in respect of a claim under rule 433(a) is to be determined by apportioning the total amount to be paid by AEMO under rule 466(1)(a) between *Trading Participants* based on their *market schedule quantities* for withdrawals from the *hub* for the relevant *gas day*.
- (b) The amount to be paid by a *Trading Participant* under rule 466(1)(b) in respect of a claim made under rule 433(b) is to be determined by:
 - (i) apportioning the amount equal to:
 - (A) the proportion of *contingency gas scheduled* that can be attributed to net participant short deviations, determined in accordance with paragraph (c);

- (B) multiplied by the total amount to be paid by AEMO under rule 466(1)(a),
to *Trading Participants* in proportion to their *short deviation quantities* for the *gas day*; and
- (ii) allocating any residual amount to be paid by AEMO under rule 466(1)(a) to *Trading Participants* in proportion to the quantity of gas withdrawn from the *hub* by each *Trading Participant* on the *gas day*.
- (c) The proportion of *contingency gas scheduled* that can be attributed to net participant short deviations is:
 - (i) the maximum of zero and the lesser of:
 - (A) the quantity of *contingency gas scheduled* for increase in net supply to the *hub*; and
 - (B) the quantity of gross allocations of gas flow to the *hub* less the gross flows to the *hub* in the *ex ante market schedule*;
 - (ii) divided by the quantity of *contingency gas scheduled* for increase in net supply to the *hub*.

Note: This method of cost recovery first calculates what proportion of the total *contingency gas* called was due to the net short deviation of market participants. The corresponding proportion of the total compensation cost is recovered from those participants that had short deviations on the *gas day*. Any residual amount could be due to mis-estimation of the amount of CG needed, or CG called in multiple directions, or a *market administered scheduling state*, and this amount is smeared according to withdrawal quantities.

10.11.4 Direct cost of supplying gas

- (a) The direct cost to a *Trading Participant* of supplying the quantity of gas that was supplied under *eligible price steps* (as determined under clause 10.11.5(b) or 10.11.6(b), as applicable) is the cost that is directly attributable to the supply of that quantity of gas, to be determined on the basis of written evidence provided by the relevant *Trading Participant*.

Note: Broadly this is expected to be based on producer and haulage contracts.

- (b) For the avoidance of doubt, costs arising in related markets are not direct costs.

10.11.5 Offered value of gas supplied – Ex ante offer

- (a) The offered value of gas supplied in relation to an *ex ante offer* is the sum of:
 - (i) the quantity of gas supplied under each *eligible price step*, determined in accordance with paragraph (d);

- (ii) multiplied by the price specified in that *price step*.
- (b) The total quantity of gas that is to be taken as having been supplied under *eligible price steps* in respect of an *ex ante offer* is:
 - (i) the estimated quantity of gas supplied under the *ex ante offer*, being the *market schedule quantity* for the applicable *registered trading right* $MQ^s(p,d,ct)$, less the maximum of:
 - (A) zero; and
 - (B) $\{ MMSQ^s(p,d,k,fd = 'to') / (\sum_{ct(k)} MQ^s(p,d,ct(k))) \} \times MQ^s(p,d,ct) - AQ^s(p,d,ct)$

Where:

$MMSQ^s(p,d,k,fd = 'to')$ is the *modified market schedule quantity* for the relevant *Trading Participant* p , on the relevant *market facility* k for flow to the *hub*;

$\sum_{ct(k)} MQ^s(p,d,ct(k))$ is the total of all *market schedule quantities* for all of *Trading Participant* p 's *registered trading rights* on the same *market facility* for flow to the *hub*; and

$AQ^s(p,d,ct)$ is the *registered facility service allocation* for the applicable *registered trading right*;

Note: This compares the *modified market schedule* with the allocation. Any shortfall in delivered gas is subtracted from the *ex ante market schedule*.

- (ii) less the quantity *scheduled* in the *ex ante market* for the *price steps* in the *ex ante offer* for which the price was less than or equal to the *ex-ante market price*.
- (c) If the quantity determined under paragraph (b) is zero or a negative amount, no gas is taken to have been supplied under *eligible price steps* in respect of an *ex ante offer*.
- (d) If the quantity determined under paragraph (b) is a positive amount, that quantity must be allocated to the *eligible price steps* in the relevant *ex ante offer* in order of increasing price.
- (e) If the relevant *Trading Participant* has also made a claim under rule 433(b) in relation to *contingency gas* provided for the same *gas day* and *market facility* for flow to the *hub*, the *dispute resolution panel* may reduce the quantity determined under paragraph (b)(i)(B) by an amount equal to amount determined in accordance with clause 10.11.6(b)(i)(B).

Note: Hence if the *Trading Participant's* allocation is less than its *modified market schedule*, the shortfall is first subtracted from the estimate of *contingency gas* supplied, and only the remainder will be subtracted from the *ex-ante estimate*.

10.11.6 Offered Value of Gas Supplied – Contingency gas offer

- (a) The offered value of gas supplied in relation to a *contingency gas offer* is the sum of:
- (i) the quantity of gas supplied under each *eligible price step*, determined in accordance with paragraph (d);
 - (ii) multiplied by the price specified in relation to that *price step*.
- (b) The total quantity of gas that is to be taken as having been supplied under *eligible price steps* in respect of a *contingency gas offer* is:
- (i) the estimated quantity of *contingency gas* supplied under the *contingency gas offer*, being, subject to paragraph (e):
 - (A) the quantity of *contingency gas scheduled* under the *contingency gas offer*,
 - (B) less the maximum of:
 - (1) zero; and
 - (2) for *contingency gas offers* by an *STTM Shipper* relating to flow direction to the *hub*,
 $MMSQ^s(p,d,k,fd = 'to') - \sum_{ct(k)} AQ^s(p,d,ct(k))$
 - (3) for *contingency gas offers* by an *STTM Shipper* relating to flow direction from the *hub*,
 $\sum_{ct(k)} AQ^s(p,d,ct(k)) - MMSQ^s(p,d,k,fd = 'from')$
 - (4) for *contingency gas offers* by an *STTM User*,
 $\sum_{ct(k)} AQ^u(p,d,ct(k)) - MMSQ^u(p,d,k,fd = 'from')$
- Note:** This compares the *modified market schedule* with the allocation. Any shortfall in delivered gas is subtracted from the estimate of contingency gas supplied. The estimate is also subject to adjustment based on other evidence, as set out in paragraph (e).
- (ii) less the quantity *scheduled* for the *price steps* of the relevant *contingency gas offer* for which the price is less than or equal to the *high contingency gas price*.
- (c) If the quantity determined under paragraph (b) is zero or a negative amount, no gas is taken to have been supplied under *eligible price steps* in respect of a *contingency gas offer*.
- (d) If the quantity determined under paragraph (b) is a positive amount, that quantity must be allocated to the *eligible price steps* in the relevant *contingency gas offer* in order of increasing price.
- (e) The dispute resolution panel may adjust a quantity determined under paragraph (b)(i) based on:
- (i) evidence provided by the *Trading Participant* of the quantity of *contingency gas* actually provided; or

- (ii) the fact that the *Trading Participant* has provided no such evidence,

but the adjusted quantity must not exceed the quantity of *contingency gas scheduled* under all *price steps* in the relevant *contingency gas offer*.

10.11.7 **Dispute resolution panel to take all circumstances into account**

- (a) The dispute resolution panel may reduce (but may not increase) any amount of compensation calculated in accordance with the steps in this clause 10.11 by an amount that it considers to be equitable, taking into account the conduct of the *Trading Participant* and any other circumstances relating to the relevant offer or the claim.
- (b) The dispute resolution panel may, under paragraph (a), reduce an amount of compensation to zero.

10.12 **Settlement Statements**

No requirements are specified for the purposes of rule 467.

CHAPTER 11 PRUDENTIAL REQUIREMENTS

11.1 Monitoring

- (a) For the purpose of rule 484, AEMO must review its estimated exposure to each *Trading Participant* on each business day.
- (b) A review under clause 11.1(a) must take into account the following unpaid amounts:
 - (i) from previous *billing periods* where there is a *settlement statement* but payment under that *settlement statement* is not yet due – the unpaid amount from the most recent *settlement statement* for the *billing period*; and

Note: This will include revised settlement amounts from previous months.

- (ii) from previous *billing periods* where there is no *settlement statement* – an estimate of the unpaid amount for the *billing period* determined by AEMO using the prices, quantities and allocation data available at the time of the review; and
- (iii) from the current *billing period*, up to and including the *gas day* before the review day – an estimate of the unpaid amount for the current *billing period* determined by AEMO using the prices, quantities and allocation data available at the time of the review.

Note: The review process is essentially a mini-settlement run for the month to date, combined with settlement amounts from the previous month. The review will take place after the allocations and prices from the previous *gas day* are available. The monthly amounts, such as the settlement shortfall or surplus allocation will be calculated as month to date balances. If AEMO has delayed the publication of the *ex post imbalance price* in accordance with rule 426(1A) the *provisional ex post imbalance price* may be used in the review.

11.2 Margin Calls

- (a) For the purpose of rule 485, a *Trading Participant* must respond to a *margin call*:
 - (i) if the *margin call* is issued before 10:00 am on a business day, before 2:00 pm on the same business day;
 - (ii) otherwise, before 10:00 am on the next business day,
 by either:
 - (iii) providing AEMO with a guarantee or bank letter of credit which complies with rule 479; or
 - (iv) prepaying an amount in cleared funds to AEMO.
- (b) Where a *Trading Participant* responds to a *margin call* by prepaying an amount in accordance with clause 11.2(a)(iv), AEMO must apply

the prepayment to obligations and liabilities for *billing periods* in chronological order, starting from the earliest relevant *billing period*.

CHAPTER 12 – TRANSITIONAL

12.1 MOS Periods

- (a) Notwithstanding clause 5.1(a)(i), the first *MOS period* for a *hub* commences on the first *gas day* for the *hub* and ends on the last *gas day* of the *MOS Period* in place for all other *hubs* at the commencement of the *hub*.
- (b) Deleted.

12.2 Market administered scheduling state

For the purposes of rule 430(2)(a)(i), the *ex ante market price* for each of the 30 *gas days* prior to the first *gas day* for a *hub* is taken to be \$5/GJ.

12.3 Cumulative Price Threshold

For the purposes of clause 8.1, for each of the 7 *gas days* prior to the first *gas day* for a *hub*:

- (a) the *ex ante market price* is taken to be \$5/GJ; and
- (b) the *ex post imbalance price* is taken to be \$5/GJ; and
- (c) the *high contingency gas price* and the *low contingency gas price* are taken not to have been determined by AEMO.

12.4 Deviation Quantities

The changes to clause 10.8.4 introduced by version 2 of the STTM Procedures do not affect any calculations relating to *gas days* prior to the effective date of version 2 of the STTM Procedures.