

VICTORIAN ENERGY EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS PROTOCOL


PREPARED BY: AEMO Emergency Preparedness

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This document outlines the Victorian energy emergency communications process.



Version Release History

VERSION	DATE	AUTHOR	PEER REVIEW	APPROVED	COMMENTS
1	29 Jul 11	Paul Farley	Industry	Draft distributed for comment to industry	Amalgamation of Gas and Electricity Protocols
2	Sept 12	Shonal Dessmann	Graham Manson	Matt Zema	
3	22 Jul 13	Cherry Harrop	Shonal Dessmann	Graham Manson	Amendment to Appendix B & C to include "Business-in-Confidence" header and footer. Amend DPI to DEPI
4	26 Sep13	Paige Robinson	Shonal Dessmann	Graham Manson	Amend DEPI to DSDBI and EMS Team to ESS Team. Legal review and inclusion of disclaimer
5	4 Nov 13	Megan Bracksley	Shonal Dessmann	Matt Zema	No updates – issued prior to summer
6	2 Dec 14	Megan Bracksley	Matt Howe	Matt Zema	Periodic update pre summer
7	11 May 16	Michael Pintabona	Daniel Lavis	Matt Zema	Update following consultation with VEEC – OWG members, including changes to the VEECP electricity activation triggers, confirmation of key contact details, and administrative changes/updates
8	April 2017	George Tsaikos			
9	October 17	Serge Stojanovic	Shonal Dessmann	Damien Sanford	Update following consultation with VEEC members, including the addition of the E-EMLO process, full review of electricity areas throughout whole document and administrative changes/updates.

This document has been created by the AEMO Emergency Preparedness Team and will be reviewed bi-annually.

Any queries or suggestions for improvement should be addressed to AEMO's Emergency Preparedness team by emailing Emergency@aemo.com.au.

Important Notice

This Victorian Energy Emergency Communications Protocol has been made by AEMO for the purposes of its functions under the National Electricity (Victoria) Law and the National Gas (Victoria) Law. Those Laws and other applicable Acts and statutory instruments will prevail over this Protocol to the extent of any inconsistency.

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1 Emergency Communications Protocol Overview

This Victorian Energy Emergency Communications Protocol (VEECP) has been developed by the Australian Energy Market Operator (AEMO), industry and emergency agencies to facilitate timely sharing of information between stakeholders when responding to an energy event.

The VEECP has been endorsed by the Gas Emergency Management Consultative Forum (GEMCF) and the Victorian Electricity Emergency Committee (VEEC) and does not operate in isolation but complements existing AEMO, industry, and government emergency policies and procedures.

For gas, this means any incident that may occur across Victorian participants that draw gas from the Declared Transmission System (DTS).

The purpose of this protocol is to outline how industry share relevant information with emergency services to support the response to and recovery from an emergency event.

Table 1.0 Triggers for Activation of the Protocol

Electricity	
Actual Trigger	Preparedness Trigger
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Actual off supply > 20,000 customers in a single Distribution Business' distribution zone. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Any event where customers are expected to remain off supply > 24hrs Significant transmission or distribution equipment failure or an outage which would potentially impact > 50,000 customers following the next single credible contingent event which reduces redundancy. Inadequate supply with potential for load shedding (forecast or actual LOR 3 conditions, where an event is likely to occur in the next 72 hours) External security threat or occurrence (e.g. a cyber security or activist group threat) High profile event or natural disaster (includes prolonged electricity related community emergencies). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Forecast of extreme weather event: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Two days with maximum forecast temperatures > 40 degrees in the central weather forecast district Two days with maximum forecast temperatures > 45 degrees in any other weather forecast district Forecast wind gusts over 110km/h, and 130km/h in Alpine areas. Fire danger rating of Extreme or Code Red
Gas	
Actual Trigger	Preparedness Trigger
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> High profile event or natural disaster that is likely to impact reputation and or supply External security threat or occurrence (e.g. a cyber security or activist group threat) Significant facility outage or equipment failure that is likely to affect supply Any impact due to loss of supply or safety implications to customers 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Forecast potential impact due to loss of supply or safety implications to customers Forecast supply shortfall (including a high GPG demand forecast and or an extreme high temperature forecast) Forecast extreme weather event: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Two consecutive extreme cold days with maximum forecast temperatures < 12 degrees in Melbourne One extreme cold day with maximum forecast temperature < 10 in Melbourne

1.1 Potential Emergencies, High Profile or Smaller Events

The triggers for the activation of the VEECP have been designed to encompass the majority of scenarios that may threaten the gas and/or power systems. However, there will be instances where situations or events fall outside the scope of these triggers. These instances may include indirect threats to the gas and/or power systems such as protest activity, potential industrial action or any event that may not constitute an energy emergency, but may result in a community emergency and have political and/or media ramifications such as customers off supply in the Melbourne CBD.

In these types of emergencies, agencies who are affiliated with the State Control Centre (SCC) will have access to information on outages on the network through spatial data feeds from Distribution Businesses (DBs) through to the Emergency Management Common Operating Picture (EM-COP) database.

During a disruption to the electricity supply, DELWP as the control agency for energy (as defined in the State Emergency Response Plan and referenced in Part 3 and Part 7 of the Emergency Management Manual Victoria), may request access to further information from the affected DB that would otherwise not be displayed publically or may not be available on EM-COP. Appendix B provides triggers for DELWP to begin monitoring a situation which may result in DELWP contacting the affected DB.

In some cases, a core group of stakeholders may convene to further assess potential impacts for the gas and/or electricity industry and the Victorian Community. These include:

- The affected business or businesses.
- The Department of Environment, Land, Water, and Planning (DELWP).
- Energy Safe Victoria (ESV).
- Emergency Management Victoria (EMV).
- Victoria Police.
- AEMO.
- Any other stakeholders that may be required depending on the incident.


Stakeholders may request activation of the protocol by contacting the
 AEMO Emergency Duty Manager
0439 202 469

1.2 Communications Process

The VEECP supports the timely gathering and analysis of information through the Response and Recovery Phases of an incident.

All communication that takes place following activation of the VEECP is disseminated to industry stakeholders through existing IT systems and established communication channels.

There are five identified phases to the VEECP that are outlined in detail below.



1.2.1 Notification & Monitoring

All energy stakeholders monitor their assets and systems through existing operational structures and control centres. Stakeholders routinely share information which may lead to notification of an event or impending trigger resulting in a direct or indirect threat to Victorian gas and/or power systems.

The activation triggers of the VEECP do not necessarily imply a supply shortfall – it simply means AEMO, industry, and relevant stakeholders are monitoring gas and/or electricity supply and demand more closely and there is potential for some supply challenges. The requirement for AEMO notification is generally triggered by a specific event as outlined in the list of triggers in table 1.0, however unusual occurrences on either the supply or demand side (such as protest activity, potential industrial action which threatens electricity generation or gas production, or significant community disruption from minor distribution or transmission failures) may activate this process outside of the normal trigger mechanisms.

1.2.2 AEMO Assessment

Once AEMO is notified of an actual or potential event, an assessment will be made against the pre-determined triggers (see Table 1.0). The outcome of this assessment will result in one of the below actions:

- None of the triggers have been met and the event is managed as Business as Usual (BAU). In this instance, consequence management discussions between DBs and DELWP may take place without activation of the VEECP.
- One of the triggers has been met. However the electricity or gas system continues to operate securely. In this instance, AEMO would advise relevant stakeholders. However, a stakeholder teleconference may not be convened. AEMO, along with VEECP electricity and/or gas stakeholders, will continue to monitor the situation, consequence management discussions between DBs and DELWP may take place without activation of the VEECP.
- One or more of the triggers have been met and the VEECP is activated. Stakeholders will be convened via teleconference to provide an update of the situation and to discuss any consequence management issues.

As an event develops, VEECP electricity and/or gas stakeholders will continue to monitor, evaluate and assess the risk to gas and/or electricity systems until resolved. Agencies may access outage information from the DBs public websites or from spatial data feeds (EM-COP) to inform their response decisions. DELWP may contact DBs directly to gain further clarification of the information provided.

1.2.3 Response

When an actual event has occurred that impacts the supply of either gas or electricity and meets the triggers outlined in Table 1.0, VEECP members will undertake a range of activities to mitigate the impacts of the event. The event is then in the Response Phase.

Industry participants will activate their own emergency procedures; however, the VEECP will provide the platform for industry wide collaboration and information sharing. Where there is a need for an Electricity Emergency Management Liaison Officer (E-EMLO) to attend the SCC, such requests are to be channelled through DELWP as the controlling agency as defined in **section 2** of this document.

The following steps are to be undertaken by the AEMO Emergency Duty Manager in relation to emergency communications:

- Scheduling and conduct of teleconferences when the VEECP is activated.
- Issue of Victorian Power or Gas Update.

- Review and assessment of the situation.

If required, AEMO's Public Affairs team will assist in preparing media statements, in accordance with the Single Industry Spokesperson Protocol. During an electricity system security incident the Victorian Responsible Officer (VIC RO)/Jurisdictional System Security Coordinator (JSSC) will be the primary point of contact to communicate with DELWP (Jurisdictional Designated Officer and or DELWP Energy Duty Officer) and ESV.

During a gas system security incident the AEMO Gas Duty Manager will be the primary point of contact to communicate with DELWP (DELWP Energy Duty Officer) and ESV.

The advice provided by either the Victorian Responsible Officer or the Gas Duty Manager may involve recommendations concerning the use of the State Government's emergency powers or the conduct of load shedding and/or curtailment.

Where a dual energy event occurs in Victoria, a joint teleconference between the gas and the electricity sector may be called by AEMO. This ensures that the situation is understood and allows both sectors an opportunity to discuss the impacts and ask questions.

1.2.3.1 Multi-jurisdictional Activations

When an energy event impacts or may impact multiple jurisdictions, AEMO's operational response will be managed in collaboration with the National Gas Emergency Response Advisory Committee (NGERAC), Interruption to Supply Process and/or the National Electricity Market Emergency Management Forum (NEMEMF), Power System Emergency Management Plan (PSEMP).

The VEECP will remain operating in support of the Victorian response. AEMO and DELWP will provide the conduit between the Victorian jurisdiction and the national response processes.

1.2.4 Recovery

Once VEEC members agree that an event is moving into the recovery phase, members will initiate the Recovery Process. The Recovery Process can commence during any phase of the event and lasts until the event or potential event has been resolved. Commencement of the Recovery Process will be recommended during a VEEC teleconference and agreed to by all participants. This closes the need for the VEECP to be activated and allows for participants to return to BAU. The aim of the Recovery Phase is to:

- Agree to ongoing communication processes to be employed prior to business as usual being declared.
- Scale back the level of response to normal operating levels.
- Ensure that ongoing operations conducted during the recovery phase where the VEECP is not activated are still reported on by affected DBs to the appropriate agencies. This includes public messaging and communication to affected customers.
- Through the Victorian Power or Gas Update, publish the number of customers who continue to be affected by the event.
- Prepare for any subsequent inquiries or investigations.

It is fundamental during the Recovery Process that communication continues with all relevant stakeholders. Where appropriate, all stakeholders should aim to gather information assessing their performance throughout the event. This information should inform and assist in improving how the industry collaborates and communicates during future emergencies.

1.2.5 Post Incident Review

Once the activation has been officially closed by AEMO and all participants have returned to BAU, a review of the event is to be considered. This review will be conducted by AEMO and required

stakeholders will be invited to attend the relevant meetings. Any recommendations will be reported to the relevant committees (GEMCF or the VEEC) for consideration.

The review should assess whether or not activation of the VEECP was justified, and whether or not triggers should be reviewed (this may also apply where there should have been an activation of the VEECP, but there was none). The review should consider:

- The nature of the emergency.
- The adequacy of the VEECP.
- Stakeholder feedback.
- Improvement initiatives.

2 Electricity Emergency Management Liaison Officer (E-EMLO)

The E-EMLO is the conduit for the provision of information and situational awareness between the electricity industry and government agencies. The E-EMLO may be requested to support both state and regional control centres.

2.1 State

When the VEECP is activated an E-EMLO may be requested by DELWP in an electricity emergency to provide support at the SCC in one of the following capacities:

Tier 1 (Blue)	No requirements for E-EMLO at the SCC. DELWP represents the energy industry at the SCC through direct contact with relevant DBs as required.
Tier 2 (Orange)	In readiness for an anticipated electricity disruption as a result of an emergency event DELWP represents the energy industry at the SCC. The DB E-EMLO is available on the phone during this time to participate in relevant meetings. Once an electricity disruption occurs, whether as a result of another emergency or as a result of an impact directly on the network, then a DB E-EMLO may be requested to provide support to the SCC in person within 1 hour of the occurrence.
Tier 3 (Red)	E-EMLO positioned within the SCC, and attends meetings as scheduled. Operational hours will be based around the risk on the electricity network, but will generally operate between 1000 - 2000hrs.

When requested the DBs will resource the E-EMLO role as follows:

Single DB affected	Affected DB provides the E-EMLO.	It is the responsibility of DELWP as the State Agency Commander (SAC) to; <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Activate the E-EMLO in conjunction with the DBs at the request of the SCC *.
Multiple DBs affected	Resourcing of the E-EMLO will revert to the roster.	
Prolonged emergency	DBs will pool their available resources to maintain the E-EMLO role.	

*E-EMLO will be sourced from the affected DB as far as practicable.

Providing an E-EMLO from the affected DB should also be a consideration during recovery from an emergency.

Note: On declaration of a Code Red Day, an E-EMLO will be requested to be present in the SCC on the actual Code Red Day. When state and regional and/or local teams are activated simultaneously, the E-EMLO will be positioned in the control centre best suited for the situation, this may be at the state level providing support remotely to the other centres.

2.2 Regional

During regional events, when Regional Control Centres (RCC) have been activated, DELWP regions will provide the electricity point of contact and will coordinate the provision of an E-EMLO with the affected DBs. E-EMLOs are to be provided by phone and if possible and necessary, in person.

2.3 Local

During local events, requests for information from DBs should be made through Incident Control Centres (ICC).

ESTA ('000') will liaise directly with the appropriate DB control room about wires down as required.

2.4 Handover

Handover processes help manage shift changes during an emergency and allows incoming personnel to be briefed on the current situation. Handovers are required to be conducted by all E-EMLOs and should include;

- The current Situational report.
- Completed and outstanding actions.

The incoming E-EMLO should also be given access to all logbooks used by the previous E-EMLO.

To maintain situational awareness, the below email addresses are to be included in all communications including shift changeover updates:

- Jemena – sccemlo@jemena.com.au
- Powercor – sccemlo@powercor.com.au
- AusNet Services – emergency@ausnetservices.com.au
- AEMO – emergency@aemo.com.au

2.5 Training and familiarisation

EMV (SCC) have on-line training resources and materials to support DBs in training and familiarisation of the SCC and the roles and responsibilities of the E-EMLO.

3 Public Information / Media Liaison

In an event, AEMO may be asked to play a role in providing public information and/or media liaison. AEMO's Public Affairs team is responsible for this activity.

AEMO's Public Affairs team may refer to the Single Industry Spokesperson (SIS) process to manage media communications.

In consultation with industry and government, AEMO's Public Affairs team may assist with the preparation of media material for release in emergencies that require curtailment or load shedding. The preparation of this material however, remains the overall responsibility of DELWP and may be provided to the Emergency Management Joint Public Information Committee (EMJPIC) where appropriate.

AEMO's Media Duty Manager participates in the VEECP teleconferences to ensure there are appropriate linkages during an emergency between industry, corporate and media communications and government.

Depending on the scale and nature of the emergency DELWP may consider the use of the VicEmergency platform to communicate warnings and information to the community. VicEmergency uses a range of systems, such as website, app, social media, and hotline.

4 Review and Preparedness

In order to maintain currency of the VEECP, AEMO in conjunction with industry and government agencies will perform a bi-annual review of the document pre winter (April) and pre summer (October) as well as incorporating any improvement opportunities that may arise out of the activation of the VEECP.

AEMO will also test the Whispir SMS and teleconference facilities that are used during the activation of the VEECP bi-annually to verify contact details remain current/correct.

The VEECP is exercised bi-annually through the GEMCF and the VEEC.

5 Access to, or changing details on contact groups

It is the responsibility of each organisation to ensure that the relevant contact details of VEECP signatories are current. This can be done by advising the AEMO Emergency Management Services Team at emergency@aemo.com.au

5.1 Electricity contact groups

Electricity stakeholders/participants are requested to provide and update their respective emergency contact details. As highlighted in the NER section 4.11.3 Network Service Providers, System Operators, Distribution System Operators, Generators and Market Participants must advise AEMO of each nominated person for the purposes of giving or receiving operational communications in relation to each of its facilities.

The persons nominated must be those responsible for undertaking the operation of the relevant equipment of the relevant Registered Participant (as defined in the NER).

Details provided are to be updated to ensure that all respective VEECP participants are invited and informed of any activation.

5.2 Gas contact groups

For gas stakeholders all contact lists will be kept in line with the Market Information Bulletin Board (MIBB). Participants here are required to adhere to the National Gas Rules (NGR) requirements as listed in Part 19, Sub Division 2, and Sections 333 to 336.

This is also described in the Emergency Procedures Gas Protocol. Representatives listed as a contact must be a person who has the authority and responsibility within the registered participant's organisation to act as the primary contact (as defined in the document) for AEMO in the event of an emergency.

Gas participants who are not affected by the NGR requirements are requested to maintain and update their respective contacts when changes occur or when requested by AEMO.

Appendix A

Victorian Energy Industry Emergency Response Notification Groups

AEMO maintains a series of contact lists for activation at specific levels throughout the VEECP. The contact lists are scaled to support information flow as a specific threat or incident escalates.

POWER VIC - Teleconference

The Power Teleconference Group is a group of government, emergency services, and industry (AEMO, distribution, transmission and generation) organisations that is convened to discuss electricity incidents in Victoria. This group may be contacted collectively or individually depending on the nature of the incident and is brought together through the AEMO Emergency Duty Manager.

POWER VIC - Update

The Power Update Group is the primary group of stakeholders that may participate in a response to an electricity distribution incident in Victoria. Primarily this group is for industry (AEMO and distribution businesses), government and emergency services representatives who need to access information about the emergency and act on that information in an operational, public information, or briefing capacity.

GAS VIC – Teleconference Group

The Gas Teleconference Group is a group of government, emergency services, and industry (AEMO, distribution, retailers and transmission) organisations that is convened to discuss gas incidents in Victoria. This group may be contacted collectively or individually depending on the nature of an incident and is brought together through the AEMO Emergency Duty Manager.

GAS VIC - Update

The Gas Update group is the primary group of industry stakeholders that may participate in a response to a gas incident in Victoria. Primarily this group is for industry, government and emergency services representatives who need to access information about the emergency and act on that information in an operational, public information or briefing capacity.

Weather Warnings

The Weather Warnings group automatically receives emergency weather forecasts and fire briefings for stakeholder emergency management liaison officers via email.

Weekly Supply and Demand Balance (Electricity)

The Weekly Supply and Demand Balances group receives routine and re-issues of the Weekly Supply and Demand Balances.

Appendix B

DELWP Regional/ Urban Triggers

Incident Level	Triggers	De-escalation
Level 1	<p>Unplanned disruption to supply. <5,000 households impacted or likely to be impacted for <6hours in an urban area. <500 customers are off supply in a single event on the network with supply interruption anticipated for <6hours in a rural area.</p>	<p>The energy business will decide when to de-escalate a Level 2 or Level 1 incident</p>
	<p>No significant infrastructure or facilities including hospitals, major industry and/or other utilities immediately threatened. Minimal commercial impact. No downstream consequences anticipated.</p>	
	<p>Incident is not attracting or unlikely to attract media attention.</p>	
	<p>Impacts localised and of short duration and can be resolved through use of local / initial response resources.</p>	
	<p>Control limited to the immediate area. Low likelihood of any escalation.</p>	
Level 2	<p>>5,000 customers are off in a single event on the network with supply interruption anticipated for >6 hours in an urban area. >500 customers are off supply in a single event on the network with supply interruption anticipated for >6 hours in a rural area.</p>	<p>The energy business will decide when to de-escalate a Level 2 or Level 1 incident.</p>
	<p>AEMO LOR2 conditions: Victoria has enough supply to meet the forecast operational demand but reserves are forecast to fall below the LOR2 trigger. AEMO is seeking additional reserves. There is a risk that supply will not meet forecast operational demand if either a large generating unit, multiple smaller units or Basslink is lost.</p>	
	<p>Potential threat to significant infrastructure or facilities including hospitals, major industry and or other utilities. Commercial/industrial impact. Sensitive communities. Downstream consequences.</p>	
	<p>Any incident attracting or likely to attract significant media attention.</p>	
	<p>Resources are required beyond the initial response. May involve more than one distribution business. May require operations to be divided geographically or functionally Incident management functions need to be established due to complexity. Any <i>Level 1</i> incident likely to escalate to a <i>Level 2</i> incident.</p>	

Class 2 Emergency Level 3	<p>Actual significant transmission or distribution equipment failure or outage impacting >50,000 customers; Actual off supply > 20,000 customers in a single Distribution Business' distribution zone Any event where customers are expected to remain off supply < 24 hrs</p>	<p>The Class 2 State Controller will decide when to de-escalate a Class 2 Emergency to a Level 2 incident as the incident level triggers are no longer met resulting from: resumption of service; a reduction in the population impacted; reduced potential consequences of the incident; and/or any necessary recovery arrangements are in place.</p>
	<p>AEMO LOR3 conditions – Risk of inadequate supply with potential for load shedding.</p>	
	<p>Any incident attracting or likely to attract significant media attention with the risk of broader reputational damage to the state. Significant commercial/industrial impact. Political consequences.</p>	
	<p>Immediate threat to significant infrastructure or facilities including hospitals, major industry and or other utilities. Significant downstream consequences.</p>	
	<p>A large and complex incident; and/or Has the potential to have or is having significant adverse consequences for the Victorian community or a part of the Victorian community; or Degree of complexity requires more substantial organisational structure. Will be assessed for consequence and whether it is most appropriately managed as a Class 2 Emergency.</p>	
	<p>Any Level 1 or level 2 incident considered likely to escalate to a Class 2 Emergency.</p>	
	<p>A decision is made by the State Agency Commander or at the request of the Emergency Management Commissioner, that any incident should be managed as a Class 2 Emergency.</p>	

**VICTORIAN POWER UPDATE
SITUATION REPORT (*NOT FOR CIRCULATION*)**

DATE:

TIME:

TOTAL CUSTOMERS OFF SUPPLY AT TIME OF BULLETIN:

Distribution

AusNet Services

Current Customers off supply	
Where	
Wires down	
Customers off supply > 20 hours	
Duration	
Peak (<i>max # off at any one time</i>)	
Expected return to service	
Call Centre Reports	
Additional Information	

Citipower

Current Customers off supply	
Where	
Wires down	
Customers off supply > 20 hours	
Duration	
Peak (<i>max # off at any one time</i>)	
Expected return to service	
Call Centre Reports	
Additional Information	

Powercor

Current Customers off supply	
Where	
Wires down	
Customers off supply > 20 hours	
Duration	
Peak (<i>max # off at any one time</i>)	
Expected return to service	
Call Centre Reports	
Additional Information	

United Energy – UE

Current Customers off supply	
Where	
Wires down	
Customers off supply > 20 hours	
Duration	
Peak (<i>max # off at any one time</i>)	
Expected return to service	
Call Centre Reports	
Additional Information	

Jemena – JEN

Current Customers off supply	
Where	
Wires down	
Customers off supply > 20 hours	
Duration	
Peak (<i>max # off at any one time</i>)	

Expected return to service	
Call Centre Reports	
Additional Information	

Other Reports

Transmission

Generation

Energy Safe Victoria

Department of Environment, Land, Water, and Planning

Victoria Police

AEMO

Weather Information

Public Safety Messages

EMV (including fire threat)

Mutual Aid

NEXT TELECONFERENCE:

Contact Details

	Customer Contacts		Media Contacts
AusNet Services	131 799	AusNet Services	03 9483 0989
CitiPower	13 12 80	CitiPower/Powercor	03 9683 4342
Powercor	13 24 12	CitiPower/Powercor	As above
Department of Environment, Land, Water, and Planning	Energy Duty Officer	DELWP	TBC
Jemena	131 626	Jemena	1300 331 239
United Energy	132 099	United Energy	03 8846 9998
AEMO	1300 858 724	AEMO	0409 382 121
Energy Safe Victoria	1800 800 158	Energy Safe Victoria	0400 948 934

Glossary

- Customer off supply = any premise which has lost supply for more than one minute.
- Where = a suburb description of where the majority of customers are affected.
- Wires down = an estimate of number of wires down and issues.

- Current = the customers off supply at the time of the bulletin.
- Duration = the total number of customers affected from event start.
- Peak = the maximum number of customers off supply at any one time.
- Call centre reports: Caller wait time – **reducing**; Caller wait time – **stable**; Caller wait time – **increasing**; **Average wait time; number of calls received.**
- Customers off supply for > 24 hours = Department of Health and Human Services protocol is considered.

THESE FIGURES ARE ONLY INDICATIVE AND ARE TO BE AUDITED AT A LATER TIME. NOT FOR CIRCULATION. TOTAL NUMBERS CAN BE QUOTED AS INDICATIVE.

**VICTORIAN GAS UPDATE
SITUATION REPORT (NOT FOR CIRCULATION)**

DATE:	
TIME:	
TOTAL CUSTOMERS OFF SUPPLY AT TIME OF BULLETIN:	

Transmission Reports

APA	
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AEMO	
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Jemena	
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Distribution

Multinet

Situational Update	
Current Customers off supply	
Where (areas of main concern)	
Expected return to service (return to BAU)	
Potential Impacts	
Additional Information	

AusNet Services

Situational Update	
Current Customers off supply	
Where (areas of main concern))	
Expected return to service (return to BAU)	
Potential Impacts	
Additional Information	

Australian Gas Networks

Situational Update	
Current Customers off supply	
Where (areas of main concern))	
Expected return to service (return to BAU)	
Potential Impacts	
Additional Information	

Retailers / Facility Operators

AGL	ERM Power Limited
Energy Australia	TPG
Origin	<i>CLICK GROUP</i>
Lumo / Red Energy Australia Pty Ltd	<i>Alinta</i>
M2 DODO (M2 Group)	ENGIE – was (International Power Mitsui (Loy Yang B))
Origin Energy Limited	Visy
Simply Energy	Santos Direct
Powershop	CovaU
Momentum / Hydro Tasmania	APT Pipelines
<i>Gas Victorian Pipeline</i>	Coastal Pipeline
<i>Iona / Lochard</i>	<i>South East Australia Gas Pty Ltd</i>
Jemena	

Other Reports

Energy Safe Victoria

Department of Environment, Land, Water, and Planning

Victoria Police

AEMO

Weather Information (relevant to the situation and location)

EMV

Public Safety Messages

<u>Next Teleconference:</u>	
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Glossary Adjust glossary to provide detail on acronyms within document

- Current customers off supply = any premise which has lost supply of gas.
- Where = a suburb description of where the majority of customers are affected.

THESE FIGURES ARE ONLY INDICATIVE AND ARE TO BE AUDITED AT A LATER TIME. NOT FOR CIRCULATION. TOTAL NUMBERS CAN BE QUOTED AS INDICATIVE.

Acronym	Meaning
AEMO	Australian Energy Market Operator
VEECP	Victorian Energy Communications Protocol
GEMCF	Gas Emergency Management Consultative Forum
NGERAC	National Gas Emergency Response Advisory Committee
PSEMP	Power System Emergency Management Plan
NEMEMF	National Electricity Market Emergency Management Forum
SIS	Single Industry Spokesperson Protocol
LOR	Lack of Reserve
DELWP	Department of Environment, Land, Water and Planning
EMV	Emergency Management Victoria
ESV	Energy Safe Victoria
BAU	Business as Usual
DM	Duty Manager